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Levison's surprise that the DOJ could compel him to hand over TLS keys This is the part that baffles me. The lavabit about page clearly identified the FBI and
by tedunangst 13y ago
Levison's surprise that the DOJ could compel him to hand over TLS keys
This is the part that baffles me. The lavabit about page clearly identified the FBI and NSL as a threat. Lavabit was supposedly designed to be secure against the FBI, even if the FBI didn't play by the rules. But then he still expected them to play by the rules?
- tptacek 13y agoRight! He even leads today's apologia with these words: Lavabit was designed to protect the privacy of e-mail by allowing users to encrypt messages stored on the Lavabit servers. Once encrypted, an e-mail could only be decrypted with a user’s password. The system was made to protect messages on Lavabit’s servers from prying eyes. Quite simply, the goal was to remove Lavabit from the surveillance equation. Quite simply, Levison failed to remove Lavabit from the equation, because Levison was only willing to provide privacy to a point where it didn't compromise convenience.
- m8urn 13y agoThat is a key point--that no system can ever be secure as long as the host has some way of intercepting messages. The fact is that no matter how secure Levison makes the system, there will always be some way he could intercept messages if he really wanted to, even if it meant modifying the code a bit. And if he can do it, the feds can compel him to do it.
- Rami114 13y ago> no system can ever be secure as long as the host has some way of intercepting messages. Erm, that's only the case for systems that use cleartext in transit. If you encrypt and decrypt (and we assume you're doing it right) at the endpoints then the intermediate can't do anything with the content. Your 'no matter how' bit is correct, and it was flawed to rely on SSL for transit only and hope the law would protect the keys. Hence tqbf's point that using cleartext in-out is just plain bad to begin with.
- MagicWishMonkey 13y agoYou cannot refuse to hand over data when given a warrant, but if the data is encrypted (and you do not possess the key to decrypt it) the information is essentially worthless and they won't throw you in jail for refusing to comply. Fun fact: Lavabit turned over an archive of encrypted emails from Snowdens account when he was first contacted by the feds. Those emails are still perfectly secure, because Snowden is the only person who knows the password required to decrypt the mail files. The reason the feds demanded the SSL keys (a few weeks after he first turned over the emails) is because they could not decrypt the mail files and wanted to try and capture Snowdens password the next time he accessed his account.
- tedunangst 13y agoWell, they could be secure, unless the FBI also has a previously recorded session which they can now decrypt with the SSL key to recover the password.
- tptacek 13y agoSince 'tedunangst is being coy, let's be clear that what he's saying is that they aren't at all secure.