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I wondered about that traffic, and getting confirmation from the source that the only way the NSA could have it would be by tapping into the internal network is
by ChuckMcM 13y ago
I wondered about that traffic, and getting confirmation from the source that the only way the NSA could have it would be by tapping into the internal network is as quite damning.
Google has the best OpSec team I've ever known, it is my hope that they close this 'loophole' as completely as possible.
- bitskits 13y agoClosing that loophole was underway in Sept according to this article (also linked in the post)... http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-encrypts-data-amid-backlash-against-nsa-spying/2013/09/06/9acc3c20-1722-11e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8ef_story.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-enc...
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- frank_boyd 13y agoWe still don't know if that was really a loophole or rather access given by Google (of course, they will decline that).
- cbhl 13y agoMy personal opinion is that it's more likely that the access was given by a telecom that Google leased from than from Google itself.
- rsync 13y agoGoogle, and their "geniuses" in opsec, should not be given a pass at all for this. Even if this is a leased private line, non-Internet routed, whatever, it is trivially easy to encrypt the communications and is absolutely a best practice. I see this as great big egg on their face. In fact, it's such a cock-up that one wonders if this is the plausibly deniable ingress that they agreed to provide for the NSA, et. al This is akin to using telnet to access your home server because you're "on your own network". Nobody does that and I can't believe they would have either.
- ChuckMcM 13y agoYou are of course entitled to your opinion, I know Brandon and I know how dedicated he is, I got to watch him and the OpSec team in action during the Chinese incursion. One of the side effects of being in the platforms group was that I had exceptional access to what was going on everywhere on Google's internal network and machines. And a lot changed after that event, both internally and externally. I can forgive someone for thinking that if they dug trenches in the street, bought some fiber, and ran it between a couple of buildings, in a country where the rule of law was in effect, they might consider it a reasonable assumption that the fiber is laying in the street unmolested. Even if the distance is such that they can't see the entire length of the ground above the conduit. Prior to Snowden's disclosures, it was the common belief amongst the security community that in 'safe' countries, the government in power would not subvert your infrastructure through physical access. They might do some network tricks, but not tap your fiber. In 'bad' countries counter measures were taken. And the network setup in say Russia or China was different than it was in the US and the UK. That your own government would illegally subvert your infrastructure [1] through the use of a technicality was not considered a "likely" threat [2]. Given that not it has been exploited it is rewriting a bunch of assumptions. I am not surprised in the least that they are now deploying the same hardening they use in hostile environments world wide. [1] The NSA cannot legally tap into communications infrastructure in the US (that is the FBI's job) and when the FBI does it they need a warrant. By doing this in the UK they sidestepped those constraints. [2] In classic vulnerability analysis you deploy your resources against both the probability and damage potential of a given threat. So for example datacenters are vulnerable to being bombed by aircraft, the probability of that is low enough that you don't defend against it, bombed by cars you put a security perimeter around the building.
- crucifiction 13y agoNo, but they should take some precaution if someone unseemly (rogue employee, hacker, etc) has network access. You don't need a NSA level fiber taps under the ocean to do packet sniffing. Passing all of their service calls, database replications/connections, etc. in clear text over the wire is just plain lazy, bad security for an operation of their scale and (supposed) sophistication. I am sure it saved them some money on server/load balancers however.
- 1g00gler 13y agoIf you're referring to the Orange team yes, they're pretty good. Brandon Downey has proved time and time again that his incompetence gets in the way of protecting Google's network. Perhaps if he spent less time posting garbage on eng-misc and more doing his job we could have implemented security measures to prevent this way sooner. Point your browser at go/privacyboost and search on Moma for Autobahn and the related CLs.