3 ms·
so, you want to send someone a message. you don't care if someone sees you sending it. but you don't want anyone to know whom you sent it to, or what the messag
by peterwwillis 13y ago
so, you want to send someone a message. you don't care if someone sees you sending it. but you don't want anyone to know whom you sent it to, or what the message contains.
requirement 1. message integrity and security
1a. use public-key cryptography
- step 1. Person A writes a letter to Person B.
- step 2. Person A encrypts a message using Person B's public key.
- step 3. Person A sends encrypted message to Person B.
- step 4. Person B receives and decrypts the message using Person B's private key.
requirement 2. clandestine recipients
1a. coded messages
- con: coded messages are usually broken after enough messages pass
1b. steganography
- not difficult to detect if messages sent often
1c. dead drops
- pro/con: MITM has to monitor the drop box to determine recipient
1d. peer-to-peer message passing
- can still determine recipient using statistical analysys
i think if you took the tor model for private services and removed the open circuits, and added a more evenly-distributed constant stream of garbage messages sent to random peer addresses, it would be much less likely that any one message could be linked to any two nodes with certainty. this would hinge on the premise that all nodes are constantly receiving messages (mostly garbage) at random. this would probably be a horrible thing for network bandwidth, but luckily most e-mails are very small.
- jaekwon 13y agoYes, we're on the same page! We have an idea for how fake messages would be passed around fake friends, and how to grow this "dark" network organically. Let's collaborate!
- peterwwillis 13y agoI think you're going to be disappointed. The only way this could work is based on network participants, and that's highly subjective. But here's an idea that might be plausible. You have four nodes in your network: B, C, D, E. B wants to send E a message, but doesn't want anyone who might be observing the whole network to know. B sends garbage messages all day at random to all active peers on the network, or as close as possible. We'll assume an even distribution of these random messages. When it comes time to send the correct message, it gets delivered just like all the others. This really only works if each message is received by a real peer. What you get is a constant stream of communication at random, in which case you know 99.9999% of it is junk, and maybe 0.0001% is real. At this point the observer will start drilling down into everything possible to increase the probability of detecting the authentic message. You'll have to prove none of their methods would be able to improve that quality, but an actual cryptographer would be a better person to ask about that.
- jaekwon 13y agoWhat do you mean by "The only way this could work is based on network participants, and that's highly subjective." ?
- peterwwillis 13y agoIf you design based on trusting other nodes (committee and/or trusted peer groups), you have to inherently trust those nodes, and they have to be highly reliable/available, which is kind of ridiculous if you're trying to account for things like oppressive nation states. If you design based on anonymous communication, it's still subject to analysis of network traffic. Even if the messages you're sending are secret, and you have some peers in the middle storing and handing things off, you can still tell who is sending something and who is receiving something and tell with a high probability if the two events are linked. If you design based on the premise of hiding amongst a bunch of nodes, or wandering randomly through a maze of lots of nodes, you're dependent on lots of nodes and their expected behavior. The number of nodes may diminish, or their routes may be controlled, or their behavior changed, depending on the influence of the observers/controllers of the networks. I'm of course only speaking about the delivery mechanism. The encryption of the message on either end is the easy part. It's getting it over there secretly that's really hard.
- jaekwon 13y agoI see. We can't provide secrecy, but I think we can provide some level of deniability, and also make it a pain for those who are surveilling. I'm not aware of any application that provides secrecy besides BitMessage. Are there others?