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Yes. What you really want is a cryptosystem that provides a "clean" image when given one passphrase, and the "real" image when given another passphrase. Then
by jrockway 13y ago
Yes.
What you really want is a cryptosystem that provides a "clean" image when given one passphrase, and the "real" image when given another passphrase. Then when you're compelled to give up the passphrase, you do. Since it's mathematically impossible to tell the encrypted data from random data you wrote to the disk before using it for real, it would be very difficult to prove (through analysis of the disk image alone) that you knew 1 or more additional passphrases that would reveal other encrypted data.
Of course, this all depends on very careful implementation: the "clean" image must not overwrite "real" data, but also must not leak the existence of a possible area of more data. You'd also better have realistic timestamps in the "clean" area, etc.
- cortesoft 13y agoYes, like http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume