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If you can be compelled to provide a physical key, I don't see why a digital key should be different. It's not "being a witness". That said, I'm nonetheless h
by dllthomas 13y ago
If you can be compelled to provide a physical key, I don't see why a digital key should be different. It's not "being a witness".
That said, I'm nonetheless happy the EFF is pushing at this - it's that kind of pressure that makes sure reasonable calls are made in the corner cases.
- revelation 13y agoBecause you can't stick a digital key into random data and expect the result to make any sense? They believe the random looking data is actually encrypted data, data they believe is relevant, and they believe it can be decrypted by what they believe is a keyphrase they believe you still remember or had in the first place. That is quite a big wager to throw someone in jail over, for a potentially unlimited time. (Now of course TrueCrypt containers and the like still have somewhat of a recognizable header format - but theres no guarantee they contain anything)
- MichaelGG 13y agoThat's why a court becomes involved and a judge makes a decision based on reasonable belief. For instance, if you have a laptop that has a password on boot, and there's evidence that you've been using the laptop, you'd need a pretty great excuse to suddenly not know the boot password.
- dllthomas 13y agoFor the record, I absolutely don't think that indefinite detention is an appropriate response.
- dllthomas 13y agoAlso, I don't think "block of random looking bits" should be considered prima-facie evidence that it is encrypted data (by any particular key or even at all). But if there is strong evidence that key A was used to encrypt some bits, and if there is strong evidence that person B has access to key A, then compelling production of that key is not absurd if done correctly.
- cortesoft 13y agoYou can use the hidden volume feature of TrueCrypt to make the presence of headers not be incriminating: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume
- bo1024 13y agoFor one thing, there's the argument in the article: giving the key is an admission that you know the key in the first place, which is self-incrimination.
- mpyne 13y agoJust like possessing a key means you were associated with the safe and its contents, though. Again, there's still a real-world analogy so I suspect the courts will treat it as they do in the real world and try to determine on a case-by-case basis whether simply being able to decrypt the data could be considered incriminating or not. For instance, it's not self-incriminating if the government can show that they already know you're associated with the key/lock. Likewise with an encryption key...
- Jtsummers 13y agoQuestion: Can you be compelled to decrypt a notebook written in some sort of cipher?
- TheCondor 13y agoIf they truly take this serious and as far as they can go, it will come down to revealing the key which is different than producing a decrypted copy or making available access to the encrypted data.