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For a privacy protecting VPN where you can't trust governments: There is really no policy-only way to trust a provider of a security-specific service where turn
by rdl 13y ago
For a privacy protecting VPN where you can't trust governments: There is really no policy-only way to trust a provider of a security-specific service where turning on logging is just flipping a single bit. There has to be some kind of technical measure to protect users, and no one has built that (yet).
It also will take a pretty clear Chinese wall between builders and operators of a service, or even an arms length multi entity relationship (eg a meta VPN provider sells sells fairly turnkey VPN nodes to operators, who then run them; maybe a third entity which does billing for end users and rev shares everything out). Much more like Tor than the commercial VPN services of today.
The corporate VPN world is different, and the simple "torrent shit on comcast" or "watch Netflix on vacation" market is way easier.
IFF lavabit is resolved successfully, you may be able to trust a US provider for general privacy stuff, but that is months or years off.
- bradleyjg 13y ago> IFF lavabit is resolved successfully, you may be able to trust a US provider for general privacy stuff, but that is months or years off. I've read through lavabit's filing and I'm not sure the factual predicates are as strong as they possibly could be. So they could lose on narrow grounds and still leave the door open for other companies to argue that it is possible to create a reasonable expectation of privacy for its customers in their metadata. However if lavabit loses and the decision is written broadly, you are right that it is probably game over for any system that requires you to trust the subject to US jurisdiction operator in any way.