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Don't assume just because X service says they're not logging data that someone else isn't. In this case PIA might not be logging user activity, but as the NSA h
by DigitalSea 13y ago
Don't assume just because X service says they're not logging data that someone else isn't. In this case PIA might not be logging user activity, but as the NSA have proven in the past, it's all too easy for them to get a secret court order and install hardware into a data centre server rack that monitors network activities for a particular service. They've done it before and if they wanted too, they could do it again.
The scary part is if it's a secret court order, the service provider is gagged and threatened with legal action if they publicly disclose the fact they're complying with a Government request. Being an American based company all the more makes it too easy for the NSA to get the information if they need it. This article does not make me feel any less insecure about my privacy.
- Wingman4l7 13y agoCory Doctorow wrote a piece for The Guardian[1] theorizing a sort of "dead-man's switch" for this that might allow you to circumvent a gag order. Basically, you regularly post a signed message saying "we have not yet been compromised" -- and then when you are, you just STOP posting that. As Doctorow mentions in his article, the basic idea is not new -- it originated in 2004 with Jessamyn West, a librarian trying to fight back against the FBI trying to look at patron's reading habits, and the accompanying gag order. In that case, it was: > a sign on the wall of her library reading "THE FBI HAS NOT BEEN HERE (watch very closely for the removal of this sign)." [1]: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/09/nsa-sabotage-dead-mans-switch http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/09/nsa-sabota...
- GunlogAlm 13y agohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary
- Wingman4l7 13y agoThanks! I thought there was a name for this, I should have done a bit of Googling!
- hdevalence 13y agoI think that one of the claims in the parent was that the feds can just hand the NSL to the data centre provider or whatever and monitor all the traffic that way -- they don't necessarily need compliance from the person running the service.
- Wingman4l7 13y agoTrue -- but then there's nothing stopping the datacenters from having a "warrant canary" either.
- duaneb 13y agoI like this idea, but I would imagine they would force you to maintain the canary (which is clear communication, even if the information was communicated by absence). Legally this hasn't been tested.
- Wingman4l7 13y agoThey'd have to know about the canary before they could force you to maintain it. :) You're right though -- it's likely that it wouldn't hold up in court -- they'd just call it "a clear example of communication by omission" or something. If they want to get you, they'll find a way.