4 ms·

People keep saying this, but it's just not true. Use a tumbler. Done.

betterunix 13y ago
No, not done: (1) You need to hope and pray that your mixing service does not just run off with your money (2) You need to be careful not to withdraw your money from the mixing service "too quickly" or else you will de-anonymize yourself Here is a paper that casts serious doubt on at least one mixing service, based on a simple (by the authors' own admission) approach to de-anonymizing Bitcoin: https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/mbc13-moeser-paper.pdf https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/de... All this ignores the fact that the security model of Bitcoin mixing services is even less well-developed than the security model of Bitcoin itself (incredibly, such things are possible).
- sillysaurus2 13y ago
  Thank you for the paper. But did you read it? Bitcoin Fog works, and the paper goes into detail about why it works. In the Silk Road investigation, the investigators basically threw up their hands and said "don't bother trying to analyze the transaction graph." So there's some evidence that tumblers are effective in practice.
  - betterunix 13y ago
    I do not think the takeaway is that Bitcoin Fog works; rather, it is that Bitcoin Fog protects you from the specific strategy used by the authors of the paper. Another approach might work against Bitcoin Fog. "In the Silk Road investigation, the investigators basically threw up their hands and said "don't bother trying to analyze the transaction graph." So apparently tumblers are effective in practice." Do you have a citation about mixing services specifically thwarting investigators? Maybe the investigators felt that Bitcoin itself was too much to deal with. It would not be the first time a law enforcement agency has pointed to a system with little-to-no security and claimed that they cannot attack it.
    - sillysaurus2 13y ago
      Do you have an email I could reach you at?
      - betterunix 13y ago
        Sure, but is there a less public way for me to give it to you?
        sillysaurus2 13y ago
        You can email me... I'll just delete this comment after you do. My email is sillysaurus2 at gmail.

No, not done: (1) You need to hope and pray that your mixing service does not just run off with your money (2) You need to be careful not to withdraw your money from the mixing service "too quickly" or else you will de-anonymize yourself Here is a paper that casts serious doubt on at least one mixing service, based on a simple (by the authors' own admission) approach to de-anonymizing Bitcoin: https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/mbc13-moeser-paper.pdf https://www.wi.uni-muenster.de/sites/default/files/public/de... All this ignores the fact that the security model of Bitcoin mixing services is even less well-developed than the security model of Bitcoin itself (incredibly, such things are possible).

sillysaurus2 13y ago
Thank you for the paper. But did you read it? Bitcoin Fog works, and the paper goes into detail about why it works. In the Silk Road investigation, the investigators basically threw up their hands and said "don't bother trying to analyze the transaction graph." So there's some evidence that tumblers are effective in practice.
- betterunix 13y ago
  I do not think the takeaway is that Bitcoin Fog works; rather, it is that Bitcoin Fog protects you from the specific strategy used by the authors of the paper. Another approach might work against Bitcoin Fog. "In the Silk Road investigation, the investigators basically threw up their hands and said "don't bother trying to analyze the transaction graph." So apparently tumblers are effective in practice." Do you have a citation about mixing services specifically thwarting investigators? Maybe the investigators felt that Bitcoin itself was too much to deal with. It would not be the first time a law enforcement agency has pointed to a system with little-to-no security and claimed that they cannot attack it.
  - sillysaurus2 13y ago
    Do you have an email I could reach you at?
    - betterunix 13y ago
      Sure, but is there a less public way for me to give it to you?
      - sillysaurus2 13y ago
        You can email me... I'll just delete this comment after you do. My email is sillysaurus2 at gmail.