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Intact tail fin offers clue to Air France crash
- jgrahamc 17y agoPure speculation, and this and the previous LA Times article have the underlying "it's safer in a Boeing" bias. Oddly, the other LA Times article was complaining (inaccurately) that the computerized controls in the Airbus would limit the pilot's ability to use the controls. This article complains that the controls don't limit the pilot's ability to mess things up. What's needed is the truth, not this speculation. Perhaps the vertical stabilizer did rip off. If it did we need to know why.
- DanielBMarkham 17y agoIf I thought the point of the article was crash speculation, I wouldn't have posted it. Instead to me the point was the difference in what the pilots thought of the design of the airplane and how the airplane was actually designed. That's an important point. I'm sorry he used this crash to make it, but I think it deserves to be discussed, especially with fly-by-wire (but really with any FAA-approved airframe)
- bonsaitree 17y agoAgreed. I don't see how this article serves anyone's interests other than LA Times traffic numbers. It offers nothing but further rampant speculation on top of the usual news cycle on airline crashes. Worse, it offers zero closure to the families of the crash victims nor relief to the air crews and passengers of the 100s Airbus A330s now flying on a daily basis. At least it's labeled as "opinion" and the author clearly demarcates this line of reasoning as pure speculation. That's far more disclosure than most "professional" journalists do these days.
- DanielBMarkham 17y agoFrom the concluding paragraph: This is pure -- and premature -- speculation. But it is not speculative to observe that some vertical fins are weaker than they should be, and that this is because of the regulations that govern how airplanes are built. The FAA, together with its international counterparts, should amend certification requirements for future aircraft to restore to the maneuvering speed the safety status that pilots always believed it had. The rules that govern the structural integrity of airliners should not include asterisks. Peter Garrison has a long history of writing and editing aviation pieces. He's written a fair number of accident reports for the aviation community. He understands the nature of premature speculation. He made the call that this issue is important enough to use the crash as a vehicle to bring up. I agree. The purpose is not to speculate on the crash, provide closure to the crash victims or relief to the air crews. The purpose is to bring up a regulatory issue that needs further attention. In this case, I think it's a worthwhile cause. In 99% of the other stories, I did not. In fact, I blogged about how terrible it was to use a crash just to drive traffic. http://www.whattofix.com/blog/archives/2009/06/funeral-home-bl.php http://www.whattofix.com/blog/archives/2009/06/funeral-home-...
- gort 17y ago"the underlying "it's safer in a Boeing" bias." Indeed. I saw a documentary on Flight 587 a while ago, and seem to distinctly remember that both Airbus and Boeing planes suffer from this "rudder reversal" issue.
- foldr 17y agoRudder reversal is a different issue. It's where hydraulic problems cause sudden rudder movements, or cause control inputs to the rudder to have the opposite of the expected effect. The problem here is with the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer under full (pilot-commanded) rudder deflection. The stabilizer is not strong enough to handle full ruder deflection in the whole flight envelope, so /if/ the fly-by-wire system is not functioning for some reason, the pilot's rudder inputs could cause a structural failure.
- gort 17y ago"Rudder reversal is a different issue." I don't believe so. > The bulletin also stated that a rudder reversal was also known as a "rudder doublet" and was defined as "a large rudder deflection input in one direction followed immediately by a rudder deflection input in the opposite direction." In addition, the bulletin stated that "large 'rudder reversals' or 'rudder doublets' must be avoided on Transport Category Aircraft" because "these inputs can result in loss of control or structural failure of the aircraft." -- Report on Flight 587: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf (page 114) [Edited to add: i.e. the pilot goes from having the rudder full left to full right, or vice versa. This is what happened to Flight 587.]
- foldr 17y agoThe problems on the Boeing planes resulted from /uncommanded/ rudder reversal due to a problem in the hydraulic systems. There's no suggestion that an uncommanded rudder reversal occurred in this crash. The suggestion is that pilot-commanded rudder inputs put the rudder beyond its structural limits. Thus, the issue is one of the structural strength of the vertical stabilizer. This was not the primary issue in the Boeing incidents (the stabilizer remained in tact in most cases but the planes were in serious trouble anyway since they were pretty much uncontrollable). In short, while Boeing and Airbus both have rudder-related problems, they are different problems. Boeing have an issue with uncommanded rudder movements, whereas Airbus' older models (if the author is correct) have the problem that it is too easy for pilot-commanded rudder inputs to put the plane beyond its structural limits. This problem can surface on the newer models if the fly-by-wire systems go down.
- logjam 17y agoCan we please give the silly "it's just speculation" cliche a rest? Of course it is speculation. The NTSB experts (or at least, their equivalent) are doing the same thing at this point. I guarantee that the way root causes for aviation accidents are established is exactly via speculation (aka hypothesis), followed by rigorous testing of that speculation where possible. Peter Garrison is well-known in the aviation community and may well be considered an expert on flight safety. He is a pilot with thousands of hours of flight time. He designed and built several airplanes himself, and for decades has written Flying's "Aftermath" section, which takes a hard look at general aviation's accidents. Should Feynman have avoided "speculating" when he compressed an O-ring in ice water on television during the Challenger safety board inquiry, when NASA and the Rogers' board were plodding along? Or did it help lead to a rigorous and open inquiry?
- jgrahamc 17y agoThere's a difference between speculating in a major newspaper and speculating in an investigation. Also, Feynman didn't speculate about the O-ring freezing, he knew it would happen and gave a simple demonstration.
- DLWormwood 17y agoThe manufacturer who adds extra "beef" to its structure ends up with a heavier airplane that carries fewer passengers or uses more fuel, and loses sales to the lighter and more efficient, though "weaker," competitor. The same is true of cars. We willingly sacrifice greater safety to get cheaper, more fuel-efficient vehicles. If this wasn't published by a U.S. based paper, I'd think this writer was European or something. The historical trend (prior to the recent price hikes with gas of the last couple of years) has been the direct opposite. Americans were buying bigger and beefier cars (read: SUVs and minivans) to protect themselves and any children. (The whole "soccer mom" phenomenon, remember?) This was a contributing factor to the implosion of the U.S. car industry, since they faced selective pressures at home that caused them to develop vehicles that didn't sell as well to the world at large. And now that fuel prices are starting to invert the equation, foreign auto makers are eating our lunch,
- stcredzero 17y agoTwo examples of failure of the market. If everyone was driving light fuel-efficient cars, then engineering quality, not greater mass, would be the dominant safety factor for the buyer. Also, the market seems to drive the lightness of the tail on an airliner right down to the limits set by the regulations. If the market was doing what it should, then engineers would stop short.
- anamax 17y ago> If everyone was driving light fuel-efficient cars, then engineering quality, not greater mass, would be the dominant safety factor for the buyer. Light fuel-efficient cars don't meet everyone's needs. (Yup, mom-mobiles/mini-vans are needed.) And few people can afford to have both a commute car and an "everything else" car per daily-driver. (Besides, a commute-only vehicle means that you can't do as much in transit.) Besides, the "if everyone drove small, everyone would be safe" assumption is wrong because many car accidents don't involve another car. I'm unaware of significant efforts to make "not cars" (not just trucks, but immobile structures) more crash friendly. (Yes, I know about break-away traffic signs. Even if all signs were break-away, that wouldn't be enough.)
- vinutheraj 17y agoThe rules that govern the structural integrity of airliners should not include asterisks.
- marvin 17y agoThis is actually a huge point of misunderstanding among pilots. The angle of attack (alpha) is the angle between the wing and the airflow. If you increase alpha above a certain angle, the wing stalls, and ceases generating lift. Stalls are commonly encountered when flying really slow, but can occur at any speed. Pull the stick hard enough, and the elevator rudder will increase alpha above the threshold, momentarily causing the wings to cease generating lift and no longer stress the airframe. The lifting force generated by the wings is proportional to the angle of attack. However, when the airplane reaches a certain airspeed, flying the wings at an alpha just below stalling will cause the wings to generate more lift (measured in accelleration, or G units) than the airframe is designed to handle. This is the "maneuvering speed", the maximum speed at which full rudder deflection in smooth air will not cause the plane to exceed its design loads. The misunderstanding lies in that this speed is considered an absolute safe speed to do whatever you want with the controls. This is not the case. Turbulence, the airframe's current position in relation to the airflow, the plane's attitude and current position of the flight control surfaces can all add to the forces that work on the airframe. So when you pull 4G at the maximum maneuvering speed and encounter a 2G gust of turbulence, the air works 6Gs on the airframe, which will cause you to exceed the design specifications. Every professional pilot should know this, but it wouldn't surprise me if there are some who don't. It is really, really common among hobbyist pilots.