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[The researchers] went on to say there's no technical measure stopping Apple employees, working under a secret court order or otherwise, from performing the sam
by anfedorov 13y ago
[The researchers] went on to say there's no technical measure stopping Apple employees, working under a secret court order or otherwise, from performing the same kind of attack and making it completely transparent to the parties exchanging iMessages.
Since Apple controls the entire infrastructure, there's nothing preventing company employees from swapping out the proper keys with ones controlled by Apple or other parties.
We have evidence of a secret court order for Verizon to hand over the meta-data associated with phone calls. IANAL, but this seems quite different from ordering Apple to perform a MITM attack against a user.
Under what kind of court order would Apple have to remove or compromise end-to-end encryption from a target's device?
- ChuckMcM 13y agoThe same kind of court order that told Lavabit to hand over their SSL key, one where the person of interest was communicating over iMessage. It would probably be accompanied by an NSL which would then prevent Apple from talking about it.
- anfedorov 13y agoAFAIK, the Lavabit case is not legally decided yet: http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/11/lavabit-challenges-contempt-order/ I imagine Apple would put up quite a strong legal fight if they were issued the same order, especially considering their public stance. A NSL can force Apple to not disclose it, but they can't force them to publically lie about it. And lying about that would be ridiculously stupid.
- privong 13y ago> A NSL can force Apple to not disclose it, but they can't force them to publically lie about it. And lying about that would be ridiculously stupid. I'm not sure they'd be put in a position to lie. It would have to be a very direct, specific question to _require_ a lie. Otherwise, dodgy language would suffice.
- anfedorov 13y agoThey didn't use dodgy language: "conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read them. Apple cannot decrypt that data." [1]. 1. https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/ https://www.apple.com/apples-commitment-to-customer-privacy/
- fpgeek 13y agoSuppose Apple made the broad, unequivocal claim before they got an iMessage-related NSL. While the NSL can't compel Apple to lie, would Apple choose tone down their language afterwards?
- privong 13y agoI meant using dodgy langugage in future statements. They may not have received a NSL yet, so one doesn't know if their strong language could poentially be tempered by a NSL. I don't think one can conclusively argue this point either way.
- ChuckMcM 13y agoAnd per the article, that statement can be true at the same time this statement can be true: "Apple can intercept the creation of new conversations between users on iMessage or FaceTime if compelled to do so by a valid court order." English being as fungible as it is, leads to this sort of mess.
- ChuckMcM 13y agoYou also misunderstand a bit what happened in Lavabits case (easy to do I know). Basically the government got a court order for one of Lavabits user's email [1]. Lavabits responded they couldn't decrypt the email because they don't have the key. Government responded, ok, give us your SSL key so we can decrypt any traffic we may or may not have between you and your users. They stalled but eventually complied [2]. Court further forced them to give them the key in digital form, which they also did. And then shut down to prevent the Government's possession of that key to give them new data from their users. There wasn't a "case" here, Lavabit was compelled and risked fines, jail time, or both if they did not comply. You get a legal court order you can challenge it in court, but when the court upholds the legality of the order (as it did here) you either comply or go to jail. Apple will comply with any legal court order (although they may object to it first, as Google has done according to court records). [1] Presumed to be Snowden. [2] Printed out in 4pt font (which I thought was brilliant btw)
- StavrosK 13y agoA subpoena? I'm not aware of the protocol, but it may be that Apple could only do this the first time someone sent a message, when keys were established. It might not, I'm just speculating, but it sounds reasonable. If Apple wanted the protocol to be insecure, they'd have just sent messages in plaintext over TLS and be done with it. The fact that Apple actively designed a reasonably secure, encrypted protocol is evidence that they wanted to protect users against themselves too (to the point where it didn't impact usability).
- otterley 13y agoIf a subpoena were used for this purpose I'd be quite surprised. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only allows subpoenas to issue for the following: 1. Compel a witness to testify; 2. Compel someone to produce a document or "tangible thing"; 3. Require someone to allow the inspection of premises. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). I can't imagine the Government would attempt to use subpoena power to force a business to take any other action, and if they tried to do so, as an attorney I would definitely appeal it (and probably prevail). That's not to say there aren't other means at the Government's disposal, but subpoena is definitely not one of them.
- Steko 13y agoHasn't there been some discussion that law enforcement sends phones to apple to decrypt messages and the whole thing takes forever because Apple needs to apply some amount of brute force to it?
- Spooky23 13y agoThe police will make this sort of request for subjects of criminal investigations. It's a specific process, governed by the courts and warrants -- I believe it's called a pen register. Whenever a new technology comes out without lawful intercept, it gets embraced by criminals. Remember Nextel/Boost phones with direct connect? You might recall that there were 3 resellers on a block in the hood selling these things in the early 2000's. DirectConnect wasn't tappable for a few years, and the addressing scheme was tied to a phone, not a user. Those users later moved to BlackBerry.