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> They tend not to target "civilians". What they think is irrelevant. > The government offers anything? You have the vocal terror group yelling "NO SURRENDER!
by gwern 13y ago
> They tend not to target "civilians".
What they think is irrelevant.
> The government offers anything? You have the vocal terror group yelling "NO SURRENDER!!" while the political wing is secretly discussing how to accept the deal and what they need to do in return. This keeps the supporters supporting you in very polarised situations.
For your game theory to remotely resemble the truth, you need to point to situations where the terrorist groups were able to extract concessions greater than offered; while I am merely saying that the terrorist groups extracted close to zero concessions. How is it game-theoretically optimal to always lose?
> I'm not sure what this means.
It means exactly what it means: a specific number of terrorist attacks come without attribution, even in situations like Iraq where there are scores of potential actors with contradictory goals, which makes extortion and extract concessions difficult to impossible.
> But the People's Front of Judea are the real splitters.
A joke is not an objection or contrary evidence.
> I guess it's interesting that terrorists fall into the same trap as most other people.
Exactly. That's the whole point - 'terrorism is not about terror'. Anymore than programming Lisp is purely about optimizing effort per lines of code or whatever, and no more than buying Apple is a coldblooded calculation of dollars vs time.
> Killing more people doesn't have particularly more impact, but does make people less sympathetic to your cause.
Which if true is itself a refutation of terrorism as a rational political strategy, and one I would agree with (see the material on the 'backfire effect').
- DanBC 13y ago> For your game theory to remotely resemble the truth, you need to point to situations where the terrorist groups were able to extract concessions greater than offered; while I am merely saying that the terrorist groups extracted close to zero concessions. How is it game-theoretically optimal to always lose? But the people offering the concessions are politicians, and it's useful to them to say "We never negotiate with terrorists", even while they are negotiating with terrorists. All these deals are done in secret, and anyone who is party to the deal will apply severe spin to any announcement. Anyone not party to the deal but interested in the process will also apply severe spin to any analysis. For an example of where terrorists may have got considerable concessions see Northern Ireland.
- gwern 13y ago> All these deals are done in secret, and anyone who is party to the deal will apply severe spin to any announcement...For an example of where terrorists may have got considerable concessions see Northern Ireland. So let me get this straight. You claim, that despite all the observable evidence, the proof of your game-theoretic claims - which postulates the rationality and basic utility maximizing behavior belied by all the other empirical results - your theoretical mechanisms really do happen, but you can't offer any evidence because all these deals are done in secret, and then you have the chutzpah to immediately claim Northern Ireland as an example? I'd like respond to that, but you have made your claims unfalsifiable.