5 ms·
I'd do two things differently. First, instead of using removable media from which data could still be recovered, I'd get a second Ethernet switch. Whenever I
by notacoward 13y ago
I'd do two things differently.
First, instead of using removable media from which data could still be recovered, I'd get a second Ethernet switch. Whenever I wanted to move data from my regular machine to my secure machine, I'd have to move the cable on my regular machine from one switch to the other. Thus it would be physically impossible to be connected to both internal and external networks simultaneously, and I wouldn't be leaving any persistent physical data trail like a USB stick or CD-ROM.
The second thing I'd do is a double air gap. Think of it as an airlock: you can't open the inner door until you're sure no contaminants got through the outer door. The intermediate host would have a single purpose: run malware checks. Thus, only data that had already been checked in a secure environment would even be allowed to touch the real secure machine.
- bradleyland 13y agoNetworks are avoided for a reason. In your scenario, establishing a network connection between the intermediate computer and your "air gap" computer is a breach of the air gap if the intermediate computer has been compromised. The same argument could be made for removable media, but there are good methods for tightly controlling the transfer of data on removable media. Network interfaces have a larger attack surface.
- notacoward 13y agoThere are methods for tightly controlling the transfer of data on networks too. It's really trivial to set things up so that the only connection allowed in either direction is the one your file-transfer program is using. That's Firewall 101, too restrictive for any normal machine but easy to accomplish. Also, a compromise of the intermediate computer doesn't represent a breach of the air gap. The same two-gap approach could be used with removable media. It would still provide the same benefits (and vulnerabilities). You seem to be saying that the intermediate computer could get compromised because the air gap is breached, and the air gap is breached because the intermediate computer could be compromised. A bit circular, don't you think? That intermediate computer can provide an extra layer of protection or an extra vector for attack. Which matters more will depend on its configuration and use, but for any semi-sane configuration the protective aspect would quickly dominate. The intermediate computer in a double-air-gap setup would be just as secure as Schneier's single-air-gapped one, and the third computer even more so.
- Daniel_Newby 13y ago> It's really trivial to set things up so that the only connection allowed in either direction is the one your file-transfer program is using. You sound a bit like a 10-year-old playing James Bond. Network packets have plenty of metadata fields and slack space that can be used for data egress. And then there are steganographic methods like playing tricks with packet fragmentation, retransmission, and jitter. The only way to do it with any degree of security is to convert to a primitive serial connection like RS-232 and run the data through an NSA-style guard device.
- notacoward 13y agoI'm not the one thinking magically. Of course it's possible to do nasty things even on a physically isolated network. I know because I was doing nasty things on physically isolated thicknet twenty-some years ago. ;) But that's not the point. The point is that there are also vulnerabilities in the proposed alternative. Those vulnerabilities have in fact existed even longer (see mseebach's diskette comment) and Schneier mentions a couple that should give pause to anyone from the "USB sticks are better" camp. When all is said and done, "left the USB stick on the counter" vulnerability is probably the largest of all. Recording your data transfer, which is what that amounts to, is doing half of the bad guy's job already. Brilliant. Sure, you avoid one set of problems, but only by walking into a much worse set. "convert to a primitive serial connection like RS-232 and run the data through an NSA-style guard device." Actually I thought of suggesting line-of-sight IR. That's a true air gap, optical is harder than electrical to eavesdrop on, and it still avoids the vulnerabilities specific to sneakernet.
- bradleyland 13y agoHold the phone. Who is engaged in magical thinking here? Everyone in this conversation appears to be presenting rational arguments. There's some disagreement over whether networks have a larger attack surface than physical media, but neither side has engaged in any magical thinking.
- bradleyland 13y ago
- mseebach 13y agoYou're assuming that the only way to compromise a computer is through a direct internet connection. This is wrong. Pre-internet viruses spread on diskettes. The point of the air gap is to assume that any computer that has ever been connected to the internet is infected in an undetectable manner and that this infection is capable of spreading autonomously. Only by physically denying the infection the means to spread can you protect against it. Secondarily, you want to deny the infection the means to communicate back home, but sometimes the point of an infection isn't to steal data - see Stuxnet.
- notacoward 13y ago"You're assuming that the only way to compromise a computer is through a direct internet connection." I'm assuming the exact opposite. I recognize, as does Schneier, that infection can occur without such a connection. Any mechanism that facilitates transfer of data also facilitates infection. That includes USB sticks and CD-Rs, which have the additional problem of leaving artifacts around for others to pick up later. It's the "we can secure USB sticks better than we can secure networks" belief that's magical. "Only by physically denying the infection the means to spread can you protect against it." As soon as you physically move a USB stick from one machine to another, you've effectively created a network. A really crappy one with high latency, but that doesn't make it any more secure as you yourself illustrate with the diskette example.
- mseebach 13y agoA network connection, even brief has an enormous attack surface. The corresponding surface when using physical media is much smaller.
- notacoward 13y agoBull. A network connection on a physically separate network subject to proper inspection/monitoring has a very small attack surface. The corresponding attack surface for a USB stick is larger, with new exploits being discovered every day. The separate switch is functionally identical to the USB stick. They both allow transfer of data. They can both potentially be attack vectors. They both (in this construction) require manual intervention to complete the data path. The only difference is that it's a lot easier to get a copy of someone's data on a USB stick, after someone conveniently recorded their data transfer on a readily purloined bit of media. You can't acknowledge the exploits that have occurred via diskettes or USB sticks, and then also say they're fundamentally better than an isolated network. It's illogical. In fact, it's stupid.