6 ms·

The more I think on this, the more I actually start to side with the government's argument. I hate it, but I think they're justified. Lavabit intentionally str

by pflats 13y ago

The more I think on this, the more I actually start to side with the government's argument. I hate it, but I think they're justified. Lavabit intentionally structured their service such that there were only two ways to get at a criminal's email: obtain a copy of the suspect's private key or compromise the entire service. Lavabit was capable of reading the suspect's email, but only by slurping from the firehouse and reading everyone's email. What Lavabit set up to be their greatest strength ("Nobody can read your email unless they somehow have our SSL key") turned into a terrible systemic weakness ("If the government want to exercise its legal right to obtain a warrant and read a suspect's email, then the only way it can do that is to get the key to everyone's email"). My personal real-world analogy is a safe deposit box that opens either with a key the suspect has or with a master key that opens everyone's lockbox. The bank would defintely be required to turn over the master key. The fact that the only key that opens the suspect's lockbox also opens every other customer's lockbox is a fault of the bank's own devising. (Of course, who the suspect is in the investigation is irrelevant to everything else.)

3pt14159 13y ago
The government shouldn't have the right to COMPEL someone to hand over data. They should have the right to ASK and they should have the right to complain publicly that AT&T or Google isn't cooperating with a specific case, but as communications get more international it is silly to suggest that they have the ability to intercept every communication. This way there is some actual balance to this madness. If Google refuses to help track down Osama, then the government can announce this, and people will be outraged at Google. Snowden is a different matter, many people don't believe he did anything wrong, so it is hard to take the government's side of things.
- mikeyouse 13y ago
  The US Government absolutely has the right (under court order) to compel a US-based company to hand over data about a US citizen. Do you really think that if Google had access to OBL's whereabouts and wouldn't comply with court orders to provide the information, that the acceptable outcome would be the CIA whining about Google on TV? If Google refuses to help track down Osama, then the government can announce this, and people will be outraged at Google. Snowden is a different matter, many people don't believe he did anything wrong, so it is hard to take the government's side of things. Are you really suggesting that our laws should be based on public opinion?
  - ataggart 13y ago
    Compare this: >The government shouldn't have the right... to this: >The US Government absolutely has the right... You can't refute a normative claim with a positive claim. ---- >Are you really suggesting that our laws should be based on public opinion? I think he's suggesting that violence (which ultimately backs state compulsion) is not an appropriate response to a non-violent act (declining to hand over keys).
    - mikeyouse 13y ago
      I think he's suggesting that violence (which ultimately backs state compulsion) is not an appropriate response to a non-violent act (declining to hand over keys). I'm sure that's what he is saying, but it's an intellectually lazy claim. If you only look at the scope of the demand (hand over the keys or we will put you in jail), it may seem like an escalation of force by the government. The real normative claim being made is that contempt of court charges are unconstitutional. Which is patently absurd. The threat of force exists because through contempt, 'non-violent' dissenters can enable further violence.
  - malandrew 13y ago
    If giving up Osama Bin Ladin's location also required giving up the privacy of everyone that uses Google to the CIA, then I would say that act would become OBL crowning achievement. He already succeeded in destroying an icon of our economy and taking thousands of lives with it. Are you really suggesting that its acceptable for us to debase one of the basic human rights that are the foundation of this country in order to capture one man? This is exactly what is happening with Lavabit. I don't think any law should be based on public opinion, but when the interpretation of a law is potentially unconstitutional, then that interpretation becomes a matter of public opinion that should be decided in the US Supreme Court.
    - mikeyouse 13y ago
      Lavabit had the option of providing access to only Snowden's account. They declined that option. The FBI then escalated their demand to get the data they were entitled to. This 'unconstitutional' demand from the FBI was Lababit's creation by being obstinate to begin with. Did they just expect the government to give up after Lavabit told them they couldn't access that data?
- pflats 13y ago
  I agree that the current status of the pen register (it doesn't constitute a search and thus doesn't require probable cause, only that it's "likely" the data will be relevant) is a bar too low. If it had the same requirements as a search warrant, though, I can't say I register an objection. Beyond that, saying that the government's recourse is to put out a press release that says, "So, we're trying to get into Osama's email, but Google won't let us," is the appropriate way to handle a secret criminal investigation, then I think we'll always disagree.
- rayiner 13y ago
  You can argue that the government shouldn't have the right to compel someone to hand over data or documents.[1] But the fact is that a broad subpoena power, enabling the government to do precisely that, has been part of American law since before there was a United States. So if you think the government shouldn't have this power, the real question is: how do you change this hundreds of years old practice? [1] You can argue this, but it should be noted that nobody on HN seems to have a problem with the subpoena power when it's say used to subpoena documents from say Enron's accountants.
  - prirun 13y ago
    The difference is, Enron was suspected of committing a crime. Lavabit committed no crime. If the government subpoenas an individual for their encryption key, because they have reason to suspect the individual for a crime, it is different than to subpoena an innocent, indirect 3rd party. To me, it's like saying "We don't have enough police to handle this crime. So here - you have to take this gun and help us find the criminal. If you refuse, we throw you in jail." Any service on the Internet could be used by all types of people, for good and bad purposes, just like a hammer can be used to drive nails or kill someone. You don't throw a hammer manufacturer in jail when someone uses a hammer to kill someone. Lavabit is an innocent 3rd party in all of this, regardless of how their computer system was designed.
dec0dedab0de 13y ago
In your analogy the bank should only be required to to open the safe, not turn over the key.
Glyptodon 13y ago
In the bank analogy it's obvious that the bank's representation would be present and witnessing the use of their master key to ensure that only the box in question was searched, and that's all that Lavabit asked for. We take it for granted when it comes to a physical search so why should they have unsupervised access to everything for a digital one?
jules 13y ago
> Lavabit intentionally structured their service such that there were only two ways to get at a criminal's email: obtain a copy of the suspect's private key or compromise the entire service. This is a very disingenuous way of phrasing this. A far more accurate way of phrasing this is: lavabit did not implement a feature that would allow you to compromise a specific user's emails. They simply implemented the most secure option. Of course you can compromise any user of a service by compromising the whole service. That is not something they did "intentionally", that is simply how the world works. If it were possible to make it completely impossible to compromise a user's emails, I'm sure they would have done so.
- pflats 13y ago
  If you're offering encryption as a service, you need to consider technological and legal best practices[1]. If, at any point, you have the technological ability to see a client's plaintext, that's something you need to strongly address. The most secure technological option is not always the most secure option. If you don't trust the government, then you have to choose one of 3 options: 1. Consider a system that's resilient against rubber-hose techniques (aka warrants and contempt of court). You'll probably want one where you are technologically incapable of seeing the plaintext. Perhaps offer your paying customers the option of using an open-source program or browser extension. 2. Consider a less technologically secure system where you have access to private keys so that you can fold on one client but not every one. 3. Consider never visiting that country again. I'm not sure what other choices you really have. Obviously, we can all campaign for better privacy. We can support the EFF and the ACLU, as I do. But we have to work within the laws of our countries, or they'll come down very hard on us. [1]After this incident, the only way I see Encryption as a Service as being sustainable is an open-source suite with consultation contracts.
  - jules 13y ago
    The thing is, you can't design a web based system where you can't read the plaintext. If you have to give up your SSL key all bets are off. The FBI can perform a MITM attack to your users. The best you can do in that case is shut down the service, which is what they did.
qq66 13y ago
That is exactly how safe deposit boxes work, and the bank never turns over the master key. The government specifies a box number in the search warrant, the bank officer goes and retrieves that box and hands it over to the official.
- jasonlotito 13y ago
  Yes. And that was what they initial asked for.
  - 59nadir 13y ago
    Giving away the box is not opening the box.
andrewvc 13y ago
In this analogy, however, the government is saying "we know one of your deposit boxes is owned by John Doe, we'll look at em all, figure out which one is John's, and retrieve his stuff".

by pflats 13y ago

3pt14159 13y ago

The government shouldn't have the right to COMPEL someone to hand over data. They should have the right to ASK and they should have the right to complain publicly that AT&T or Google isn't cooperating with a specific case, but as communications get more international it is silly to suggest that they have the ability to intercept every communication. This way there is some actual balance to this madness. If Google refuses to help track down Osama, then the government can announce this, and people will be outraged at Google. Snowden is a different matter, many people don't believe he did anything wrong, so it is hard to take the government's side of things.

mikeyouse 13y ago
The US Government absolutely has the right (under court order) to compel a US-based company to hand over data about a US citizen. Do you really think that if Google had access to OBL's whereabouts and wouldn't comply with court orders to provide the information, that the acceptable outcome would be the CIA whining about Google on TV? If Google refuses to help track down Osama, then the government can announce this, and people will be outraged at Google. Snowden is a different matter, many people don't believe he did anything wrong, so it is hard to take the government's side of things. Are you really suggesting that our laws should be based on public opinion?
- ataggart 13y ago
  Compare this: >The government shouldn't have the right... to this: >The US Government absolutely has the right... You can't refute a normative claim with a positive claim. ---- >Are you really suggesting that our laws should be based on public opinion? I think he's suggesting that violence (which ultimately backs state compulsion) is not an appropriate response to a non-violent act (declining to hand over keys).
  - mikeyouse 13y ago
    I think he's suggesting that violence (which ultimately backs state compulsion) is not an appropriate response to a non-violent act (declining to hand over keys). I'm sure that's what he is saying, but it's an intellectually lazy claim. If you only look at the scope of the demand (hand over the keys or we will put you in jail), it may seem like an escalation of force by the government. The real normative claim being made is that contempt of court charges are unconstitutional. Which is patently absurd. The threat of force exists because through contempt, 'non-violent' dissenters can enable further violence.
- malandrew 13y ago
  If giving up Osama Bin Ladin's location also required giving up the privacy of everyone that uses Google to the CIA, then I would say that act would become OBL crowning achievement. He already succeeded in destroying an icon of our economy and taking thousands of lives with it. Are you really suggesting that its acceptable for us to debase one of the basic human rights that are the foundation of this country in order to capture one man? This is exactly what is happening with Lavabit. I don't think any law should be based on public opinion, but when the interpretation of a law is potentially unconstitutional, then that interpretation becomes a matter of public opinion that should be decided in the US Supreme Court.
  - mikeyouse 13y ago
    Lavabit had the option of providing access to only Snowden's account. They declined that option. The FBI then escalated their demand to get the data they were entitled to. This 'unconstitutional' demand from the FBI was Lababit's creation by being obstinate to begin with. Did they just expect the government to give up after Lavabit told them they couldn't access that data?
pflats 13y ago
I agree that the current status of the pen register (it doesn't constitute a search and thus doesn't require probable cause, only that it's "likely" the data will be relevant) is a bar too low. If it had the same requirements as a search warrant, though, I can't say I register an objection. Beyond that, saying that the government's recourse is to put out a press release that says, "So, we're trying to get into Osama's email, but Google won't let us," is the appropriate way to handle a secret criminal investigation, then I think we'll always disagree.
rayiner 13y ago
You can argue that the government shouldn't have the right to compel someone to hand over data or documents.[1] But the fact is that a broad subpoena power, enabling the government to do precisely that, has been part of American law since before there was a United States. So if you think the government shouldn't have this power, the real question is: how do you change this hundreds of years old practice? [1] You can argue this, but it should be noted that nobody on HN seems to have a problem with the subpoena power when it's say used to subpoena documents from say Enron's accountants.
- prirun 13y ago
  The difference is, Enron was suspected of committing a crime. Lavabit committed no crime. If the government subpoenas an individual for their encryption key, because they have reason to suspect the individual for a crime, it is different than to subpoena an innocent, indirect 3rd party. To me, it's like saying "We don't have enough police to handle this crime. So here - you have to take this gun and help us find the criminal. If you refuse, we throw you in jail." Any service on the Internet could be used by all types of people, for good and bad purposes, just like a hammer can be used to drive nails or kill someone. You don't throw a hammer manufacturer in jail when someone uses a hammer to kill someone. Lavabit is an innocent 3rd party in all of this, regardless of how their computer system was designed.

dec0dedab0de 13y ago

In your analogy the bank should only be required to to open the safe, not turn over the key.

Glyptodon 13y ago

In the bank analogy it's obvious that the bank's representation would be present and witnessing the use of their master key to ensure that only the box in question was searched, and that's all that Lavabit asked for. We take it for granted when it comes to a physical search so why should they have unsupervised access to everything for a digital one?

jules 13y ago

> Lavabit intentionally structured their service such that there were only two ways to get at a criminal's email: obtain a copy of the suspect's private key or compromise the entire service. This is a very disingenuous way of phrasing this. A far more accurate way of phrasing this is: lavabit did not implement a feature that would allow you to compromise a specific user's emails. They simply implemented the most secure option. Of course you can compromise any user of a service by compromising the whole service. That is not something they did "intentionally", that is simply how the world works. If it were possible to make it completely impossible to compromise a user's emails, I'm sure they would have done so.

pflats 13y ago
If you're offering encryption as a service, you need to consider technological and legal best practices[1]. If, at any point, you have the technological ability to see a client's plaintext, that's something you need to strongly address. The most secure technological option is not always the most secure option. If you don't trust the government, then you have to choose one of 3 options: 1. Consider a system that's resilient against rubber-hose techniques (aka warrants and contempt of court). You'll probably want one where you are technologically incapable of seeing the plaintext. Perhaps offer your paying customers the option of using an open-source program or browser extension. 2. Consider a less technologically secure system where you have access to private keys so that you can fold on one client but not every one. 3. Consider never visiting that country again. I'm not sure what other choices you really have. Obviously, we can all campaign for better privacy. We can support the EFF and the ACLU, as I do. But we have to work within the laws of our countries, or they'll come down very hard on us. [1]After this incident, the only way I see Encryption as a Service as being sustainable is an open-source suite with consultation contracts.
- jules 13y ago
  The thing is, you can't design a web based system where you can't read the plaintext. If you have to give up your SSL key all bets are off. The FBI can perform a MITM attack to your users. The best you can do in that case is shut down the service, which is what they did.

qq66 13y ago

That is exactly how safe deposit boxes work, and the bank never turns over the master key. The government specifies a box number in the search warrant, the bank officer goes and retrieves that box and hands it over to the official.

jasonlotito 13y ago
Yes. And that was what they initial asked for.
- 59nadir 13y ago
  Giving away the box is not opening the box.

andrewvc 13y ago

In this analogy, however, the government is saying "we know one of your deposit boxes is owned by John Doe, we'll look at em all, figure out which one is John's, and retrieve his stuff".