> 1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the Internet as little as possible. It's impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer to the Interne

> 1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the Internet as little as possible. It's impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer to the Internet, but try to configure it all at once and as anonymously as possible. There's no technical reason you can't keep your airgapped computer completely off the internet for its entire life cycle. I'd even go so far as to commit heresy say that this is just plain bad security advice that Mr. Schneier is giving out here. Instead, you should probably get your install media from a trusted source and use that to install the OS and any initial updates (maybe that's a manufacturer's install CD or a Linux ISO that you burned yourself - avoid anything that isn't write-once). If the OS on your airgapped machine has a unpatched remote vulnerability, you're already putting that system at risk by connecting it to the internet even once. Don't discard that trusted install media - if you need to create another airgapped machine, you're using the same airgapped data to perform the install. I realize that Bruce was discussing setting up a stand-alone computer, but I thought I'd share my experience: Years ago, around the same time that Blaster was a nuisance, I managed a network of airgapped machines. If any one of them had been hit because I chose to just let it download updates off the internet, the entire network would have been compromised. This would be much worse if you were worried about a targeted attack - every time you connect a fresh computer to the internet with the intent of moving that box over to the secure network, you're giving the attacker another opportunity to gain access. For transferring data back and forth, I've used CDs in the past, but toyed with the idea of using a dedicated serial cable for transfers instead. Tar up the files, connect the cable, tell the remote machine to listen, shoot them over, then disconnect the cable. The connection has no network stack to worry about independent programs sending data across the channel; if extra data is added, the result on the other end likely won't untar; there's no auto-execution of programs to worry about. The only thing I have to worry about being compromised are my copies of tar and cat. Removeable media in general has issues - Schneier mentions a few examples in the article of successful compromises using USB sticks.