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I think the revocation misses the point: "if" the NSA has been logging all the traffic from Lavabit for the last 6 months, they can now use the SSL key to decry
by tsaoutourpants 13y ago
I think the revocation misses the point: "if" the NSA has been logging all the traffic from Lavabit for the last 6 months, they can now use the SSL key to decrypt all the data they've stored. It's not just about future communications, but about decrypting the past.
- Daniel_Newby 13y agoI will repeat my previous comment: Perfect forward secrecy, bitches. If you use a protocol that supports perfect forward secrecy, and you ought to, then the private key is used only to authenticate the ephemeral session key, not to encrypt it. Compromise of the private key does not allow previous sessions to be decrypted. (Compromise does allow impersonation, though, which is why you need pre-distributed certificate revocations.)
- tsaoutourpants 13y agoI agree. But like virtually any site of which I am aware, Lavabit didn't force PFS. It's browser-negotiated. The "funny" thing is that there's a good chance that any one user might have been using PFS, so it's less likely that they can get a specific user's data (Snowden) and more likely that they can get a random sampling of other, non-target users' data.
- malandrew 13y agoBut does pfs protect meta data as well?