17 ms·
P2P, Encrypted Email Protocol
- AndrewDucker 13y agoIf it's P2P then I'm back to running my own server - and if you run your own server then email is already P2P.
- autotravis 13y agoBut setting up a mail server is more difficult than firing up a piece of P2P software.
- AndrewDucker 13y agoTrue. But servers have advantages, like being able to get to my email from anywhere. I remember the dark days of POP...
- chimeracoder 13y agoNot really - setting up a mail server is actually pretty easy if you ignore spam detection algorithms. Email/SMTP is a very fault-tolerant protocol, which means it's very forgiving to a whole number of different errors that you can make while setting it up. The problem comes when you account for the facts such as (1) some ISPs block ports commonly used for email; (2) some email providers will mark email from self-hosted email servers as spam. But none of that is about email/SMTP specifically (and could theoretically apply to any P2P solution that catches on).
- omh 13y agoIt seems like it would be relatively easy to perform traffic analysis of this protocol. If you can see the traffic of a reasonable number of nodes (as I'm sure the NSA can) then can't you just watch the messages being inserted and retrieved and work out who the sender and recipient is? Obviously this doesn't help with the content of the message, but in many cases just knowing who's talking to whom is a good part of what you want to keep secret.
- naughtysriram 13y agoWhat if the tool automatically sends a new public key for next message within every current message? Or the public key can be recycled after certain period of use say 1 week. Would this make the emails look anonymous or still can be tracked?
- tux 13y agoUnless you're using your real name this should not be a problem. Also many will use this client with VPN/Proxy.
- omh 13y agoIn that respect it's not much better than just anonymously signing up for gmail via a VPN.
- adouzzy 13y agoYou can pretend reading ,say 1M, emails passed by. I mean you can only understand those you can encrypted. But there is no way to analysis which emails have you encrypted through traffic analysis. The best way to get invisible is to get into the crowd :)
- kansface 13y agoThis is just an encryption scheme. It does not provide anonymity. Truly anonymous email would not be good for spam.
- Steuard 13y agoI've read chunks of the site, but I'm still not entirely clear on what advantage this scheme has over RSA encryption of standard SMTP mail (via PGP/MIME on the local machine, say). Is the main advantage that a given identity isn't tied to a specific server here? Is that a big enough gain to justify an entirely new protocol and ecosystem of clients? I assume I'm missing some other benefits.
- delinka 13y agoP2P reduces points of failure. Sure, you can encrypt email to your heart's content, but can you trust the server you dropped it with to deliver it? "Why would anyone want to prevent you emailing people?" you ask. Lots of reasons, the biggest of which seems to me to be that if you can't trust encrypted mail to arrive, perhaps you'll abandon it.
- zokier 13y agoSMTP leaks metadata.
- qznc 13y agoHow does this p2p approach avoid that?
- bcl 13y agoOnly if the servers aren't using SMTPS. Which in practice many don't but there really is no reason why that cannot be changed.
- ape4 13y agoIf yourserver.com is connecting to friendsserver.com on port 25... there is some metadata. I mean if three-letter-agencies are monitoring the internet they'll figure out what just happened.
- ye 13y agoYou still need a way to exchange the RSA encryption keys with each sender and receiver.
- ugexe 13y agoSo this allows potential crackers to save every copy of every encrypted email, allowing them to be cracked in the future when there is increased computer power and more advanced cracking techniques/rainbow tables?
- qznc 13y agoHow would you prevent this? It is not prevented by SMTP and not by this p2p approach.
- ugexe 13y agoThis puts your email in everyone's hands, it's just encrypted so it probably can't be read without the key (yet). Regular email does not do this.
- qznc 13y agoSo its "everyone" for p2p vs "many secret services" for SMTP. On the upside, it gives every user a good incentive to use good encryption.
- Karunamon 13y agoOn the positive side, it's unlikely "everyone" who isn't a government agency with billions of dollars of taxpayer money to waste has the time, storage, and compute resources to mount the kind of attack you're talking about. I know NSA is the topic of the day, but they're kind of a special case here. They're the single most powerful and well funded adversary the average crypto user will face.
- tedunangst 13y agoUntil you break up and your ex decides to publish your key in revenge. Unlike a password, you can't change a key and revoke access.
- Karunamon 13y ago
- ape4 13y agoThis is a nice try. I would like to see some incremental improvements in mail. For example in the header we could display a rating of how secure the mail is. Based use of TLS, etc. If client programs displayed this it would encourage infrastructure improvements.
- pampa 13y agoAny proof of concept source code yet?
- frank_boyd 13y agoIs this about re-inventing the wheel again? http://retroshare.sourceforge.net/ http://retroshare.sourceforge.net/ does encrypted p2p for "email"/chat/VOIP/file sharing/forums/etc.
- dingdingdang 13y agoThanks for mentioning retroshare, it is a VERY decent system. Still, I reckon there's quite a bit of mileage in doing -one thing- right; retroshare's fix-it-all-in-one-package may not appeal to everybody.
- sirsar 13y agoSo it's like Bitmessage, but without an implementation?
- johnchristopher 13y agoI also thought they already had a working client. The wording is misleading: "FlowingMail is the name of a new decentralized messaging protocol, while FlowingMail Client is an email client that uses the protocol."
- Osmium 13y agoSpeaking of the need for a more secure email, I just want to share an anecdote that blew my mind recently. I was trying to pay for something with a major tech company but they were having problems with my card, so they emailed me my card details to check they were correct! I'd be tempted to name and shame them, but it's not really their fault as much as it is the specific person, because I find it hard to believe people aren't trained not to do that. Makes me think that all customer support emails should be regex'd for credit card numbers and if they're found their mail servers shouldn't allow them to be sent... In any case, the whole institution of email is a security nightmare. I doubt this is the solution, but there certainly needs to be one, and as much for "normal" people as anyone else. We all have information that needs to be kept secure.
- showerst 13y agoI've actually worked for someone who had a company-wide email filter for credit card numbers and SSNs. It was frustrating because it would occasionally catch license keys or foreign phone numbers, but probably a good idea for some groups.
- corobo 13y agoIn the era of automatic payment processing I can't think of any reason why a member of staff should have access to anything other than the last 4 digits, name and address for verifying it's the correct card
- adambard 13y agoI've been trying to get some identity documents (birth certificate, marriage certificate) translated recently. Every place I've contacted wanted me to just email them scans of the documents, that will presumably sit on their ISP's server in plaintext indefinitely. I definitely think there's something to a messaging protocol that's simply not able to be insecure.
- kgo 13y agoThis seems very similar to bitmessage, which has a functioning client and 1000's of active nodes. Why would I wait for this instead of using bitmessage?
- yapcguy 13y agoRead the Bitmessage white paper and you'll know why you should avoid Bitmessage: Every node will have a copy of every single message sent across the entire network. I believe the meme to use here is "Fail".
- pampa 13y agoCare to explain why you think it is a fail?
- jnbiche 13y agoYes, it's not scalable. Even the Bitmessage creator acknowledges this. They've been at an impasse for quite a while trying to come up with a better system with which to scale.
- 18pfsmt 13y agoI realize not reading Bitmessage's documentation is lazy, but could you explain the inability to scale such a system? Is it simply the chicken or the egg dilemma of nobody using it currently (and so, pretty much the same issue BitTorrent originally had)? Or is it some technical reason?
- quantumpotato_ 13y agoEvery node has a copy of every message. If the whole internet used this, everyone would have a copy of every (encrypted) email.
- 18pfsmt 13y ago
- mknits 13y agoRetroshare already do that.
- lectrick 13y agoI'm moving on until I see a link to some open-source code. With a test suite.
- Vektorweg 13y agoIf xmpp would be more secure, it would be a good replacement for email. Using multiple xmpp servers would give a comparable advantage to p2p email.
- marquis 13y agoI wasn't aware XMPP wasn't secure? It supports TLS, SSL, OTR and more. Are there known issues?
- zanny 13y agoI was under this impression too. I really like Jingle for encrypted voice calls, but if that is vulnerable I'd want to know!
- Vektorweg 13y agoThe only problem is, that the server can see all messages. OTR solves this problem, but who use it? OTR would even solve the e-mail issue.
- marquis 13y agoXMPP supports signing of messages, and for push notifications OTR is great.
- nightcracker 13y agoI've been looking at similar ideas lately, but I simply do not know how to defeat the Sybil attack =/ A centralized certificate authority is necessary to keep a functioning system, as far as I can see.
- mic159 13y agoIf I understand correctly, there is a key in the DHT that is effectively a list of pointers to all your mail? If so, an attacker could control your inbox by starting a bunch of nodes around that key, couldn't they? To disable a persons mail, you would start up some altered nodes around the address space you want to attack, have them respond normally until you control enough or all of the nodes covering the target address. Then flip a switch that makes them all start saying that inbox is empty. Then start backing off your nodes, and replacement regular nodes would replicate your altered state. Would this be possible? Or am I missing something?