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You didn't actually understand the parent post. If we make a copy of you and I kill you, am I extending your life? You're dead (you are not capable of having co

You didn't actually understand the parent post. If we make a copy of you and I kill you, am I extending your life? You're dead (you are not capable of having conscious experience). But there's a biological system with a nearly identical behavior that's living. That copy of you will have a similar conscious experience, but it won't be you. That's the point of the parent. The parent's not talking about a soul.

Udo 13y ago
> If we make a copy of you and I kill you, am I extending your life? If you make a copy of me, for a brief time there will be two of "me". After living for some time, those two will diverge increasingly. That's what living is, changing and developing. So next after copying me, you want to kill me and you want to know if you're thereby extending my life? That seems like a non sequitur statement. What do you mean by killing "me", anyway? Killing both copies? Killing one copy? How does killing extend the life of anything? > But there's a biological system with a nearly identical behavior that's living. That copy of you will have a similar conscious experience, but it won't be you. Okay, now we're moving closer. The first mistake you make is assuming there's an "original" and a "copy". If they're functionally identical, they're both me in equal measures. Killing one is still murder, becoming more tragic the more time the two minds had to develop on their own. Your are basing this example on the hidden assumption that a mind is trapped inside a body and forever bound to it, that a copy of my mind won't be "me". I recognize this sounds intuitively correct to a lot of people, but it's not actually reflecting physical reality. The atoms making up my mind are not specially tagged. The information they represent can be copied in principle, and the process that is "me" can be executed on other platforms. In this, the assumption of uniqueness is just not applicable. > That's the point of the parent. The parent's not talking about a soul. I realize that "soul" is a loaded term. But in the end, you're operating on those same loaded assumptions that seem obvious to yourself, but aren't really compatible with a purely physical model. It's an easy mistake to make without realizing it. Our everyday intuition is not always a good indicator of physical reality. Everyday intuition suggest that there can only be one "me". It suggests that consciousness is one unbroken process, and that my mind is a fundamentally static kernel. It suggests that I'm a black box with unknowable inner workings. None of these things are actually true.
- 011011100 13y ago
  >If you make a copy of me, for a brief time there will be two of "me". After living for some time, those two will diverge increasingly. That's what living is, changing and developing. ok. >What do you mean by killing "me", anyway? Killing both copies? Killing one copy? How does killing extend the life of anything? I label you with 1. I label your copy as 2. I kill #1. >The first mistake you make is assuming there's an "original" and a "copy". That's not a mistake at all. I'm talking about biological systems. There are two distinct biological systems here in the sense that #1 and #2 occupy different portions of space. If there are two objects in different places in memory on a computer that represent the same thing, they are conceptually equal, but they are not equal if you compare their addresses. >Your are basing this example on the hidden assumption that a mind is trapped inside a body and forever bound to it, that a copy of my mind won't be "me". I recognize this sounds intuitively correct to a lot of people, but it's not actually reflecting physical reality. The atoms making up my mind are not specially tagged. The information they represent can be copied in principle, and the process that is "me" can be executed on other platforms. In this, the assumption of uniqueness is just not applicable. This is entirely a misinterpretation of what I've said. >I realize that "soul" is a loaded term. But in the end, you're operating on those same loaded assumptions that seem obvious to yourself, but aren't really compatible with a purely physical model. It's an easy mistake to make without realizing it. Our everyday intuition is not always a good indicator of physical reality. Everyday intuition suggest that there can only be one "me". It suggests that consciousness is one unbroken process, and that my mind is a fundamentally static kernel. It suggests that I'm a black box with unknowable inner workings. None of these things are actually true. Again, a misinterpretation.
  - Udo 13y ago
    > I label you with 1. I label your copy as 2. I kill #1. Which one is "me" again? > If there are two objects in different places in memory on a computer that represent the same thing, they are conceptually equal, but they are not equal if you compare their addresses. Exactly my point. And once both minds exist separately, their both based on me, but are rapidly diverging forks of me at a certain point in time. The same thing happens to me without the fork, it's just that there is one "copy" in existence not two. > This is entirely a misinterpretation of what I've said. I didn't mean to do that.

Udo 13y ago

> If we make a copy of you and I kill you, am I extending your life? If you make a copy of me, for a brief time there will be two of "me". After living for some time, those two will diverge increasingly. That's what living is, changing and developing. So next after copying me, you want to kill me and you want to know if you're thereby extending my life? That seems like a non sequitur statement. What do you mean by killing "me", anyway? Killing both copies? Killing one copy? How does killing extend the life of anything? > But there's a biological system with a nearly identical behavior that's living. That copy of you will have a similar conscious experience, but it won't be you. Okay, now we're moving closer. The first mistake you make is assuming there's an "original" and a "copy". If they're functionally identical, they're both me in equal measures. Killing one is still murder, becoming more tragic the more time the two minds had to develop on their own. Your are basing this example on the hidden assumption that a mind is trapped inside a body and forever bound to it, that a copy of my mind won't be "me". I recognize this sounds intuitively correct to a lot of people, but it's not actually reflecting physical reality. The atoms making up my mind are not specially tagged. The information they represent can be copied in principle, and the process that is "me" can be executed on other platforms. In this, the assumption of uniqueness is just not applicable. > That's the point of the parent. The parent's not talking about a soul. I realize that "soul" is a loaded term. But in the end, you're operating on those same loaded assumptions that seem obvious to yourself, but aren't really compatible with a purely physical model. It's an easy mistake to make without realizing it. Our everyday intuition is not always a good indicator of physical reality. Everyday intuition suggest that there can only be one "me". It suggests that consciousness is one unbroken process, and that my mind is a fundamentally static kernel. It suggests that I'm a black box with unknowable inner workings. None of these things are actually true.

011011100 13y ago
>If you make a copy of me, for a brief time there will be two of "me". After living for some time, those two will diverge increasingly. That's what living is, changing and developing. ok. >What do you mean by killing "me", anyway? Killing both copies? Killing one copy? How does killing extend the life of anything? I label you with 1. I label your copy as 2. I kill #1. >The first mistake you make is assuming there's an "original" and a "copy". That's not a mistake at all. I'm talking about biological systems. There are two distinct biological systems here in the sense that #1 and #2 occupy different portions of space. If there are two objects in different places in memory on a computer that represent the same thing, they are conceptually equal, but they are not equal if you compare their addresses. >Your are basing this example on the hidden assumption that a mind is trapped inside a body and forever bound to it, that a copy of my mind won't be "me". I recognize this sounds intuitively correct to a lot of people, but it's not actually reflecting physical reality. The atoms making up my mind are not specially tagged. The information they represent can be copied in principle, and the process that is "me" can be executed on other platforms. In this, the assumption of uniqueness is just not applicable. This is entirely a misinterpretation of what I've said. >I realize that "soul" is a loaded term. But in the end, you're operating on those same loaded assumptions that seem obvious to yourself, but aren't really compatible with a purely physical model. It's an easy mistake to make without realizing it. Our everyday intuition is not always a good indicator of physical reality. Everyday intuition suggest that there can only be one "me". It suggests that consciousness is one unbroken process, and that my mind is a fundamentally static kernel. It suggests that I'm a black box with unknowable inner workings. None of these things are actually true. Again, a misinterpretation.
- Udo 13y ago
  > I label you with 1. I label your copy as 2. I kill #1. Which one is "me" again? > If there are two objects in different places in memory on a computer that represent the same thing, they are conceptually equal, but they are not equal if you compare their addresses. Exactly my point. And once both minds exist separately, their both based on me, but are rapidly diverging forks of me at a certain point in time. The same thing happens to me without the fork, it's just that there is one "copy" in existence not two. > This is entirely a misinterpretation of what I've said. I didn't mean to do that.