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"It was the best current technology could offer" Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can

"It was the best current technology could offer" Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. "this technology was not meant to deal with the oppressive government that can compel any company to reveal any information" Then it was not meant to deal with the evil hacker who takes control of the server and grabs valuable information. "As soon as Ladar..." There's the handwave. The security of the system depends not on technology, math, or physical laws, but on the whims of just one man. What if Ladar was less principled?

vividmind 13y ago
Have you heard about "thermorectal decryption"?
michaelt 13y ago
Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. As I understand it Snowden was using Lavabit to communicate with journalists who didn't themselves have/use/understand PGP. Lavabit is technology you can use even if no-one else uses it. How do PGP and S/MIME solve the bootstrapping problem, where no-one uses them because no-one uses them?
- betterunix 13y ago
  There is no bootstrapping problem. Snowden was also able to get journalists to use OTR, without relying on some web interface with questionable security claims. The problem with PGP and S/MIME is that the existing software is too hard to set up. It is hard to tell journalists to go use Thunderbird, get Enigmail set up, and publish a key. The situation is even worse with S/MIME, despite the built-in support in many email clients. Basically, the problem is that PGP and S/MIME as they exist today are (and I shudder to say it) too security conscious. The reality is that most users are not going to take the time to maintain their public keys, to verify others' public keys, etc., nor are most users going to spend the time to get their keys verified by a CA. We need a "lite" PGP client that is less obnoxious about using untrusted keys, and basically a "newbie" PGP that is more vulnerable to active MITM attacks (which are actually much harder to pull off than one might expect). It would also be nice if public keys could be easily published via QR codes, so that someone can literally hand their public key to another person. The worst thing we can do is lie to people about the security they receive e.g. telling them things like "Lavabit is set up so that nobody but you can read your email!"
  - lifeisstillgood 13y ago
    qr codes for gpg public keys - sounds a great idea. Any idea why no one done it yet - seems like it could be a simple transform from an ASCII armoured output. Bookmarking reply
    - XorNot 13y ago
      You have to use a very large QR code to do it. It won't fit on a business card and phones are picky about scanning them.
      - betterunix 13y ago
        Sure, but we have key servers for distributing the actual keys. You would only need the fingerprint in the QR code.
        XorNot 13y ago
        Kind of defeats the point - how do you know you're downloading the private key you scanned? While someone might have their business cards replaced, it's a lot easier just to send a different key to someone.
        lifeisstillgood 13y ago
        I thought a QR code could be effectively any size - I certainly remember a Japanese billboard that used shadows etc. A QR code can have ~4000 chars of a-z and ~3000 Latin1 iirc so with my limited gpg knowledge that handles my public key quite happily. would be interested on the business card front though
        betterunix 13y ago
        "Kind of defeats the point - how do you know you're downloading the private key you scanned?" Assuming that "private key" is a typo (you download public keys), you can just check the fingerprint of the key against the fingerprint you were given. That is easily automated.
- smsm42 13y ago
  The mere fact Snowden was talking to someone in Guardian would be quite damning even if the contents of the messages were not known. The problem in catching the leak is knowing who's talking, not what they're saying - finding out what is the easy part, who is the hard one. Access to envelope info solves the who part, and full access to mail server gives full access to envelope.
intelliot 13y ago
I want secure email but I have yet to figure it out. What are "the dozens of other ways we can have secure email"? Honest question
smsm42 13y ago
How PGP or S/MIME would help you if any provider could be required to turn over all the traffic it gets, unencrypted? The only way you could securely communicate is peer-to-peer with the trusted party, but the email doesn't work this way. Unless you always send mail directly to your target's SMTP server which is hosted by the recipient himself (which kind of defies the whole idea of having email as a service and turns it into just a peer-to-peer chat with funny headers), the adversary would have access at least to the envelope information. >>> Then it was not meant to deal with the evil hacker who takes control of the server and grabs valuable information. Indeed, it is not. If the hacker gets full control of your mailserver, at least your envelope information is completely compromised. >>> The security of the system depends not on technology, math, or physical laws, but on the whims of just one man This is completely false. Security depended on adversary not having full access to the Lavabit servers, not on Ladar's "whim". As soon as Ladar realized there's no possibility of legally providing it in the US, he closed the service. Assuming your adversary doesn't have full access to your service is kind of a precondition of using the service as means of security. That's like using lock is assuming the adversary does not have the key, if he does, the lock is useless as a security measure. As soon as Lavabit became essentially useless for the purpose it was created, it was shut down.
- betterunix 13y ago
  "the adversary would have access at least to the envelope information." This is a strawman, because Lavabit never did anything to protect headers. What you are missing is that Lavabit could respond to a demand for plaintext, if Ladar were willing to do so; on the other hand, Google cannot give anyone access to the plaintexts of PGP encrypted messages that I send through their servers because of technical barriers. That is the point of doing your encryption locally, and that is why security and privacy are not a service. "Indeed, it is not. If the hacker gets full control of your mailserver, at least your envelope information is completely compromised." Except that with Lavabit, an attacker could also get all your message bodies. "Security depended on adversary not having full access to the Lavabit servers, not on Ladar's "whim"." Let's put it this way: if you were involved in a lawsuit against Ladar, would you trust your communications with your lawyer to Lavabit? Of course not, because Ladar could have modified the code at any time and without alerting his users at all to read any plaintext that he wanted to read. If he had been willing to cooperate with the government, he could have and nobody would have a clue. "Assuming your adversary doesn't have full access to your service is kind of a precondition of using the service as means of security." In other words, security is not something you can get as a service. The entire model is fundamentally and fatally broken. "That's like using lock is assuming the adversary does not have the key, if he does, the lock is useless as a security measure" No, it is like storing your key with the bartender at your favorite night club and assuming that he will not allow your adversaries to use it. "As soon as Lavabit became essentially useless for the purpose it was created, it was shut down." It was shut down because Ladar chose to shut it down rather than capitulate. He could have chosen to keep it going while the government eavesdropped on it instead. That means that, as I said, security boiled down to Ladar and his principles. That is why PGP and S/MIME provide you with better security: mathematics are not subject to the choices that human beings make, and with PGP, S/MIME, etc. your security is a matter of mathematics.

vividmind 13y ago

Have you heard about "thermorectal decryption"?

michaelt 13y ago

Sure, if we ignore the existence of things like PGP, S/MIME, smart cards, and the dozens of other ways we can have secure email without relying on some trusted third party like this. As I understand it Snowden was using Lavabit to communicate with journalists who didn't themselves have/use/understand PGP. Lavabit is technology you can use even if no-one else uses it. How do PGP and S/MIME solve the bootstrapping problem, where no-one uses them because no-one uses them?

betterunix 13y ago
There is no bootstrapping problem. Snowden was also able to get journalists to use OTR, without relying on some web interface with questionable security claims. The problem with PGP and S/MIME is that the existing software is too hard to set up. It is hard to tell journalists to go use Thunderbird, get Enigmail set up, and publish a key. The situation is even worse with S/MIME, despite the built-in support in many email clients. Basically, the problem is that PGP and S/MIME as they exist today are (and I shudder to say it) too security conscious. The reality is that most users are not going to take the time to maintain their public keys, to verify others' public keys, etc., nor are most users going to spend the time to get their keys verified by a CA. We need a "lite" PGP client that is less obnoxious about using untrusted keys, and basically a "newbie" PGP that is more vulnerable to active MITM attacks (which are actually much harder to pull off than one might expect). It would also be nice if public keys could be easily published via QR codes, so that someone can literally hand their public key to another person. The worst thing we can do is lie to people about the security they receive e.g. telling them things like "Lavabit is set up so that nobody but you can read your email!"
- lifeisstillgood 13y ago
  qr codes for gpg public keys - sounds a great idea. Any idea why no one done it yet - seems like it could be a simple transform from an ASCII armoured output. Bookmarking reply
  - XorNot 13y ago
    You have to use a very large QR code to do it. It won't fit on a business card and phones are picky about scanning them.
    - betterunix 13y ago
      Sure, but we have key servers for distributing the actual keys. You would only need the fingerprint in the QR code.
      - XorNot 13y ago
        Kind of defeats the point - how do you know you're downloading the private key you scanned? While someone might have their business cards replaced, it's a lot easier just to send a different key to someone.
        lifeisstillgood 13y ago
        I thought a QR code could be effectively any size - I certainly remember a Japanese billboard that used shadows etc. A QR code can have ~4000 chars of a-z and ~3000 Latin1 iirc so with my limited gpg knowledge that handles my public key quite happily. would be interested on the business card front though
        betterunix 13y ago
        "Kind of defeats the point - how do you know you're downloading the private key you scanned?" Assuming that "private key" is a typo (you download public keys), you can just check the fingerprint of the key against the fingerprint you were given. That is easily automated.
smsm42 13y ago
The mere fact Snowden was talking to someone in Guardian would be quite damning even if the contents of the messages were not known. The problem in catching the leak is knowing who's talking, not what they're saying - finding out what is the easy part, who is the hard one. Access to envelope info solves the who part, and full access to mail server gives full access to envelope.

intelliot 13y ago

I want secure email but I have yet to figure it out. What are "the dozens of other ways we can have secure email"? Honest question

smsm42 13y ago

How PGP or S/MIME would help you if any provider could be required to turn over all the traffic it gets, unencrypted? The only way you could securely communicate is peer-to-peer with the trusted party, but the email doesn't work this way. Unless you always send mail directly to your target's SMTP server which is hosted by the recipient himself (which kind of defies the whole idea of having email as a service and turns it into just a peer-to-peer chat with funny headers), the adversary would have access at least to the envelope information. >>> Then it was not meant to deal with the evil hacker who takes control of the server and grabs valuable information. Indeed, it is not. If the hacker gets full control of your mailserver, at least your envelope information is completely compromised. >>> The security of the system depends not on technology, math, or physical laws, but on the whims of just one man This is completely false. Security depended on adversary not having full access to the Lavabit servers, not on Ladar's "whim". As soon as Ladar realized there's no possibility of legally providing it in the US, he closed the service. Assuming your adversary doesn't have full access to your service is kind of a precondition of using the service as means of security. That's like using lock is assuming the adversary does not have the key, if he does, the lock is useless as a security measure. As soon as Lavabit became essentially useless for the purpose it was created, it was shut down.

betterunix 13y ago
"the adversary would have access at least to the envelope information." This is a strawman, because Lavabit never did anything to protect headers. What you are missing is that Lavabit could respond to a demand for plaintext, if Ladar were willing to do so; on the other hand, Google cannot give anyone access to the plaintexts of PGP encrypted messages that I send through their servers because of technical barriers. That is the point of doing your encryption locally, and that is why security and privacy are not a service. "Indeed, it is not. If the hacker gets full control of your mailserver, at least your envelope information is completely compromised." Except that with Lavabit, an attacker could also get all your message bodies. "Security depended on adversary not having full access to the Lavabit servers, not on Ladar's "whim"." Let's put it this way: if you were involved in a lawsuit against Ladar, would you trust your communications with your lawyer to Lavabit? Of course not, because Ladar could have modified the code at any time and without alerting his users at all to read any plaintext that he wanted to read. If he had been willing to cooperate with the government, he could have and nobody would have a clue. "Assuming your adversary doesn't have full access to your service is kind of a precondition of using the service as means of security." In other words, security is not something you can get as a service. The entire model is fundamentally and fatally broken. "That's like using lock is assuming the adversary does not have the key, if he does, the lock is useless as a security measure" No, it is like storing your key with the bartender at your favorite night club and assuming that he will not allow your adversaries to use it. "As soon as Lavabit became essentially useless for the purpose it was created, it was shut down." It was shut down because Ladar chose to shut it down rather than capitulate. He could have chosen to keep it going while the government eavesdropped on it instead. That means that, as I said, security boiled down to Ladar and his principles. That is why PGP and S/MIME provide you with better security: mathematics are not subject to the choices that human beings make, and with PGP, S/MIME, etc. your security is a matter of mathematics.