5 ms·
Other wonderful delivery methods: - Baked into cuneiform - Wax tablets. "Oh, sorry, it got hot in my car and they're a little runny..." - In the form of a cr
by kabdib 13y ago
Other wonderful delivery methods:
- Baked into cuneiform
- Wax tablets. "Oh, sorry, it got hot in my car and they're a little runny..."
- In the form of a crossword puzzle.
- Knitted into a scarf. "Perl one, skip two..."
Best to have hardware from which it is impossible to export a key.
- ars 13y ago> Best to have hardware from which it is impossible to export a key. How is that best? Just hand over the hardware.
- lifeformed 13y agoIn all seriousness, is it possible to design a system where it is simply impossible to hand over data to a third party?
- adrianb 13y agoI believe Julian Assange worked on a system that would make it impossible for an external entity to determine if there is any useful information on a data partition. Basically you would have a hard drive full of random numbers and it would be unfeasible to determine if there is any actual information on it, without the right keys and tools.
- hyperbovine 13y agoI have never heard Assange's name in connection with this, but that's what Truecrypt purports to do: http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume
- hamburglar 13y agoHe did. It was a project called rubberhose.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- Joeboy 13y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose
- tghw 13y agoIt's not exactly the same, but a TPM does something very similar by keeping it at the hardware level.
- yen223 13y agoIf you can access it, then so can someone else. If you can't access it, then why bother building the system in the first place?
- willvarfar 13y agoIts at two levels. Its trivial to make a system where the content of the messages can only be read by the recipient. PGP and GPG email is an example of this end-to-end encryption. The weakness in these schemes is two-fold: the update mechanism for the software (e.g. if its web-based, do you trust the server that serves the page?) and authentication: how do you know that the credentials you have for the recipient are accurate? Its less trivial to make a system where who-is-corresponding-with-whom is obscured. Onion Routing (e.g. TOR) is in this direction, but there are laborious ways to peel the onion. All in all, a hard problem.
- rdl 13y agoYes. You can use HSMs to load the keys; there are various other ways to handle upgrades. It's "non-trivial" in practice.
- pavanky 13y agoone 4 point character per page, delivered as a stack, but unstapled. Bonus points if the pages are numbered, but are sampled from a psuedo random number generator with large cycles.
- unfamiliar 13y ago> sampled from a psuedo random number generator This shouldn't present much of a problem to the NSA.