I'm reading/skimming through this now, and most of the beginning exhibits repeat a lot of stuff. Also, IANAL, so I may be interpreting some of this incorrectly.

I'm reading/skimming through this now, and most of the beginning exhibits repeat a lot of stuff. Also, IANAL, so I may be interpreting some of this incorrectly. On the PDF's page 51, there begins a record of a court proceeding, deliberating what, exactly, the government is looking for in these proceedings. They discuss the coverage that the FBI thinks its pen register needs. Of note is that Levison was not opposed to the pen register (which, to my understanding, would provide the FBI with all encrypted traffic going through Lavabit's servers), he was opposed only to providing the encryption keys, which Levison asserts would provide the FBI the ability to decrypt all traffic, and not just the traffic of the aforementioned SUBJECT, (read: probably Snowden). The judge appears to not be a rubber-stamp entity, which is nice, as shown on pages 58-59. Page 60, Levison states that all the gov needed to do to install the pen register, was set up an appointment with him. But, again, he would not provide any keys. Ha. On page 61, the court explicitly says that all requests for oversight and monitoring will be denied: MR. LEVISON : I guess while I'm here in regards to the pen register, would it be possible to request some sort of external audit to ensure that your orders are followed to the letter in terms of the information collected and preserved? THE COURT : No. The law provides for those things, and any other additional or extra monitoring you might want or think is appropriate will be denied, if that's what you' re requesting. On page 100, Levison states that he can manage to get the information the FBI is looking for, without providing the FBI with Lavabit's encryption keys. Someone (AUSA[censored]) says that the proposed solution does not satisfy the subpoenas and court orders, because it would not provide real-time access to the data. On page 107-108, the court has this to say about a loss of trust from Lavabit's customers, in the event that Lavabit hands over its SSL keys: "Any resulting loss of customer "trust" is not an "unreasonable" burden" Starting on page 121, there is a court discussion about "a motion to quash the requirement of Lavabit to produce its encryption keys and the motion to unseal and lift the nondisclosure requirements of Mr. Levison." Page 126, the court on the government's "right to information". Within the bounds of a criminal investigation, this position seems correct, but they are still requesting a key that would decrypt the communications of about 400,000 customers. Within that context, it seems like overreach. THE COURT : I can understand why the system was set up, but I think the government is -- government's clearly entitled to the information that they're seeking, and just because you-all have set up a system that makes that difficult, that doesn't in any way lessen the government's right to receive that information just as they would from any telephone company or any other e-mail source that could provide it easily. Whether it's -- in other words, the difficulty or the ease in obtaining the information doesn't have anything to do with whether or not the government's lawfully entitled to the information. Man, read page 128 and 129. The judge basically says that because it's a criminal case, the 4th Amendment doesn't apply to the data they are requesting (Lavabit's SSL key, which is very emphatically NOT Snowden's data (or, sorry, THE SUBJECT's data)). What appears to be the now infamous 11 page of 4-point key starts at page 145, as Attachment A. I can't actually verify, from this PDF, that it is text. With the image's resolution, it looks like lines of visual noise. Zooming in, there also appear to be visual artifacts reminiscent of JPG compression.