3 ms·
Here's why this is stupid: This is 1-factor authentication, but it's actually LESS secure than a username and password. A password is something you know - it's
by peterwwillis 13y ago
Here's why this is stupid: This is 1-factor authentication, but it's actually LESS secure than a username and password.
A password is something you know - it's in your head, so it can only be stolen if you save it somewhere, or if there's malware on your computer sniffing it.
The tokens in the phone are saved in the phone, so if you lose the phone, you've just lost your password/set of keys. On top of that, malware in the phone can extract the keys.
With malware on your phone, your accounts can be pilfered without your knowledge, at any time. Or if your phone is stolen. This is different from 2-factor, where you have to both know a secret AND have access to a device.
(If the prospect of malware on your phone doesn't phase you, consider that news articles over three years old reported hundreds of thousands of malware installs found by various security companies)
- patrikr 13y agoThe key on the phone is of course encrypted with a password.
- DanBC 13y agoMalware on the phone isn't covered by their attacks and weaknesses page. (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/attacks.htm https://www.grc.com/sqrl/attacks.htm) The Userview page seems to miss that point as well: (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/userview.htm https://www.grc.com/sqrl/userview.htm) > In other words, only the smartphone's owner can use the system to assert their identity, and nothing will prevent them from asserting their identity whenever they wish to. I think they mean "only the person currently in possession of the smartphone" ... except they go on to say that whoever has the phone has to identify themselves to the phone using a strong password. > The SQRL system was specifically designed to eliminate username and password authentication to remote websites. But controlling access to SQRL authentication itself requires the smartphone's owner to prove their identity to their own phone. > And to that end, “a secret only the user knows” is still the best technique for users to repeatedly, quickly, easily and privately prove their identity to their own smartphone. > The cryptographic design of the SQRL system inherently provides identification security for every website it contacts. In that sense the system itself is fully secure without any password protection. We refer to the SQRL password as a “local password” because it is only used to prevent others from using the SQRL smartphone app to impersonate its owner.
- santosha 13y agoMobile malware is overrated. People have been making a lot of noise for a long time, there's hardly any actual infections observed in the real world. http://chazlever.com/publications/traffic-ndss13.pdf http://chazlever.com/publications/traffic-ndss13.pdf
- nly 13y agoNo, it's two factor. If you look at the crypto page the scheme he proposes uses an 'identity password' in combination with a strong KDF (scrypt). The resulting hash is XOR'd against the masked master device key.
- peterwwillis 13y agoDo you enter the identity password each time you scan a qr code? If not, it's still one factor. Even if you can enter it each time you scan, it's still only on the phone, making it the same if not less secure than doing it all on your desktop.
- ds9 13y agoThe user is vulnerable, not only to "malware" but also to the phone vendor (and anyone the vendor enables, notably government). The degree of control one can attain over a phone or tablet is much less than on a general-purpose PC, and the latter is hard enough to relatively secure. Smartphones are captive, remote-controllable devices and as such are not trustworthy for secure communications or any important secrets. This fact, together with grc's implications that the scheme is novel, important or secure, supports the derisive view of the author in the sub-thread above. Also check out the stylistic buffoonery on his site.
- gcr 13y agoIf you have ever typed your password into your phone, your password is vulnerable to the exact same attacks (keyloggers, caching, ...) you mention. note that i am not affiliated with grc; my name is permuted :)