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Everybody note that the SSL key demand came only after Lavabit declined to turn over information on one user. I can understand the logic of this from the feds'
by wmf 13y ago
Everybody note that the SSL key demand came only after Lavabit declined to turn over information on one user. I can understand the logic of this from the feds' perspective; they tried to do it the "right" way but Lavabit refused to cooperate so then the feds starting trying progressively more aggressive approaches to get the data.
- Glyptodon 13y agoThe problem is that in order to get that information the first way Lavabit would have had to write code that made all of their business claims a lie.
- jauer 13y agoExcept that per the article they already had that code written so they couldn't credibly claim that they weren't able to do it: "The representative of Lavabit indicated that Lavabit had the technical capability to decrypt the information, but that Lavabit did not want to 'defeat [its] own system,'" the government complained.
- Glyptodon 13y ago"Technical ability" means that yes, it's doable if someone does work. It's doesn't mean that they 'already had the ability' other than in a theoretical sense. And even so, it still doesn't change the fact that it would have turned all their business claims into giant lies, possibly even exposing them to suits for false advertising, etc.
- kartikkumar 13y agoI think you're reading the sentence incorrectly. The way I read it, it's not saying that they "technically had the ability", which is what you're suggesting as having the ability in a theoretical sense. It's stating that they "had the technical ability", i.e., they had the technical prowess, knowledge, etc.
- betterunix 13y ago""Technical ability" means that yes, it's doable if someone does work. It's doesn't mean that they 'already had the ability' other than in a theoretical sense." That is a meaningless distinction. It is the difference between having to type a large number of characters (not even that large -- how hard is it to capture a password?), or a small number of characters. Lavabit, as designed, could access any user's email the moment that user logged in. That is obvious to anyone who understands what encryption is. It is an inherent vulnerability in every system that does what Lavabit/Hushmail/etc. do. "And even so, it still doesn't change the fact that it would have turned all their business claims into giant lies, possibly even exposing them to suits for false advertising, etc." If Lavabit advertised itself as an email service that cannot read your email, then that suit could have happened regardless, because the claim is untrue. If, on the other hand, it was advertised as a service that will not read your email and that protects your email while it is stored, that is different and would not have been affected by their cooperation with the FBI's demands.
- tptacek 13y agoThat's true. But then, engage with the question of whether those promises were reasonable. "Even if we have the capability of complying with a request for information on a specific user, we will resist the courts". There's a reason providers tend not to make that promise: keeping it can involve going out of business.
- Glyptodon 13y agoThat's not the promise they made, rather it was that they had not developed and would not develop any means to circumvent the protection/encryption for paying users' accounts. The 'not complying' is only a side effect, and is more so tantamount to a refusal to do work for the government in opposition to lavabit's own business promises. I'm not sure the government in any instance has a right to compel work to meet their specified ends.
- tptacek 13y agoHere my biases as a secure software engineer may be coloring my comments, because to my mind, building an architecture which solicits sensitive data from clients but fails to preclude the disclosure of those secrets without enormous engineering effort is the same thing as conceding that such disclosure is possible. Imagine a mail service that operated solely as a Tor hidden service and required all users to use PGP --- for instance, by checking the contents of mail messages to ensure they were encoding them, and rejecting them if they weren't. That's a service that might reasonably make a promise not to cooperate with a court order. Lavabit didn't have that system and instead had to make a difference promise: that they would shutter the enterprise before cooperating with a court. And so they did.
- thrownaway2424 13y agoThat's retarded though. The absence of getpeername calls in their frontend does not constitute an inability to comply with a pen register order. There are costs of doing business and one of the costs is the ability to comply with lawful court orders. You are completely wrong about the government lacking the means to compel compliance.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- wmf 13y agoArguably they should have thought about that (especially in the wake of Hushmail) before making such claims.
- betterunix 13y agoStrictly speaking, Lavabit always had a back door. Writing the code to exploit it does not in any way change the truth or lack of truth in any of Lavabit's business statements. At some point the secret keys of each Lavabit user were sitting in some part of the server's memory, in the clear, there for the taking. At best Lavabit only ever provided security between logins i.e. when the data is "at rest." Any claims of security beyond that are, to be polite, overstated.
- nkcmr 13y agoTrue, but if widening the scope of a warrant ends up invading the privacy of others completely uninvolved with the investigation, it just isn't right. And that is where the government messed up.
- tptacek 13y agoI don't follow. The inference we're meant to draw here is that DOJ wanted pen/trap information for Edward Snowden --- one specific person very much the target of the investigation. And what this article communicates is that Lavabit had that capability, but deliberately chose not to make it available to DOJ.
- wmf 13y agoI agree there; asking for the SSL key didn't work and it created bad PR for the government.
- shdon 13y agoThe goverment is very, very good at bad PR. I don't think any institution in the world is as good at making people (who didn't previously care) hate them as the US govt is. Self-fulfilling prophecies, in a way. They think everbody hates them, so they react in a paranoid manner and violate the entire world's privacy and civil rights, and they're surprised (or feel vindicated, I suppose) when it is precisely that that makes people hate them.
- PhasmaFelis 13y agoFrom the feds' perspective, sure, but the feds' perspective is equivalent to "If he'd only paid the protection money like I told him to, I wouldn't have had to burn down his restaurant. I tried to be peaceful, but he just wouldn't cooperate!"
- eli 13y agoI doubt they expected him to shutter the entire site. I'd imagine they'd rather have had Snowden's email.
- jlgreco 13y agoIn other words, they did not expect him to act with integrity. They expected him to turn over the SSL key, then continue offering something that he knew he was no longer in a position to provide. Their expectations of others reflect poorly on themselves.
- PhasmaFelis 13y agoI'm sure, but that's not really better. That just means the mobster in my analogy is befuddled that the restaurant owner chose close up shop and leave town after being threatened with arson.
- JoshTriplett 13y agoIf you start from the premise of not accepting an answer like "no, not under any circumstances", then the request certainly seems like the logical escalation. Hence the need to develop systems for which the first "no" is the only "no": "no, we don't have the client-side encryption keys, and there's no way for us to give them to you, nor is there any way for you to surreptitiously insert them into the Open Source client software without being noticed, nor are we obligated to accept your patches introducing security holes which will effectively destroy our entire business/project credibility". It needs to be more difficult to use your project as a tool for surveillance than it is to personally compromise a specific end-user system. (That's not to say we shouldn't pursue legislative solutions eliminating the requests in the first place: we need to fight surveillance capabilities on both fronts, legal and technical.)
- SoftwareMaven 13y agoI spent two years working on a secure, web-based email provider. In order to actually make it secure, you have to abandon all aspects of usability. In order to use it, you have to have native client-side code (javascript is not secure). The user has to be responsible for her key, and if she loses it (or forgets the password, if using generating keys from passwords), her email is gone. Before the user can send a message to somebody else, the other person has to install and configure everything so keys can be swapped. All of this, and you get paid squat because email is seen as a "free" service. And, to really make it secure, you need to go outside of the smtp world, because all smtp has some amount of meta-data that gets transmitted in the envelope. And that meta-data can be just as damning as the contents of the messages. I don't expect there to really ever be a truly secure email service, unfortunately.
- camus 13y agoHow does the feds kool aid taste dude ? " they tried to do it the "right" way "... there is no right way in tyrany.
- acqq 13y agoNo, under the pretext of a "single user" FBI wanted to install their own equipment inside of his facilities (at the point where everything of every user is decrypted): http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801182/redacted-pleadings-exhibits-1-23.pdf http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801182/redacted-pleadi... "shall furnish agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, forthwith , all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and use of the pen/trap device."