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Your argument is a bit disingenuous. You say you'd trust simple closed-source software more than complicated open-source counterparts. That's a false dichotomy.
by StavrosK 13y ago
Your argument is a bit disingenuous. You say you'd trust simple closed-source software more than complicated open-source counterparts. That's a false dichotomy. Open source X is always more easily auditable than closed source X.
I don't think many people are worried that BT will be evil. I think many more people are worried that they'll be incompetent, and it's very hard to be competent at cryptography. That's why we want the source.
- saurik 13y agoOk, then I will say your argument is a bit disingenuous, as I did not compare "open source X" to "closed source X": I am trying to show that "is it open source" is just one of many variables that you might consider while evaluating the security of a program, and I am further attempting to claim that it is not even the most important of these variables. In the real world, we are choosing between software that differ in many ways, not just one: all individual dichotomies are "false". I mean, I could also say the argument "you can't trust closed source software for this stuff" is also "a bit disingenuous" via the analogous argument that that open vs. closed is a "false dichotomy": a single-threaded/type-safe/un-obfuscated X-source program "is always more easily auditable" than a multi-threaded/type-unsafe/obfuscated X-source program. Now, the question becomes "what variables are more important to you, and will your reactions be 'knee jerk' or rational"?
- StavrosK 13y agoSure, it's only one variable. I disagree that it's not the most important one. You can audit a multithreaded open source program much more easily than you can audit a single-threaded closed source program. Merely compiling it adds more obfuscation than making it needlessly, complicated will, and making it needlessly complicated will immediately raise red flags. You don't need to analyze an open-source program to see that it's been obfuscated, and, if it claims to do anything that requires security, that would probably be enough to make you suspicious. My ultimate point is that compiling is a form of obfuscation that has extreme plausible deniability. There's no form of obfuscation that will complicate the code of an open source program as much as compiling it will, while still looking as innocuous as compiling does.
- saurik 13y ago> You can audit a multithreaded open source program much more easily than you can audit a single-threaded closed source program. I think this is our core disagreement, as I've been pretty clear about how I don't just accept this statement at face value given the large class of subtle bugs that can and do occur constantly in multi-threaded systems. I find reading through and finding bugs in complex binary-only buffer-management or even cryptographic systems "easy" (time consuming, but not requiring much brain function; even obfuscation just adds time and effort, it doesn't require greater intelligence); yet, I have never managed to remove every single concurrency bug from an open-source project I maintain that only actually uses threads to separate tasks like "searching" from "downloading update" (of course, I likely didn't put as much effort into it, so this doesn't prove anything of course: but I hope it makes you think), and I've seen people "much smarter than me" (working at Google and Apple) fail at doing so in systems that are "much more important" (working on Chromium and WebKit). You might then just say that I'm probably just stupid and that a more reasonable programmer wouldn't have the same kinds of issues, but "concurrency is hard" I had assumed was a well-known issue. (And again, I think that this all becomes more more interesting to think about once you realize that a "backdoor" left by an intelligent opponent is going to be nearly indistinguishable from a "bug". At least once a year there is some obscure privilege escalation bug found in the Linux kernel: I think it is interesting to at least consider momentarily that any of those might have been a backdoor, and not a bug; the concept of what constitutes purposely malicious code updates tends to be way too narrow in my view, and leads people to only consider back doors that are easy to see when you print out the source code.) > There's no form of obfuscation that will complicate the code of an open source program as much as compiling it will, while still looking as innocuous as compiling does. Yeah, no: I seriously read through compiled code every day. I was doing a lot of reading through compiled code yesterday while working on figuring out why Substrate isn't working on iOS 7 for example. I am much much much more afraid of the bugs that are latent in a large multi-threaded project that has "lots of hands in the cookie jar" so-to-speak than of a simpler implementation distributed as a closed-source binary. I'm likewise more afraid of open-source projects that accept patches from large numbers of people (which means more people who might be actively /trying/ to add difficult-to-see exploitable bugs), or of projects that are implemented to run as native code versus ones that run inside of type-safe virtual machines (especially if the virtual machine is coded to a spec and I get to select the one it runs on).
- bigiain 13y agoFrom a "non US person" perspective, I go to BitTorrent's website and read: Company Overview BitTorrent Inc. is an Internet technology company based in San Francisco. And immediately I've got _two_ things to worry about - 1) "will BT be evil/incompetent?", and 2) "will BT be leaned on by the NSA and be coerced into being evil?" If you're a US company (or individual, or a company with US based management, developers, investors, or infrastructure) who are promoting security-related products in the post-Snowden era – many of us outside the US now have very good reasons to apply extra scrutiny to those products. Opening your source will make a _big_ difference in how readily suspicions of evilness can be allayed. As saurik points out upthread, having the source available doesn't guarantee the rest of the open source community will find and fix any carefully-enough-crafted backdoors, but keeping the source closed sends a strong message…
- Avshalom 13y agoFrom a US perspective: The NSA doesn't lean on non-US companies because it is fully authorized to just hack them directly. Your data kept in foreign countries don't even have the nominal legal protection that US data does. Unless you've got unbreakable security the NSA is well funded enough that it's irrelevant where you do business.
- morkbot 13y agoExcept that in the case of non-US companies NSA has to do the actual hacking. In case of US ones they simply need to "ask" a company to, say, handle them their master keys - much easier.