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Here is an NSA slide where the NSA talks about exploiting Trusted Computing Platforms for intelligence[1]. The German government believes that the TPM is back
by EthanHeilman 13y ago
Here is an NSA slide where the NSA talks about exploiting Trusted Computing Platforms for intelligence[1].
The German government believes that the TPM is backdoored and a danger to security[2].
1: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-r...
2: http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/microsoft-seeks-calm-on-german-security-panic-over-windows-8-125702 http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/microsoft-seeks-calm-on...
- codex 13y agoIf you can't trust the TPM, can you trust Intel's debug registers to be secure? Long term I suspect that this kind of thing will use Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which creates a trusted enclave of code and data that not even the kernel nor the hypervisor can access.
- andyjohnson0 13y agoA couple of interesting articles on SGX: http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/thoughts-on-intels-upcoming-software.html http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/thoughts-on... http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/thoughts-on-intels-upcoming-software.html http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/thoughts-on...
- codex 13y agoThe second article is quite alarming. Don't run any code in an enclave which you didn't compile yourself! One may not even be able to use a virtual machine to peer inside an enclave by emulating SGX: the software could demand a valid public key stored uniquely in every Intel chip and signed by Intel's private key, which a hypervisor would not have.