8 ms·
TRESOR Runs Encryption Securely Outside RAM
- ape4 13y agoNow thats paranoid ;)
- keyme 13y agoNot really... I've seen a demonstration where a Truecrypt (or something similar) encrypted laptop is stolen. The machine is locked, but still powered on (very reasonable. You locked your machine and left your desk). This basically means that the AES key is in RAM. The attacker/thief cools down the RAM with liquid nitrogen (to slow the discharge), inserts a bootable CD with a special tool to dump physical RAM on bootup, and quickly cycles the laptop battery (causing a cold boot). Since the RAM is not zeroed on bootup, the "old" bits stay pretty much as they were (thanks to the cooling). IIRC this allowed an attacker recovery of the key with a very high probability of success.
- BWStearns 13y agoWhile everything you say is true, it would seem paranoid in many cases. I don't know how many neighborhood electronics fencers have liquid nitrogen laying around or the computer savvy to pull this kind of stuff. If someone is after me who is using this methodology then I have seriously pissed off the wrong people. While you could argue that it's only paranoia if the object of preparation is not possible, I would say that you're at least one leg over the fence into paranoia-land if you're prepping against a cold-boot and don't have any nation state or corporate espionage level enemies.
- jacquesm 13y agoObviously it is not neighborhood electronics fencers we're addressing here.
- abecedarius 13y agoLN2 is cheap. If undergrads can make LN2 ice cream, they can use it for cracking too.
- aroch 13y agoOne of the nice things about OSX and Filevault2 is that you can force the key to be destroyed on suspend: destroyfvkeyonstandby - Destroy File Vault Key when going to standby mode. By default File vault keys are retained even when system goes to standby. If the keys are destroyed, user will be prompted to enter the password while coming out of standby mode.(value: 1 - Destroy, 0 - Retain)
- anologwintermut 13y agoOne of the other nice things about OSX is the feds may already have your key[0], so if you manage to get your computer back from them after that confiscate it, it won't have cracks in it from the extreme cold. [0]http://www.nosuchcon.org/talks/D1_02_Alex_Ninjas_and_Harry_Potter.pdf http://www.nosuchcon.org/talks/D1_02_Alex_Ninjas_and_Harry_P...
- aroch 13y agoSMCs are present in nearly all Intel systems...They could very well store your truecrypt keys too
- anologwintermut 13y agoSMCs are not the problem. The problem is code in OSX could put your key there in a way that someone could dump it. Of course, since FileVault is not open source, we have no way of knowing if it does this. Is this paranoid? Perhaps, but if you are worried about cold boot attacks you should be worried about this as well. You might also be worried about some strange design decisions in FileVault such as the fact that it uses public key cryptography[0] for what ought to just be symmetric disk encryption. While not a red flag,it is a bit strange. [0]http://deimos3.apple.com/WebObjects/Core.woa/FeedEnclosure/utah.edu.1380568002.01381129957.14368733217/enclosure.pdf http://deimos3.apple.com/WebObjects/Core.woa/FeedEnclosure/u...
- InclinedPlane 13y agoIt doesn't actually require LN2. In fact, all you really need for many cases is a can of compressed air and a usb drive. The idea that your full disk encryption is only safe so long as nobody manages to have such outlandishly difficult to acquire materials is rather disheartening. Moreover, disk encryption systems aren't just designed for overly paranoid individuals who probably don't have anything more interesting on their drive than embarrassing porn, it's also targeted for people who have data they seriously want to keep from being divulged. A perfect example being a running, but locked, corporate laptop being stolen from an office building or even a public space (e.g. a coffee shop). Someone desiring to commit industrial espionage would have no difficulties whatsoever in pulling off a cold boot attack on a vulnerable system, even if liquid nitrogen was required (it's quite easy to obtain and fairly cheap).
- BWStearns 13y agoWhile the materials required are quite simple to get I am more worried about someone jacking my macbook pro and wiping the drive and reselling it as opposed to someone doing a cold boot on it. The materials are cheap, the execution of the attack isn't terrifically complicated for the folks on here, but the likelihood of being a victim of this attack in the wild is exceedingly low, that's what I was getting at moreso than the difficulty of the attack.
- dlitz 13y agoCorporate espionage isn't exactly rare, and it can affect any employee (usually the least important employees, since they tend to be the least careful).
- vidarh 13y agoReminds me of old home computers, where the RAM was slow enough to discharge that you didn't need to bother to cool down anything: Flicking the power quickly enough on a C64 would often leave most of the memory intact.
- henrikm85 13y agoThat was probably because of a capacitor somewhere in the power supply though..., right?
- tedunangst 13y agoIf this is a concern, the solution is easy. Buy an SSD, turn computer off when you walk away, turn computer on when you come back. The intersection of people vulnerable to cold boot attacks and people likely to be victims of cold boot attacks is hopefully the empty set.
- tga_d 13y agoYou don't actually even need to use liquid nitrogen. Much more common is chemical duster (hold the can upside-down and the boiling fluorocarbons will rapidly cool anything), or even nothing at all if you do it quickly. There are entire USB distributions dedicated to this sort of thing, and it has been done plenty of times outside of academic or professional settings. For example: http://revision3.com/hak5/coldbootattack http://revision3.com/hak5/coldbootattack
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- conductor 13y agoElcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor [0] can find the decryption keys from the RAM dumps or hibernation files. The RAM can be accessed using a DMA malware from the GPU/NIC/Intel ME or other devices which have a (micro-)processor and can use DMA [1, just submitted]. [0] - http://www.elcomsoft.com/efdd.html http://www.elcomsoft.com/efdd.html [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6457069 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6457069
- tedunangst 13y agoYour backdoored DMA capable NIC can also just copy the plaintext out of RAM without futzing around with the key.
- conductor 13y agoCopy the plaintext of what? The password? The encryption programs usually don't keep the password in the RAM longer than required, but the key must be always there. I just wanted to say that keeping the decryption keys out of RAM and Disks is not that paranoid because there are techniques which allow extraction of data from the RAM: cold boot, ordinary malware/rootkits, DMA malware.
- tedunangst 13y agoThe plaintext of whatever you're encrypting. Presumably you're going to actually use these debug register AES keys to encrypt or decrypt something more interesting.
- rdl 13y agoThe sneaky thing is to do like TreVisor, and I believe the commercial company PrivateCore, to encrypt all memory outside the CPU die (L1/L2, maybe L3?), by pinning the hypervisor and encryption routines to something running inside, and encrypting everything which leaves (and presumably doing some integrity protection). HN user sweis works for PrivateCore; I've talked to them a few times and they seem really interesting, although I think a more conventional HSM makes more sense for some applications, and Intel SGX is going to make the whole thing a lot more interesting in 2-3 years.
- jws 13y agoThis keeps the AES keys in some x86 debug registers so they never appear in RAM and can't be accessed after a reboot.
- zamalek 13y agoHad to delete my comment :(. Thanks for clarifying that.
- codex 13y agoWhy not keep the keys in a TPM and pull them into "real" registers whenever the kernel context switches into a specially flagged AES decode thread, and zero them when context switching away?
- EthanHeilman 13y agoHere is an NSA slide where the NSA talks about exploiting Trusted Computing Platforms for intelligence[1]. The German government believes that the TPM is backdoored and a danger to security[2]. 1: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-reveal-nsa-campaign-against-encryption.html?_r=0 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/09/05/us/documents-r... 2: http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/microsoft-seeks-calm-on-german-security-panic-over-windows-8-125702 http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/microsoft-seeks-calm-on...
- codex 13y agoIf you can't trust the TPM, can you trust Intel's debug registers to be secure? Long term I suspect that this kind of thing will use Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which creates a trusted enclave of code and data that not even the kernel nor the hypervisor can access.
- andyjohnson0 13y agoA couple of interesting articles on SGX: http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/thoughts-on-intels-upcoming-software.html http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/thoughts-on... http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/thoughts-on-intels-upcoming-software.html http://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/thoughts-on...
- jdjb 13y agoShouldn't this also be a really fast implementation since there isn't even the delay required to move items into/out of ram? Also what happens if the scheduler moves the application out of running state?
- DennisP 13y agoHm. Maybe Linux should fold this into the kernel.
- barrkel 13y agoDebug registers are only accessible in Ring 0. I haven't looked at the implementation described, but I'd be surprised if it isn't a kernel module or something equivalent.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- rthomas6 13y agoI'm not very knowledgeable about x86, but why do they have to use the debug registers if they're slower? I know in GCC you can mark registers as "do not touch" when you write assembly in C. Why not use more general purpose registers?
- mikeash 13y agoBecause the idea is to run it in kernel mode with arbitrary other software running on the computer. Asking other software to pretty please don't touch these specific registers isn't going to work, because there's no way to enforce that. The debug registers are perfect because they can only be accessed from kernel mode, not userland.
- tptacek 13y agoRegisters you ask the compiler not to touch are still flushed to RAM on context switches, which defeats the purpose of this system.
- shredfvz 13y agoIn the AUR: https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/linux-lts-tresor/ https://aur.archlinux.org/packages/linux-lts-tresor/
- kephra 13y ago/me sings, "Another one bites the Dust" Error The website encountered an unexpected error. Please try again later. Error message PDOException: SQLSTATE[HY000] [2002] Can't connect to local MySQL server through socket '/var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock' (111) in lock_may_be_available() (line 167 of /var/www/i1/includes/lock.inc). It looks as Drupal is not suited to stand a HN-DDoS, of 70 points (7000 visitors estimate) in 3 hours.
- dobbsbob 13y agoDidn't DDR3 ram basically make cold boot attacks obsolete? They don't hold any voltage when you power down long enough to even freeze the chips
- MichaelGG 13y agoInteresting, that sounds correct: http://www1.cs.fau.de/filepool/projects/coldboot/fares_coldboot.pdf http://www1.cs.fau.de/filepool/projects/coldboot/fares_coldb... Even with cooling they weren't able to recover. However, a warm reboot, would still work. Speculating, but some laptops might have a way to force a reboot like some machines have a reset button. That'd at least restart the system, although proper BIOS config should prevent that from being useful.
- sigstoat 13y agohm, it looks to me like they just cover the sorts of temperatures you see in refrigerators. any idea if work has been done on cryogenic temperatures?
- drivebyacct2 13y agoWait, there's a white paper that attacks TRESOR successfully. Why hasn't it been posted. No one will see it if I poast it anyway.
- jnt 13y agoAnd to avoid keyloggers being installed when the machine is powered of, see STARK[1] from the same uni. [1] http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/stark http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/stark
- sweis 13y agoTRESOR still leaves all the code and data exposed in memory. You can modify the code that's being executed in order to divulge the contents of the debug registers. We're working on solving the malicious device and cold boot problem at PrivateCore. To do so, we're encrypting all of main memory and keeping plaintext state in the L3 cache. Here's a resource page with links to the TRESOR paper and other resources: http://privatecore.com/resources-overview/physical-memory-attacks/ http://privatecore.com/resources-overview/physical-memory-at...
- ris 13y agoWhere's the source? Or are you expecting us to trust your proprietary nonfree software without ever seeing it? Good luck with that.