You have a point (his style, which you summarized well, grates on me too[1]). But there are not enough people pointing to the consequences of important systems

You have a point (his style, which you summarized well, grates on me too[1]). But there are not enough people pointing to the consequences of important systems in our society that, from a risk point of view, are accidents waiting to happen. We act like we understand them, but we actually understand them just well enough to be dangerous. One general casting of the "problem" is -- systems with potentially-large downside risk in which the risk is externalized to society at large, or to the future, but the principal actors are largely insulated from that risk. (Finance, of course, but also biological experimentation, climate change, nuclear technology.) Taleb doesn't cover all the bases, but I interpret that to mean that we need more voices addressing this problem. It would be smart of Taleb to identify and cite them instead of trying to invent an analysis formalism himself. But, we can't have everything. ([1] I'm familiar with measure-theoretic probability, and one author of the paper he criticizes in the extended footnote on page 6 was on my PhD committee. This is why I'm sympathetic to the problems you've identified in his writing.)