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Not to mention - you're assuming your children will grow up, move out, establish themselves, become very successful working adults, have enough money to support
by aestra 13y ago
Not to mention - you're assuming your children will grow up, move out, establish themselves, become very successful working adults, have enough money to support you and their own children (which are their "responsible financial future investment,") and then wish to support you also.
These are all crazy assumptions.
What if your children are born with disabilities and can't work and require care for the rest of their lives? You might be able to provide that care, but they might also need expensive professional care. The State might have to step in anyway. What if they move away? They might not be able to move closer even if they wanted due to circumstances, like being in the military for example. What if they can only find work part time, or minimum wage? What if they are lazy or depressed and won't work and don't want to move out of the house? What if they get into drugs? What if they become homeless? What if they simply don't want to help you financially? They actually do have free will. They might be willing, but not able. They might be willing, but upset they you expect them to help you financially. What if they have medical problems also? What if they die young, before you? They might have an accident, and lose their ability to work.
I know of people where all of these things happened. These aren't super rare occurrences. If you think these can't happen, think again.
Having children with the expectation or even assumption they will provide some kind of services (financial or otherwise) to you in your old age is extremely unfair to the children and to yourself.
- rayiner 13y ago> These are all crazy assumptions. They're really not. Even western society relied on them almost exclusively to support old people until just 60-70 years ago.
- aestra 13y agoNo. Only life on farms where children were labor, and not since the industrial revolution. The United State's page on the history of Social Security gives us some more information: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66n1p1.html http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66n1p1.html >The Great Depression was clearly a catalyst for the Social Security Act of 1935, and some of its provisions—notably the means-tested programs—were intended to offer immediate relief to families. However, the old-age insurance program—the precursor to today's Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, or Social Security, program—was not designed specifically to deal with the economic crisis of that era. Indeed, monthly benefit payments, under the original Act, were not scheduled to begin until 1942. In addition, from the beginning, the Social Security program has embodied social insurance principles that were widely discussed even before the onset of the Great Depression. >Although the Great Depression was a catalyst for the creation of the Social Security program, the idea of social insurance predated the committee's work and the Depression. As early as the 1880s, Germany had built a social insurance program (one requiring contributions from workers) that provided for sickness, maternity, and old-age benefits.1 Some authors have linked Germany's early adoption of social insurance programs to its rapid industrialization in the latter half of the 19th century (Schottland 1963, 15; Schieber and Shoven 1999, 17). A significant period of industrialization and urbanization also preceded the advent of social insurance programs in the United States. In 1880, the populations of farm and nonfarm workers were about equally balanced, but by 1930, workers in farm occupations accounted for only 21 percent of the workforce (Census Bureau 1956, 195). >As the nation industrialized, increasing numbers of Americans depended on wage income (and less on family-based structures typical of a farm economy). Further, Schieber and Shoven (1999) argue that wage income, even before the Depression, was volatile. From 1905 to 1909, the nonfarm unemployment rate varied widely (ranging from 3.9 percent to 16.4 percent), with a similarly wide range (4.1 percent to 19.5 percent) occurring from 1920 to 1924 (Schieber and Shoven 1999, 19). Older workers, in particular, often bore the brunt of economic downturns.2 Cyclical swings in the economy were not the only concern. Lost wages due to disability, death, or retirement were also seen as problems not adequately dealt with by the structures of an industrial economy. Academic and political interest grew in social insurance plans that would smooth out the volatility of income or, said differently, insure against fluctuations in labor-market income. Second of all, the life expectancy in 1935 was 61.7. Lots of people work until 61.7.