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I think they're missing the point. The passcode on an iPhone defends against other people in your environment - family members, coworkers, roommates - getting y
by neilk 13y ago
I think they're missing the point. The passcode on an iPhone defends against other people in your environment - family members, coworkers, roommates - getting your information opportunistically. It doesn't defend against hackers, the government, or even slightly savvy thieves.
Also, if a fingerprint sensor is significantly easier to use, and in practice will deter a class of privacy violations, it could increase overall security. This is a question you can only answer by looking how people behave, not solely with an analysis of the technology.
The fingerprint sensor worries me more that it records biometric information at all. It's one thing to leave fingerprints all around your environment, but there is now the potential to steal your biometrics over the internet. The device supposedly hashes the data derived from your fingerprint, presumably with a hardware-based secret, but I worry someone will find a way around that. (EDIT: maybe this is physically impossible; can someone provide details?)
Also, the issues that CCC discusses about how fingerprint unlocking can be coerced are important. Many law enforcement organizations now have devices that can scan smartphone data, which is bad enough, but at least the use of those devices are controlled. A fingerprint sensor now allows a cop to handcuff someone, jam his or her finger onto the phone, and then to (for instance) delete an incriminating video.
Likewise anyone else willing to use force. Might become the next schoolyard amusement for bullies, if your kid has a smartphone.
- controv3 13y ago> I think they're missing the point. The passcode on an iPhone defends against other people in your environment - family members, coworkers, roommates - getting your information opportunistically. It doesn't defend against hackers, the government, or even slightly savvy thieves. The Google Chrome Security team begs to differ [1]. According to them giving someone the illusion of security is bad. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6165708 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6165708
- arrrg 13y agoWhich is an incredibly absurd position, in any context. Security is not binary.
- Groxx 13y agoIf it were, it would always be 0.
- numbsafari 13y agoWhich is ironic coming from a company known to be sharing information directly with the NSA. Name one security technology that is 100% foolproof. They don't exist. So the point isn't to rely on one thing, but to rely on many things that, used in concert, increase the risk, complexity and cost associated with subverting the entire system--not its individual components.
- philwelch 13y agoI don't think I've seen anyone parry an appeal to authority with an ad hominem lately. Good one.
- numbsafari 13y agoUmm... I think the point was to subvert the appeal to authority by pointing out that Google has been compromised. The main argument is in the second paragraph. Anyhow, thanks for noticing :)
- Karunamon 13y agoIn this case it's valid. In the same way that you'd afford extra scrutiny to a government agent making claims about what encryption methods to use, you should afford the same scrutiny to companies making security claims who are documented collaborators with the TLAs. An ad hominem isn't always a fallacy, especially when the credibility of the speaker is legitimately in question. Saying they're automatically wrong would be fallacious (not to mention silly), but questioning credibility based on actual, documented behavior is not.
- victorf 13y agoCiting the Google Chrome Security team regarding security is the exact opposite of the appeal to authority fallacy. It's an appropriate expert for the context.
- sbuk 13y agoNo. It's appeal to authority.
- CamperBob2 13y agoGiving someone the illusion of security is bad because it displaces their understanding of security. An understanding of security will reveal that security is not a binary state of affairs. It's perfectly reasonable to trust known-imperfect mechanisms like the iPhone fingerprint reader to keep honest people honest and discourage ordinary muggers and thieves. I don't need military-grade access control for my personal iPhone, I don't want the inconvenience that would necessarily accompany it, and I damned sure don't want to pay for it. And the Google Chrome guy is correct in all respects: it's not reasonable to expect an application to provide security that's redundant with security provided by user accounts on the OS it runs on. It would be better to teach users to create separate accounts on their system, if they want to hide their local passwords from other members of their family.
- melange 13y agoTeaching users to create separate accounts might be better, but so would any number of impractical suggestions. It is perfectly reasonable to expect an application to provide more security than the user account provides because in the real world, we know that people don't always lock their computers. Not all applications are risky, but one that centralizes a users credentials is clearly so. Pretending otherwise is simply not acknowledging the real world.
- epo 13y agoYou are completely detached from normal practical realities, as such your beliefs on security can be safely disregarded.
- jpalioto 13y agoThe first round of sleephack data exposures will put the failure to that point.
- speedyapoc 13y ago> It's one thing to leave fingerprints all around your environment, but there is now the potential to steal your biometrics over the internet. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the biometric data never leaves the device.
- erichocean 13y agoIt's also not stored on the device. Hashes, not fingerprints, are stored. You need the fingerprints themselves to fake out the hardware.
- marshray 13y agoRare is the phone without the owner's fingerprints stored all over it.
- erichocean 13y agoSure, but his post was about stealing data "over the Internet". That's not possible. All bets are off with physical access to the hardware, of course.
- Bud 13y agoNot true at all. There are quite a large number of cases out there that would be hard to lift fingerprints from. If the owner has this sort of case, and if the owner has cleaned the screen recently or just had the phone pocketed, thus wiping the screen off rather well...I think there are a large number of phones from which you would get no prints.
- melange 13y agoNobody has been able to use those low quality fingerprints to defeat TouchID.
- marshray 13y agoI wouldn't count on that. See https://twitter.com/dotMudge/status/381900643415240704 https://twitter.com/dotMudge/status/381900643415240704
- DenisM 13y agoYou are overcomplicatimg things. The hypothetical cop could just smash your phone to pieces. Same result, less effort.
- neilk 13y agoNot the same result at all. You now have lost your phone and the cop has to argue that you smashed it yourself out of spite. There may be more witnesses or evidence after smashing a phone. Presumably there are even phone company records showing when and where a device went dead. I am not a lawyer but it seems to me, 9 times out 10, the cop would prefer a cleaner result - they confiscate your device, and oops, when you get it back, the video is gone.
- diydsp 13y agothat's actually kind of ironic... ...the people closest to you in your environment ( kids, parents, spouse, boss, co-workers) are the ones who can most easily obtain your fingerprints...
- interpol_p 13y agoAnd are probably least easily able to capture a high resolution image and reproduce a 2400 dpi heavy-ink image that is then used to create mould of your print.