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LIRA: Lightweight Incentivized Routing for Anonymity [pdf]
- exo762 13y ago> Therefore, we assume that the bank faithfully executes the > protocol and only makes observations that are part of that > protocol. In particular, he does not act as an onion > router or as a client, only observes messages that are > sent to him, and does not collude with the network > adversary. "Not collude" part worries me. Can anyone smart enough comment on this?
- javajosh 13y agoNo, a better way is to do outreach to the people who have the resources to contribute. I can think of an important group, represented by HN: web site consultants and web companies that may have excess hosting resources at the end of the month, every month. Essentially Tor could be that thing you run on your servers before you launch; and if you launched, then before you get big. Think of it as a kind of load test for your young, under-used infrastructure. ADD: How to install tor server: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-relay-debian.html.en I'm doing it right now...But I'm realizing that I really need better bandwidth constraints. I want to be able to tell Tor to limit itself by connection count, bandwidth, and memory consumption. ADD: Holy cow, they really want you to lock down your Tor box: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OperationalSecurity Anyone know why they expect a box running a tor relay to be locked down so tightly?
- zaphar 13y agoPerhaps because a compromised box is useless for running Tor? The goal here is anonimity. A box that is compromised is one more chink in that anonymity.
- superkuh 13y agoHere's a non-scribd link: http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/papers/lira-ndss2013.pdf http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/papers/lira-ndss2013.pdf