5 ms·
TripleSec - Symmetric Encryption combining AES, Salsa20, and Twofish
- zeckalpha 13y agoI may be wrong as I'm no security researcher, but I was under the impression that combining things like this (and rolling your own crypto in general) could potentially make things weaker. Is this the case here? Edit: Reading it more, I'm more convinced. It looks like there was a discussion a few days ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6401057 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6401057
- finnh 13y agoI have the same question, from the same position of ignorance. can we get some tptacek up in here?
- switch33 13y agoI've been under the assumption from reading some crypto over the years that in particular what your thinking of is applying the "same" crypto multiple times. Offering the same cryptography scheme multiple times is horribly bad. Like 3DES is horribly bad when implemented because it eats up the keyspace reducing the issue for it. If the schemes of cryptography that you use do not reduce the amount of permutations/possibilities that you are using I see no reason why it wouldn't at least add a bit of extra difficulty in attaining the calculations behind the results. This does sound like the right way to deal with cryptography with Javascript as pointed out by Triplesec: "authenticates with HMAC to protect against (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attacks; and supplements the native entropy sources (window.crypto.getRandomValues in the browser and crypto.rng in Node.js) for fear they are weak." Particulary because other ways of dealing with javascript random number generators (especially their api) is awful. You can read about some of that here: http://www.matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ http://www.matasano.com/articles/javascript-cryptography/ But, I would still like to hear someone who knows more about using these three schemes back to back. Sometimes the permutations are effected in weird ways.
- rainsford 13y agoCombining algorithms, if done properly, isn't necessarily going to make things weaker. But doing it properly isn't trivial (which goes for crypto in general) and the more complex the construction, the more opportunities for screwing it up. But at the end of the day it's still trying to solve the wrong problem. The chance of a well studied algorithm like AES having a significant weakness is much, MUCH lower than the chance that a particular program using it has a security flaw. Any effort spent layering Twofish and Salsa20 on top of AES would almost certainly be better spent making sure the usage of AES is totally secure.
- maxtaco 13y agoIt wasn't trivial to write TripleSec, which I why we did it and open-sourced it. Any encrypted data you put onto a remote-server will live there forever, so your encryption has to be future-proof. I think it pays to hedge your bets here. All of our implementations are tested against known test vectors. Side-channel attacks could be a problem though.
- maxtaco 13y agoThere is no way this construction is weaker than the weakest of the three. To convince yourself of this, assume one of the ciphers is 100% broken and spits out all 0s. Then you're XOR'ing your ciphertext with all 0s (or some other known pad). So it's just a noop. As the FAQ says, because one cipher is not used as the input to another, there's no way a weakness can spread up or down the chain. There was a discussion on twitter among cryptographers/security practitioners (search for @agl___), and in spite of some unnecessary flaming, we are almost certain now that the cipher cascade and the MAC scheme are both as strong as their strongest components. See this publication for more information about the cipher cascade: http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02620231 http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02620231 See this publication for more information about the HMAC construction: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/2094/1/thesis.lehmann.pdf http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/2094/1/thesis.lehmann.pd...
- blake8086 13y agoI like this idea to reduce dependence on trusting any given algorithm. If I'm a global passive adversary, I would try to attack your blobs in these ways: 1) weaken your random number generators 2) guess your password by running massive dumps of passwords and passwords mutated with rules against pbkdf2 (why didn't you use scrypt?) 3) try to convince you or your system to decrypt a blob and reveal the plaintext to me surreptitiously (not so passive) 4) try to get your password from security flaws in wherever you store it 5) conduct traffic analysis on who is storing blobs where and when, and how long their blobs are My bet is that the password is the weak point. Can you do anything to address that?
- rorrr2 13y ago1) How do you do that? His random generator is not even controlled by him, it's a bunch of open source browsers. 2) That's basically bruteforcing. Considering he is running pbkdf2 thousands of times, good luck with that. You might get lucky with 5-6 character passwords and a bunch of servers. 3) How? 4) Passwords are usually stored either nowhere (inside user's head) or a program like KeePass. Good luck breaking either. 5) What would that give you? It's still triple-encrypted.
- bankIsSketch 13y agoPasswords have always been a weak point. This has been widely discussed for the last two decades of security research. Solving the password dilemma is not his or her intention.
- maxtaco 13y agoPasswords are bound to be weak, you are right. Running PBKDF2 only gives some protection against password-cracking, but a well-funded adversary can overcome that protection if the original password doesn't have enough entropy. For passwords, I recommend using a sequence of 4-5 random words chosen from a ~20k word dictionary. This gives you about 58 to 72 bits of entropy. I also recommend https://oneshallpass.com https://oneshallpass.com for giving random PWs to different Web sites, but that's a slightly different problem.
- oakwhiz 13y agoDidn't Bruce Schneier publish a provably secure scheme in which multiple encryption algorithms could be combined such that a weakness in any single one of them was not sufficient to reduce the security of the message?
- maxtaco 13y agoYes, it's in Section 15.8 of the 2nd edition of Applied Cryptography. This is basically that scheme, but we're not inflating ciphertexts as he suggests (which is a good thing).
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 13y agoDon't use this thing.
- maxtaco 13y agoIs there any justification to your comments? Your criticisms on the crypto have all been debunked by those who know the crypto. See here for an example: http://d3j5vwomefv46c.cloudfront.net/photos/large/810438785.png?1379813991 http://d3j5vwomefv46c.cloudfront.net/photos/large/810438785.... Again, I am open to valid criticisms. Those of the form "this is stupid because XSS isn't solved" aren't valid in my book because they are orthogonal problems, and progress along either axis is good.
- tptacek 13y agoWhat a weird comment. All Adam Langley seems to have to say about your system is that you didn't use a weak cipher composition but did use a weak MAC composition, and all I have to say in that thread is that I didn't think the Joux multicollision attack he was referring to applied. And yet somehow, presumably by ignoring the other cryptographers criticizing this design at the same time, you synthesized a narrative about how "my criticisms" were "debunked". Here's the problem I have with your design: it doesn't make any sense to me. So worried are you about the NSA's ability to break AES or Salsa20 --- a worry not apparently shared by cryptographers, so far as I can tell --- that you resurrect Bruce Schneier's 1990s-era block cipher cascade, chaining Twofish(?!), a modified(?!) Salsa20, and AES. But so confident are you in the safety of Javascript crypto that... you deliver that code over an AES-encrypted TLS channel. I don't get it. What was the point of this again? How is anything you're doing making it harder for the NSA to subvert your comms? They're a single AES key away from rewriting your entire cryptosystem.
- agwa 13y ago> a modified(?!) Salsa20 Other concerns aside, XSalsa20 is undeserving of your indignant reaction: it was created by DJB himself and was proven by him to be secure if Salsa20 is.
- marshray 13y agoDon't upvote advice without explanation.
- maxtaco 13y agoAgreed. I am open to valid criticisms on the crypto and/or implementation shortfalls, but unjustified comments don't help.
- atoponce 13y agoThis is cool, but it lacks plausible deniability with the header, which is unfortunate. With that said, I'll be keeping an eye on it, and how it stands in the crypto community.