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I'm at Microsoft and I had lunch with Niels Ferguson the other day. He's still in the Windows division, overseeing the crypto implementation in Windows. His opi
by marshray 13y ago
I'm at Microsoft and I had lunch with Niels Ferguson the other day. He's still in the Windows division, overseeing the crypto implementation in Windows. His opinion expressed here http://blogs.msdn.com/b/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.aspx http://blogs.msdn.com/b/si_team/archive/2006/03/02/542590.as... hasn't changed.
EDIT: For some reason I can't reply to cperceiva directly at tis time. Perhaps I've commented too much in the last few hours? Anyway...
It's a fair question. I don't actually know all of the checks which are in place around the security critical parts of the code, but I have been by the care, ability, and professionalism of the people I've met who work on it.
It always seems to come down to having people we can trust cooperating in an environment of trust-and-verify, i.e., audit and review. My gut feeling is that the core crypto libraries, including the code securing Bitlocker encryption, are probably one of the worst places for a rogue insider to try to hide a bugdoor.
- cperciva 13y agoHow much do you trust the least trustworthy person who has write access to your code? My biggest concern isn't that Microsoft or Apple or Red Hat might agree to include a back door in their software; but rather that individual developers might be bribed to "accidentally" introduce exploitable bugs.