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>> When you're targeted by a patent troll, the rational thing to do is to capitulate. Defending a patent infringement lawsuit can cost millions of dollars, and

by arbuge 13y ago

>> When you're targeted by a patent troll, the rational thing to do is to capitulate. Defending a patent infringement lawsuit can cost millions of dollars, and trolls carefully calibrate their settlement demands so that it will always cost more to fight than to settle. This is the crux of the problem. We need to make things such that this is no longer true. In practice, given the cost of legal fees in the real world, I see no other way than banning software and process patents in their entirety - and retroactively. There may be those who argue the line between those kinds of patents and others is somewhat gray. If that argument holds, I'd be in favoring of scrapping the entire patent process rather than conceding.

mistercow 13y ago
It kind of reminds me of a bluffing strategy I've used in poker. If you can guess your opponent's hand, you can bet just enough to make the pot odds just under their odds of winning, so that the rational thing for them to do (assuming they don't know you're bluffing) is to fold, while exposing yourself to minimal risk. A converse strategy works for getting people to call when you know that you have them beat. (There's probably a name for these like "three eyed street corner" or "popping the collar" or something, but I kind of lost patience with reading up on poker strategy).
- deleted 13y ago
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SEMW 13y ago
> We need to make things such that this is no longer true Surely the obvious solution is costs awards - i.e. loser pays winner's legal fees. Instantly destroys the tactic of threatening suit for meritless claims, as if the defendant can see the suit is meritless, they can call the claimant's bluff and know they won't be out-of-pocket. That's what England (and, I believe, every common law country apart from the US) does. (The downside is if your legal system is bad enough that some stupid claims aren't meritless, i.e. stand a reasonable chance of winning, as with US software patents, then if that happens the loser has to pay twice. But that just means you need to do this in conjunction with reforming the patent system, not instead of).

by arbuge 13y ago

mistercow 13y ago

It kind of reminds me of a bluffing strategy I've used in poker. If you can guess your opponent's hand, you can bet just enough to make the pot odds just under their odds of winning, so that the rational thing for them to do (assuming they don't know you're bluffing) is to fold, while exposing yourself to minimal risk. A converse strategy works for getting people to call when you know that you have them beat. (There's probably a name for these like "three eyed street corner" or "popping the collar" or something, but I kind of lost patience with reading up on poker strategy).

deleted 13y ago
[deleted]

SEMW 13y ago

> We need to make things such that this is no longer true Surely the obvious solution is costs awards - i.e. loser pays winner's legal fees. Instantly destroys the tactic of threatening suit for meritless claims, as if the defendant can see the suit is meritless, they can call the claimant's bluff and know they won't be out-of-pocket. That's what England (and, I believe, every common law country apart from the US) does. (The downside is if your legal system is bad enough that some stupid claims aren't meritless, i.e. stand a reasonable chance of winning, as with US software patents, then if that happens the loser has to pay twice. But that just means you need to do this in conjunction with reforming the patent system, not instead of).