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> I don't know how the CIA measures its success, but it failed to predict the end of the Cold War. The answer is obvious -- the end of the Cold war hinged on t

by lutusp 13y ago

> I don't know how the CIA measures its success, but it failed to predict the end of the Cold War. The answer is obvious -- the end of the Cold war hinged on the end of the USSR, and the end of the USSR was not a matter of intelligence, but broad historical forces and chance. If the CIA had had perfect field data, it still wouldn't have predicted the end of the Cold War, because the Russians didn't see it coming either. This wasn't an intelligence failure, because no one had the required intelligence.

jessaustin 13y ago
Can we say that it would have been good to predict this event, in that we could have wound down our arms procurement a bit earlier? (Of course, that probably would have just shifted the schedule on our next "existential" threat, from a few thousand bearded goat enthusiasts, but let's ignore that...) If "intelligence" can't predict things we'd like to predict, perhaps we need something besides "intelligence"? Maybe we could hire some historians?
- lutusp 13y ago
  > Can we say that it would have been good to predict this event, in that we could have wound down our arms procurement a bit earlier? Yes, absolutely, very good, very desirable. But not possible. :) > If "intelligence" can't predict things we'd like to predict, perhaps we need something besides "intelligence"? Hold on -- intelligence is only meant to give an accurate picture of the present, not the future. For the future, policy analysts digest the intelligence and make a best estimate of what's coming up. But the situation in the Soviet Union was so volatile that they couldn't anticipate their own immediate future. > Maybe we could hire some historians? Historians have perfect hindsight, not foresight. Consider that the French responded to World War I, the "war to end all wars", by building the Maginot Line, which represented perfect hindsight. In the opening days of World War II, the Germans went around it.
  - jessaustin 13y ago
    But the situation in the Soviet Union was so volatile that they couldn't anticipate their own immediate future. I've never seen any reason to believe that. This was a planned economy, and yet no one was looking at production and consumption numbers? That strains credulity. I'm not talking about predicting something a decade out. I'm talking about seeing the numbers drop year after year, and realizing that there is a limit. It is my understanding that this sort of observation was what convinced Gorbachev to start the whole glasnost/perestroika thing in 1985-86. I mean, that action killed the USSR, so it wasn't undertaken lightly. The nomenklatura knew they were backed up to the precipice, however, and it was the best they could come up with.
    - lutusp 13y ago
      > This was a planned economy, and yet no one was looking at production and consumption numbers? It's important to understand about that "planned economy" is that it was guided by ideology, not facts. In practice, this meant anything that contradicted ideology was ignored or denied. In the later years that was a habit of mind, but in the 1930s, Uncle Joe purged anyone who doubted the ideology -- liquidated them. The survivors took that lesson to heart. This is how a bogus biological theory (Lysenkoism, or inheritance of acquired traits) because the centerpiece of Soviet biology in Stalin's time -- he killed anyone who suggested that his pet belief was wrong. This undermined all of Soviet biology and science, and destroyed any chance to have an effective science-based agriculture program. SO much for the planned economy. But my point is that, as more and more signs of collapse appeared, the older policy-makers went into profound denial. That's what made Gorbachev possible -- once in power, he was willing to consider alternatives to the party line.
      - jessaustin 13y ago
        Gorby took office in 1985. If the CIA had noticed that event and the significance you attribute to it, when it happened, they still would only have gotten passing marks. To get the gold star, they should have noticed years earlier. That they never noticed, is what leads one to wonder what the hell they were doing all those years.
snowwrestler 13y ago
I agree, and would add that the mission of the CIA is to assess foreign threats to the U.S. The end of the Soviet Union was not a threat to the U.S., thus predicting the exact date of its occurrence was not a priority.
- smacktoward 13y ago
  The sudden end of the Soviet Union was a massive threat to the United States. The Soviet Union was a regime that by the 1980s had amassed a stockpile of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, which were stored and deployed across the vast interior of the USSR. The regime was the only guarantor of the security of those weapons. A breakdown of the regime would (and did) throw open the question of who now controlled those weapons. A new successor state? Individual breakaway republics? Factions within the army or internal security forces? Non-state actors? Random locals who happened to show up at a silo with a big enough mob behind them to claim them? The USSR also had huge conventional forces stationed across Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. If the authority these forces reported to were to suddenly break down, how would they respond? Would factions among them split and fight each other? Would a general use his tanks to set himself up as King of Poland? Would a revanchist politician rally the army to establish a military dictatorship? With hindsight we know the answers to these questions, but at the time we did not. Which is why intelligence agencies exist -- to help answer them. Thanks to quick thinking and quick action by both Americans and Russians (and Ukrainians, and Belarusians, and Kazakhs, etc.) in the years following the dissolution of the USSR, Soviet conventional and nuclear forces were (mostly) secured. (See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/09/20/ST2009092002315.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/09/2... for an example of one story from that time.) But there were no guarantees at the time that things would turn out as well as they did. So the question of whether the USSR was breaking up should have been of urgent interest to the CIA, because a breakup that went bad could have had catastrophic consequences for the US and the world.
  - snowwrestler 13y ago
    That's a great point and I did not think of it that way. Thanks.

by lutusp 13y ago

jessaustin 13y ago

Can we say that it would have been good to predict this event, in that we could have wound down our arms procurement a bit earlier? (Of course, that probably would have just shifted the schedule on our next "existential" threat, from a few thousand bearded goat enthusiasts, but let's ignore that...) If "intelligence" can't predict things we'd like to predict, perhaps we need something besides "intelligence"? Maybe we could hire some historians?

lutusp 13y ago
> Can we say that it would have been good to predict this event, in that we could have wound down our arms procurement a bit earlier? Yes, absolutely, very good, very desirable. But not possible. :) > If "intelligence" can't predict things we'd like to predict, perhaps we need something besides "intelligence"? Hold on -- intelligence is only meant to give an accurate picture of the present, not the future. For the future, policy analysts digest the intelligence and make a best estimate of what's coming up. But the situation in the Soviet Union was so volatile that they couldn't anticipate their own immediate future. > Maybe we could hire some historians? Historians have perfect hindsight, not foresight. Consider that the French responded to World War I, the "war to end all wars", by building the Maginot Line, which represented perfect hindsight. In the opening days of World War II, the Germans went around it.
- jessaustin 13y ago
  But the situation in the Soviet Union was so volatile that they couldn't anticipate their own immediate future. I've never seen any reason to believe that. This was a planned economy, and yet no one was looking at production and consumption numbers? That strains credulity. I'm not talking about predicting something a decade out. I'm talking about seeing the numbers drop year after year, and realizing that there is a limit. It is my understanding that this sort of observation was what convinced Gorbachev to start the whole glasnost/perestroika thing in 1985-86. I mean, that action killed the USSR, so it wasn't undertaken lightly. The nomenklatura knew they were backed up to the precipice, however, and it was the best they could come up with.
  - lutusp 13y ago
    > This was a planned economy, and yet no one was looking at production and consumption numbers? It's important to understand about that "planned economy" is that it was guided by ideology, not facts. In practice, this meant anything that contradicted ideology was ignored or denied. In the later years that was a habit of mind, but in the 1930s, Uncle Joe purged anyone who doubted the ideology -- liquidated them. The survivors took that lesson to heart. This is how a bogus biological theory (Lysenkoism, or inheritance of acquired traits) because the centerpiece of Soviet biology in Stalin's time -- he killed anyone who suggested that his pet belief was wrong. This undermined all of Soviet biology and science, and destroyed any chance to have an effective science-based agriculture program. SO much for the planned economy. But my point is that, as more and more signs of collapse appeared, the older policy-makers went into profound denial. That's what made Gorbachev possible -- once in power, he was willing to consider alternatives to the party line.
    - jessaustin 13y ago
      Gorby took office in 1985. If the CIA had noticed that event and the significance you attribute to it, when it happened, they still would only have gotten passing marks. To get the gold star, they should have noticed years earlier. That they never noticed, is what leads one to wonder what the hell they were doing all those years.

snowwrestler 13y ago

I agree, and would add that the mission of the CIA is to assess foreign threats to the U.S. The end of the Soviet Union was not a threat to the U.S., thus predicting the exact date of its occurrence was not a priority.

smacktoward 13y ago
The sudden end of the Soviet Union was a massive threat to the United States. The Soviet Union was a regime that by the 1980s had amassed a stockpile of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, which were stored and deployed across the vast interior of the USSR. The regime was the only guarantor of the security of those weapons. A breakdown of the regime would (and did) throw open the question of who now controlled those weapons. A new successor state? Individual breakaway republics? Factions within the army or internal security forces? Non-state actors? Random locals who happened to show up at a silo with a big enough mob behind them to claim them? The USSR also had huge conventional forces stationed across Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. If the authority these forces reported to were to suddenly break down, how would they respond? Would factions among them split and fight each other? Would a general use his tanks to set himself up as King of Poland? Would a revanchist politician rally the army to establish a military dictatorship? With hindsight we know the answers to these questions, but at the time we did not. Which is why intelligence agencies exist -- to help answer them. Thanks to quick thinking and quick action by both Americans and Russians (and Ukrainians, and Belarusians, and Kazakhs, etc.) in the years following the dissolution of the USSR, Soviet conventional and nuclear forces were (mostly) secured. (See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/09/20/ST2009092002315.html http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/09/2... for an example of one story from that time.) But there were no guarantees at the time that things would turn out as well as they did. So the question of whether the USSR was breaking up should have been of urgent interest to the CIA, because a breakup that went bad could have had catastrophic consequences for the US and the world.
- snowwrestler 13y ago
  That's a great point and I did not think of it that way. Thanks.