4 ms·
Can someone knowledgeable about security tell me if there is anything about their claim (98% in one round) that is exaggerated or "best edge case only"? I wond
by sspiff 13y ago
Can someone knowledgeable about security tell me if there is anything about their claim (98% in one round) that is exaggerated or "best edge case only"?
I wonder how these attacks would fare against NaCl[1] or Sodium[2], who were designed to be secure against side-channel attacks.
[1]: http://nacl.cr.yp.to http://nacl.cr.yp.to
[2]: http://labs.umbrella.com/2013/03/06/announcing-sodium-a-new-cryptographic-library http://labs.umbrella.com/2013/03/06/announcing-sodium-a-new-...
- mrich 13y agoThey have quite some preconditions that need to be in place: - You must know the code locations of the instructions that you target exactly. I.e. you will need to get down to the exact cache line of the operation in the compiled binary of the attacked program. They solve this by using a binary with debug symbols, in practice this will be harder as the binary will likely be stripped from debug symbols. - You can bet that there will be differences in the attack depending on the model of processor, let alone the manufacturer that will make it very hard to generalize this attack, increasing its cost. I think there are cheaper attacks for criminals/government agencies. Also, as mentioned below it is already mitigated by a GPG fix. But I found the paper quite interesting as I never considered such an attack before.
- Scaevolus 13y agoNaCl has neither data-dependent branches, nor data-dependent array indices.[1] This attack targets data-dependent branches. In NaCl, every cryptographic function executes in the same order, regardless of input data-- leaking no information about the input. [1]: http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html