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The only reason to keep nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is if you're worried you might have to use them or lose them in a first strike. Now that we have

The only reason to keep nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert is if you're worried you might have to use them or lose them in a first strike. Now that we have almost impossible-to-target (in quantity alone) nuclear submarines with missiles capable of serving whatever strategic purpose you'd need, there's no reason to be spreading the risk around to land- and air-based systems as well.

rdl 13y ago
I'm not sure if I believe this, but the US argument for retaining the triad is this: We need to at least retain the land ICBM because they are responsible for most of the aim points for an enemy counter force strike. They are basically the size of several states, and sink hundreds or thousands of missiles, making a first strike implausible for anyone except the Russians. With the SSBN force, they are pretty safe while at sea, but supported from two bases, each of which could be destroyed by a single missile. If you had 10 weapons, you could basically take out all long term US strategic forces, except for at-sea SSBN, if you got rid of the land ICBMs. The submarines would then be in a horrible position of "use them or lose them." I think you could accomplish this by keeping the entire force on lower alert, which has largely been the case since the fall of the USSR.
- malandrew 13y ago
  I would hope that most of these first strike targets sit at the bottom of deep valleys, so that if a missile strike were to hit them that much of the resulting damage was buffeted and contained by the valley walls. I imagine that much of the fallout would also be captured by valley itself and that any future rains would funnel all contaminated material to the lowest point in the valley. In essence, every single one of these first strike targets should be designed to be massive sinks for radioactivity. On your second comment, I'm actually surprised that those two bases are that vulnerable. I was under the impression that they would be fortified the same way Russian naval bases like Object 825 GTS, one of the bases for nuclear armed submarines, is.
  - ak217 13y ago
    As far as I know, there is no good way to fortify a submarine base against a nuclear weapon (which is one of the reasons why Object 825 GTS is a museum - some of the other ones being that it's on Ukrainian soil and that it's easy to trap submarines in the Black Sea, restricting their utility - Russia operates nuclear submarines only out of the Arctic and the Pacific).
  - mpyne 13y ago
    Well you can probably look at most of the two U.S. bases right on Google Maps. It's certainly defended against conceivable land attack but as mentioned in the other comment, there's not a lot you can do to make it invulnerable to nuclear strikes.
    - malandrew 13y ago
      Norad is protected against a 30 megaton nuclear explosion. What level of protection do you need to be protected from the greatest conceivable explosion today? Do any facilities in the world meet the criteria for protection from a direct detonation of this magnitude? If not, what is the most fortified installation in the world and how close does it get to being protected from any conceivable attack today?
      - hga 13y ago
        No, not at all. In fact, we supplemented ground bunkers with airborne command and control systems at the same time we started building the Cheyenne Mountain complex. It's axiomatic that you don't place all your eggs in one basket if you care very much about survival, as we used to. E.g. sometime around 1970 I think we judged the Soviets would be able to land very powerful nukes with sufficient simultaneity at both of Cheyenne Mountain's exterior entrances, negating the passive defense of the blast door entrance. Sub pens would be a much more difficult problem; note also the relative incompressiblity of water compared to air. If you're really really serious about this sort of thing, you need a defense in depth of active defenses. For deterrence it doesn't matter if all or even any of them work in practice, just that the perception that your strikes will very possibly fail. And/or if you maintain enough targets, enough systems, with interlocking constraints making a time-on-target for all of them well neigh impossible, well, that's why we still maintain the triad.
- chiph 13y ago
  because they are responsible for most of the aim points for an enemy counter force strike. I hadn't thought about this aspect. If you assume your opponent has a limited number of missiles (because of treaties and/or intelligence gathering), you build your own missile launchers not only as a weapon system, but as targets to divert incoming missiles away from cities. They can't not target them without leaving a retaliatory capability in place.

rdl 13y ago

I'm not sure if I believe this, but the US argument for retaining the triad is this: We need to at least retain the land ICBM because they are responsible for most of the aim points for an enemy counter force strike. They are basically the size of several states, and sink hundreds or thousands of missiles, making a first strike implausible for anyone except the Russians. With the SSBN force, they are pretty safe while at sea, but supported from two bases, each of which could be destroyed by a single missile. If you had 10 weapons, you could basically take out all long term US strategic forces, except for at-sea SSBN, if you got rid of the land ICBMs. The submarines would then be in a horrible position of "use them or lose them." I think you could accomplish this by keeping the entire force on lower alert, which has largely been the case since the fall of the USSR.

malandrew 13y ago
I would hope that most of these first strike targets sit at the bottom of deep valleys, so that if a missile strike were to hit them that much of the resulting damage was buffeted and contained by the valley walls. I imagine that much of the fallout would also be captured by valley itself and that any future rains would funnel all contaminated material to the lowest point in the valley. In essence, every single one of these first strike targets should be designed to be massive sinks for radioactivity. On your second comment, I'm actually surprised that those two bases are that vulnerable. I was under the impression that they would be fortified the same way Russian naval bases like Object 825 GTS, one of the bases for nuclear armed submarines, is.
- ak217 13y ago
  As far as I know, there is no good way to fortify a submarine base against a nuclear weapon (which is one of the reasons why Object 825 GTS is a museum - some of the other ones being that it's on Ukrainian soil and that it's easy to trap submarines in the Black Sea, restricting their utility - Russia operates nuclear submarines only out of the Arctic and the Pacific).
- mpyne 13y ago
  Well you can probably look at most of the two U.S. bases right on Google Maps. It's certainly defended against conceivable land attack but as mentioned in the other comment, there's not a lot you can do to make it invulnerable to nuclear strikes.
  - malandrew 13y ago
    Norad is protected against a 30 megaton nuclear explosion. What level of protection do you need to be protected from the greatest conceivable explosion today? Do any facilities in the world meet the criteria for protection from a direct detonation of this magnitude? If not, what is the most fortified installation in the world and how close does it get to being protected from any conceivable attack today?
    - hga 13y ago
      No, not at all. In fact, we supplemented ground bunkers with airborne command and control systems at the same time we started building the Cheyenne Mountain complex. It's axiomatic that you don't place all your eggs in one basket if you care very much about survival, as we used to. E.g. sometime around 1970 I think we judged the Soviets would be able to land very powerful nukes with sufficient simultaneity at both of Cheyenne Mountain's exterior entrances, negating the passive defense of the blast door entrance. Sub pens would be a much more difficult problem; note also the relative incompressiblity of water compared to air. If you're really really serious about this sort of thing, you need a defense in depth of active defenses. For deterrence it doesn't matter if all or even any of them work in practice, just that the perception that your strikes will very possibly fail. And/or if you maintain enough targets, enough systems, with interlocking constraints making a time-on-target for all of them well neigh impossible, well, that's why we still maintain the triad.
chiph 13y ago
because they are responsible for most of the aim points for an enemy counter force strike. I hadn't thought about this aspect. If you assume your opponent has a limited number of missiles (because of treaties and/or intelligence gathering), you build your own missile launchers not only as a weapon system, but as targets to divert incoming missiles away from cities. They can't not target them without leaving a retaliatory capability in place.