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If Deconstruction were a meaningful thing, if there were actual ways in which it is relevant that one could point to, then there would be a Wikipedia article th

by rspeer 13y ago

If Deconstruction were a meaningful thing, if there were actual ways in which it is relevant that one could point to, then there would be a Wikipedia article that says what it is and explains why it is relevant. Say what you want about Wikipedia's internal processes (if you must), but it does an overwhelmingly good job at saying what things are, including schools of thought and beliefs. Even through the edit wars, it can explain the most controversial tenets of religions, where the stakes are much higher than poststructuralism and stuff. But the Wikipedia article http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction has been an incoherent disaster for over a decade. It's not even much of an edit war, just a stagnant mess. Everyone agrees that it is bad. Nobody agrees on what to do about it. The disagreement is not between literary theorists and sciencey types. The disagreement is between literary theorists and other literary theorists, whose only unified view is that sciencey types should not be writing the article. Occasionally one of them will wholly rewrite the article, at which point everyone else says, basically, "wtf did you just write", and the list of problems gets longer. My personal conclusion is that, while you criticize people who "talk about history of thought without having any idea what they are talking about", the people who do have an idea what they are talking about on this topic don't exist.

dvanduzer 13y ago
Here are some facts: 1) If one can construct something, one can deconstruct it. 2) Derrida was a guy who existed. If you have an idea for a single Wikipedia page that can resolve these two impossible contradictions, then you are a person who has an idea. (edit: The grandparent poster's error was in making sweeping generalizations about capital D versus little D without mentioning the difference.) (second edit: the Wikipedia page on Deconstruction is the quintessential case of original research?)
- rspeer 13y ago
  Wat. I don't know what you're trying to say, but "Derrida was a guy who existed" is not, in reality, an "impossible contradiction". It's just true. Your first statement, on the other hand, sounds either meaningless or false. I think I agree with you, though, that the Wikipedia page on Deconstruction is "the quintessential case of original research".
  - dvanduzer 13y ago
    Now you can cite this conversation when editing it.
jseliger 13y ago
The disagreement is not between literary theorists and sciencey types Sometimes it is! (http://www.amazon.com/Fashionable-Nonsense-Postmodern-Intellectuals-Science/dp/0312195451 http://www.amazon.com/Fashionable-Nonsense-Postmodern-Intell...)
menssen 13y ago
On the other hand, I think the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Derrida does a pretty solid job of summarizing at least Derrida's stated definition(s) of "Deconstruction:" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#Dec http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#Dec It's still dense and a bit jargon-y, but relatively easy to follow linearly. The second you get into "X thinks Y about Deconstruction" or "X's work relates to Deconstruction because Y" (which is most of the Wikipedia article), the whole thing seems incredibly unapproachable without being an expert on the entire canon of western philosophy. This is unreasonable for something that's really a pretty simple concept. This sort of argument is very common (from my experience) in contemporary philosophy: "Your work on X is invalid because you didn't consider how it relates to Y." Despite the fact that that is a fallacy, covering all the "it relates to Ys" seems to be a primary goal of the Wikipedia article.
- rspeer 13y ago
  It started promisingly. Then it said at the end of the first paragraph, > But with Derrida, we know now, the foundation is not a unified self but a divisible limit between myself and myself as an other (auto-affection as hetero-affection: “origin-heterogeneous”). That's bullshit intended to baffle.
  - dcre 13y ago
    There are some extra adjectives in there, maybe, but it's really not that bad. Translation: "Maybe the self is not the unitary thing we normally consider it to be. But how can that be possible? For example, if it has multiple parts, couldn't we just say that only one of those parts is the self? Where does the multi-faceted nature come from? Is it merely the grammatical division between subject and object -- are there two selves in the sentence 'I affect myself'?" Etc. I agree that the writing is a little silly (that parenthetical should be its own sentence), but it's partly because the ideas are just pretty hard to think about.
    - rspeer 13y ago
      > Is it merely the grammatical division between subject and object -- are there two selves in the sentence 'I affect myself'? No, there aren't, though I don't see why that has anything to do with the paragraph in question. Are you saying that the foundation of Deconstruction itself rests on a violation of the use-mention distinction as obvious and pithy as "there is no 'I' in 'team'"?
rmk2 13y ago
> If Deconstruction were a meaningful thing Deconstruction is not a "thing". Neither is "empiricism". They are modes of enquiry. Both position you in a certain mode towards your surrounding environment, be it political, social or scientific. They both open certain modes of enquiry while excluding others. One conclusion that one can draw from deconstruction (if we "apply" it onto itself) is that no answer one can ever give will be without bias or will completely exclude any other option. Jürgen Habermas coined, in his Systemtheorie, the notion of the nth grade observer, where every degree of observer may observe another onlooker and his specific bias and blind spot, yet each degree of observation always introduces its own, new blind spot. When Derrida talks about archi-écriture, what he says is that if there was ever an all-encompassing entirety of meaning that only had one singly way of interpretation, then this unity is a mythical one which cannot be recovered. Every utterance, every decision has the inherent option of an opposition. Derrida is Hegel upside down. If Hegel sees Geist as the unity of matter and spirit, then for Derrida, this unity might have existed in an archaic past but has since been lost and cannot be put back together. Hence, whatever we do will not empty out all possible interpretations and views of life, there will be no single answer to the meaning of life or some such. Instead, all that remains is the fundamental idea that every utterance and every positions carries within itself already the means to disprove it. This is not fundamentally different to the scientific method. The atom was thought to be the smallest, inseperable unit (hence the name) before it could be found. However, in finding the atom, we realised that it is, indeed, made up of smaller parts, which in turn are again made up of smaller parts. What was taken as an absolute minimum was, in fact, only the temporary minimum before we could conceive smaller units. The same, just in reverse, goes for the solar system, galaxies etc.
- Mithaldu 13y ago
  > Deconstruction is not a "thing". Neither is "empiricism". They are modes of enquiry. In current times the term thing applies also to non-physical entities. As such, a mode of enquiry is a thing. Otherwise, i like the rest of your explanation.
- derleth 13y ago
  > Every utterance, every decision has the inherent option of an opposition. To the extent this is meaningful at all, it implies that it is not true in the slightest, which makes it difficult to take seriously. > This is not fundamentally different to the scientific method. The atom was thought to be the smallest, inseperable unit (hence the name) before it could be found. However, in finding the atom, we realised that it is, indeed, made up of smaller parts, which in turn are again made up of smaller parts. Until that process bottomed out, of course, and bottomed out based on evidence, not philosophy.

by rspeer 13y ago

dvanduzer 13y ago

Here are some facts: 1) If one can construct something, one can deconstruct it. 2) Derrida was a guy who existed. If you have an idea for a single Wikipedia page that can resolve these two impossible contradictions, then you are a person who has an idea. (edit: The grandparent poster's error was in making sweeping generalizations about capital D versus little D without mentioning the difference.) (second edit: the Wikipedia page on Deconstruction is the quintessential case of original research?)

rspeer 13y ago
Wat. I don't know what you're trying to say, but "Derrida was a guy who existed" is not, in reality, an "impossible contradiction". It's just true. Your first statement, on the other hand, sounds either meaningless or false. I think I agree with you, though, that the Wikipedia page on Deconstruction is "the quintessential case of original research".
- dvanduzer 13y ago
  Now you can cite this conversation when editing it.

jseliger 13y ago

The disagreement is not between literary theorists and sciencey types Sometimes it is! (http://www.amazon.com/Fashionable-Nonsense-Postmodern-Intellectuals-Science/dp/0312195451 http://www.amazon.com/Fashionable-Nonsense-Postmodern-Intell...)

menssen 13y ago

On the other hand, I think the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's article on Derrida does a pretty solid job of summarizing at least Derrida's stated definition(s) of "Deconstruction:" http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#Dec http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#Dec It's still dense and a bit jargon-y, but relatively easy to follow linearly. The second you get into "X thinks Y about Deconstruction" or "X's work relates to Deconstruction because Y" (which is most of the Wikipedia article), the whole thing seems incredibly unapproachable without being an expert on the entire canon of western philosophy. This is unreasonable for something that's really a pretty simple concept. This sort of argument is very common (from my experience) in contemporary philosophy: "Your work on X is invalid because you didn't consider how it relates to Y." Despite the fact that that is a fallacy, covering all the "it relates to Ys" seems to be a primary goal of the Wikipedia article.

rspeer 13y ago
It started promisingly. Then it said at the end of the first paragraph, > But with Derrida, we know now, the foundation is not a unified self but a divisible limit between myself and myself as an other (auto-affection as hetero-affection: “origin-heterogeneous”). That's bullshit intended to baffle.
- dcre 13y ago
  There are some extra adjectives in there, maybe, but it's really not that bad. Translation: "Maybe the self is not the unitary thing we normally consider it to be. But how can that be possible? For example, if it has multiple parts, couldn't we just say that only one of those parts is the self? Where does the multi-faceted nature come from? Is it merely the grammatical division between subject and object -- are there two selves in the sentence 'I affect myself'?" Etc. I agree that the writing is a little silly (that parenthetical should be its own sentence), but it's partly because the ideas are just pretty hard to think about.
  - rspeer 13y ago
    > Is it merely the grammatical division between subject and object -- are there two selves in the sentence 'I affect myself'? No, there aren't, though I don't see why that has anything to do with the paragraph in question. Are you saying that the foundation of Deconstruction itself rests on a violation of the use-mention distinction as obvious and pithy as "there is no 'I' in 'team'"?

rmk2 13y ago

> If Deconstruction were a meaningful thing Deconstruction is not a "thing". Neither is "empiricism". They are modes of enquiry. Both position you in a certain mode towards your surrounding environment, be it political, social or scientific. They both open certain modes of enquiry while excluding others. One conclusion that one can draw from deconstruction (if we "apply" it onto itself) is that no answer one can ever give will be without bias or will completely exclude any other option. Jürgen Habermas coined, in his Systemtheorie, the notion of the nth grade observer, where every degree of observer may observe another onlooker and his specific bias and blind spot, yet each degree of observation always introduces its own, new blind spot. When Derrida talks about archi-écriture, what he says is that if there was ever an all-encompassing entirety of meaning that only had one singly way of interpretation, then this unity is a mythical one which cannot be recovered. Every utterance, every decision has the inherent option of an opposition. Derrida is Hegel upside down. If Hegel sees Geist as the unity of matter and spirit, then for Derrida, this unity might have existed in an archaic past but has since been lost and cannot be put back together. Hence, whatever we do will not empty out all possible interpretations and views of life, there will be no single answer to the meaning of life or some such. Instead, all that remains is the fundamental idea that every utterance and every positions carries within itself already the means to disprove it. This is not fundamentally different to the scientific method. The atom was thought to be the smallest, inseperable unit (hence the name) before it could be found. However, in finding the atom, we realised that it is, indeed, made up of smaller parts, which in turn are again made up of smaller parts. What was taken as an absolute minimum was, in fact, only the temporary minimum before we could conceive smaller units. The same, just in reverse, goes for the solar system, galaxies etc.

Mithaldu 13y ago
> Deconstruction is not a "thing". Neither is "empiricism". They are modes of enquiry. In current times the term thing applies also to non-physical entities. As such, a mode of enquiry is a thing. Otherwise, i like the rest of your explanation.
derleth 13y ago
> Every utterance, every decision has the inherent option of an opposition. To the extent this is meaningful at all, it implies that it is not true in the slightest, which makes it difficult to take seriously. > This is not fundamentally different to the scientific method. The atom was thought to be the smallest, inseperable unit (hence the name) before it could be found. However, in finding the atom, we realised that it is, indeed, made up of smaller parts, which in turn are again made up of smaller parts. Until that process bottomed out, of course, and bottomed out based on evidence, not philosophy.