4 ms·

And even if there are safeguards in place to prevent this from happening (and I'm sure there are) with 99.99999repeating% accuracy, you still want something in

by jljljl 13y ago

And even if there are safeguards in place to prevent this from happening (and I'm sure there are) with 99.99999repeating% accuracy, you still want something in place to mitigate or control risk if the safeguards fail. Which is no doubt what this clause is supposed to do.

bilbo0s 13y ago
99.99999% is not good enough. That's not the way OpSec works guy. I realize my view is strongly informed by the military... but I view this as essentially OpSec for the civilian leadership, and the principles can't be that different. I may be wrong in my interpretation of this as OpSec, but I doubt it. If you need that clause in an agreement, FOR ANY REASON... then you need to re-evaluate the agreement. Full stop.
- Groxx 13y ago
  Senator X accidentally sends an email Y from an alternate email address that the US doesn't have directly linked to them (maybe they just created it). This email gets filtered with no reason to assume it's from senator X. Cooperating government Z gets email Y, and discovers it's from senator X because they look more closely and connect dots the US may not have. No process could have prevented this (except stopping the sharing entirely). It's a reasonable clause.
  - bilbo0s 13y ago
    "... (except stopping the sharing entirely)..." So the only secure path seems clear. To me at least. Again, maybe this information is not as critical as information you might be exchanging in the military. I don't know. But, to me, it seems a good example of information you don't want foreign powers being privvy to.
  - deleted 13y ago
    [deleted]
  - opinali 13y ago
    Wrong; there's one easy process that would prevent this: manual vetting of all shared information (or at least, all info that can't be automatically vetted with absolute confidence, or would not be that critical). Of course that wouldn't scale to a system that shares a big firehose of data or does that in real-time. Easy to solve too: don't share the firehose, and don't share in real-time. Collaboration with allies is fine but that should come as a distant second to protecting your own [citizen's] interests.
    - tvladeck 13y ago
      > Collaboration with allies is fine but that should come as a distant second to protecting your own [citizen's] interests. What makes you think the NSA is sharing data with Israel for any other reason? We have strategic and human interests where they are located.
    - Groxx 13y ago
      Except for this: "and connect dots the US may not have." A manual process could certainly do a better job, but no, it still isn't a guaranteed thing.
- jljljl 13y ago
  I will admit I'm not well versed in how OpSec works. Are there no OpSec policies for what happens if something accidentally leaks? Are there no policies for what happens if a Top Secret file makes it to someone with the wrong clearance? My gut would tell me that you want as perfect OpSec as you can manage, but then have contingencies for the occasion when something fails. Otherwise you would get the kind of flailing we're seeing right now after the Snowden leaks.
  - Amadou 13y ago
    Two points: 1) When classified information is accidentally moved to a computer with a lower classification it is a shit storm. Everything stops. All hardware involved is isolated and scrubbed. If it can't be scrubbed with certainty (e.g. deallocated sectors on the hard disk that might contain classified data but can't be scrubbed anymore because they are deallocated) then the equipment is destroyed (or classified to match the level of the information that was leaked). 2) All information on a classified system is considered classified at the level of the computer system it is stored on. When there is a need to move not-really-classified information off that system (like send a log file that a vendor needs to help debug software) then it is manually inspected by a SME (subject matter expert) to positively verify it does not contain classified information and then copied off to unclassified media. But if there is any doubt, like a binary core file, the file is forbidden from leaving the system. The main point here is that the SME positively identifies all the data as being unclassified. The assumption is that the data is classified and it must be pain-stakingly verified on a line-by-line basis. It is a real PITA. Considering that these NSA programs are highly classified, at least TS and I'm thinking TS sci/codeword given the style of single-word names for the programs, the same sort of manual, positive identification process should be used when giving the data to another country. Also, Israel is considered a major intelligence adversary by the US DoD. Israel and China are at the top of the list of countries they warn people with clearances to be careful of. Blithely handing over this raw SIGINT data is ridiculous given that context.

by jljljl 13y ago

bilbo0s 13y ago

99.99999% is not good enough. That's not the way OpSec works guy. I realize my view is strongly informed by the military... but I view this as essentially OpSec for the civilian leadership, and the principles can't be that different. I may be wrong in my interpretation of this as OpSec, but I doubt it. If you need that clause in an agreement, FOR ANY REASON... then you need to re-evaluate the agreement. Full stop.

Groxx 13y ago
Senator X accidentally sends an email Y from an alternate email address that the US doesn't have directly linked to them (maybe they just created it). This email gets filtered with no reason to assume it's from senator X. Cooperating government Z gets email Y, and discovers it's from senator X because they look more closely and connect dots the US may not have. No process could have prevented this (except stopping the sharing entirely). It's a reasonable clause.
- bilbo0s 13y ago
  "... (except stopping the sharing entirely)..." So the only secure path seems clear. To me at least. Again, maybe this information is not as critical as information you might be exchanging in the military. I don't know. But, to me, it seems a good example of information you don't want foreign powers being privvy to.
- deleted 13y ago
  [deleted]
- opinali 13y ago
  Wrong; there's one easy process that would prevent this: manual vetting of all shared information (or at least, all info that can't be automatically vetted with absolute confidence, or would not be that critical). Of course that wouldn't scale to a system that shares a big firehose of data or does that in real-time. Easy to solve too: don't share the firehose, and don't share in real-time. Collaboration with allies is fine but that should come as a distant second to protecting your own [citizen's] interests.
  - tvladeck 13y ago
    > Collaboration with allies is fine but that should come as a distant second to protecting your own [citizen's] interests. What makes you think the NSA is sharing data with Israel for any other reason? We have strategic and human interests where they are located.
  - Groxx 13y ago
    Except for this: "and connect dots the US may not have." A manual process could certainly do a better job, but no, it still isn't a guaranteed thing.
jljljl 13y ago
I will admit I'm not well versed in how OpSec works. Are there no OpSec policies for what happens if something accidentally leaks? Are there no policies for what happens if a Top Secret file makes it to someone with the wrong clearance? My gut would tell me that you want as perfect OpSec as you can manage, but then have contingencies for the occasion when something fails. Otherwise you would get the kind of flailing we're seeing right now after the Snowden leaks.
- Amadou 13y ago
  Two points: 1) When classified information is accidentally moved to a computer with a lower classification it is a shit storm. Everything stops. All hardware involved is isolated and scrubbed. If it can't be scrubbed with certainty (e.g. deallocated sectors on the hard disk that might contain classified data but can't be scrubbed anymore because they are deallocated) then the equipment is destroyed (or classified to match the level of the information that was leaked). 2) All information on a classified system is considered classified at the level of the computer system it is stored on. When there is a need to move not-really-classified information off that system (like send a log file that a vendor needs to help debug software) then it is manually inspected by a SME (subject matter expert) to positively verify it does not contain classified information and then copied off to unclassified media. But if there is any doubt, like a binary core file, the file is forbidden from leaving the system. The main point here is that the SME positively identifies all the data as being unclassified. The assumption is that the data is classified and it must be pain-stakingly verified on a line-by-line basis. It is a real PITA. Considering that these NSA programs are highly classified, at least TS and I'm thinking TS sci/codeword given the style of single-word names for the programs, the same sort of manual, positive identification process should be used when giving the data to another country. Also, Israel is considered a major intelligence adversary by the US DoD. Israel and China are at the top of the list of countries they warn people with clearances to be careful of. Blithely handing over this raw SIGINT data is ridiculous given that context.