5 ms·
I'm confused by this paragraph, and I wonder whether this indicates a limitation on my part, the part of whoever wrote the marketing copy, or the part of the de
by jessaustin 13y ago
I'm confused by this paragraph, and I wonder whether this indicates a limitation on my part, the part of whoever wrote the marketing copy, or the part of the developers of this platform:
The problem of preventing an attacker associating a user’s encrypted ID to a decrypted ID is reducible to a security model called indistinguishability. We are using AES-CBC to perform this encryption, which means that our encryption scheme satisfies indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack, where the attacker is able to request encryptions, under the encryption key, of various plaintexts. We are confident that no such attacker exists, and that therefore our encryption is very secure.
First, it's my understanding that CTR is considered superior to CBC in all cases. Second, although it's true that resistance to CPT attack is a basic requirement for public-key crypto, AES is not public-key. It's likely they're talking about using RSA to secure the AES key, which seems normal. (As in, one could choose an existing solution.) But the last sentence seems bizarre. They're secure against a particular attack, and they doubt they'll ever see that particular attack, therefore they are "very secure"? WTF?
I guess I'm saying that this paragraph doesn't do much to convince me that the keys used to encrypt PID are securely stored, which I thought was the purpose of the paragraph. I don't assume that such keys are actually insecurely stored, and furthermore I'm not really sure that PID needs all this protection.
- samphippen 13y agoHi Jesse, So, let's talk about this point by point: 1. CTR mode and CBC mode both fulfil the same security definition: IND-CPA. IND part of the security definition refers to the fact that: there exists no polynomially bounded attacker that can with probability better than a half distingiush which of two plaintexts (that the attacker choses) have been encrypted under the scheme. The CPA part refers to the fact that this is a chosen plaintext attack, and the polynomially bounded attacker may submit plaintexts for encryption. CTR mode does not satisfy a stronger security definition than CBC mode, but is parallelizable for encryption and decryption. Whilst this may sound like it makes CTR mode preferable, it also means that each block of ciphertext is independent. With CBC mode, errors propogate throughout the ciphertext meaning that it is harder for an attacker which does have access to a encryption oracle to modify the message through modification of the ciphertext. They would have to be able to modify every block of the ciphertext in CBC mode, whilst having to only modify one in CTR Mode. 2. To clarify: all PID is encrypted under the strong AES encryption I have outlined above. In practical terms there is only one security definition that is stronger than the one we are using, which IND-CCA in which the attacker also has access to a decryption oracle. The attacker in this case is arbitrarily restricted to be unable to decrypt certain plaintexts. This does not make a large deal of sense in a real world attack, if the attacker does have access to a decryption oracle, it is likely they will be able to decrypt any ciphertext and blow the encryption wide open. Regarding the necessity of encrypting PID, for various compliance reasons it is necessary for us to ensure that if someone pulls our servers out of the rack they can't get access to our users' data. This scheme satisfies our compliance requirements and, we believe, keeps our permission control model cryptographically enforced. Thanks -- Sam Phippen How are you? Engineer.