9 ms·
Although, I should add that there's this API which uses the output of RdRand straight up: /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar t
by jgrahamc 13y ago
Although, I should add that there's this API which uses the output of RdRand straight up:
/*
* Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
* with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
* value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
* depleting entropy is too high
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
unsigned int get_random_int(void)
{
__u32 *hash;
unsigned int ret;
if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
return ret;
[...]
There's one interesting use of this in the Linux kernel: the output is used for randomization of the address space. So, I suppose we could say that if NSA can predict RdRand then they can predict memory layout and which might enable some sorts of interesting attacks.
- tptacek 13y agoAs I understood it, TCP sequence numbers also got the direct output of rdrand. In neither case do I think that's meaningful; the needs of both are sub-cryptographic, due to environmental constraints (ie, no matter how high-quality the randomness you feed it, TCP seqnos and executable address space aren't going to be cryptographically random anyways.)
- simias 13y agoThe only use of randomized address space I know is to mitigate other attack vectors (stack smashing and other arbitrary code execution exploits). So it would just make exploiting an other vulnerability easier, it wouldn't be a vulnerability on its own. So it's still a bit far fetched conspiracy-wise as far as I'm concerned.
- zurn 13y agoI think it would be a justified move (in an evil kind of way). Most of the interesting exploits these days need to leverage more than one vulnerability. This kind of thing would give you a marked advantage in penetrating systems, and do so in a non-obvious way without exposing the targets to other attackers. The advantage would be something like 10x, or whatever the difficulty factor is that ASLR adds to the average exploit. It would also be a good match for probabilistic/big picture kind of approach that a big organization can afford to take. But will owning RdRand give you good enough control over ASLR, that's another question.