5 ms·
Prefer faster over slower. Would any security expert give a critique of this section of the article? That line seems counterintuitive: faster sometimes means
by sillysaurus2 13y ago
Prefer faster over slower.
Would any security expert give a critique of this section of the article? That line seems counterintuitive: faster sometimes means easier to break. Shouldn't the goal to be as slow as possible (but no slower than a user will tolerate)?
Also, who is Brian Smith? His personal page doesn't give any info, just an email address. Searching for "brian smith cryptographer" yields a stackoverflow user page, some comments by Brian Smith on various security-related newsgroups, and a linkedin profile[1] with very strange job history -- overlapping timelines, and no entries after 2004 ... I'm assuming that's the same Brian Smith because of his interest in "Cryptography and Information Security."
If that is him, I wonder who he's worked for since 2004? (Should we even be asking these kinds of intrusive questions about people who are proposing new security standards?)
While I'm at it, I may as well ask: who is the submitter, fejr? His account is 5 days old with just one comment but 11 submissions, all related to the NSA or security. I'm curious how they came across this Brian Smith proposal in the first place, because that would give us some information about his background at least. This proposal seems new, because Wayback Machine has no record of that Brian Smith proposal URL[2] so fejr seems to be the first one to post this to any news website.
[1] http://www.linkedin.com/pub/brian-smith/6/6b3/9a7 http://www.linkedin.com/pub/brian-smith/6/6b3/9a7
[2] http://web.archive.org/liveweb/https://briansmith.org/browser-ciphersuites-01.html http://web.archive.org/liveweb/https://briansmith.org/browse...
EDIT: This article deserves a better top comment than mine. When I wrote this, the submission had zero comments and raised a whole lot of questions: Who is this person? Can we trust them? Why haven't we heard about this proposal till now? The answers came swiftly: Brian Smith works for Mozilla. Yes, we can trust that this proposal has no hidden agenda. We hadn't heard about it because it was originally posted to the Mozilla Crypto list two days ago.
Now that those questions are settled, I find myself in the top comment spot and entirely undeserving of the honor. It may have been necessary to at least consider the questions I raised (trust and identity of the author), but my comment addressed none of the substance of the article. I wrote it in order to get some discussion started until tptacek comes in and writes a thorough critique of the proposal's strengths and any possible weaknesses.
So please, someone, write up a good topcomment analysis of the proposal so we can upvote you. :)
- sp332 13y agoI think "as slow as possible" is good for the initial key exchange, or for storing keys at rest. The point is to make offline key recovery (by guessing) more difficult. But once you have a good key, the ciphertext is already completely scrambled. Slowing down won't make that part any harder.
- dtf 13y agoHere's some discussion on mozilla's crypto list: http://www.mail-archive.com/dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org/msg11247.html http://www.mail-archive.com/dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.or...
- sillysaurus2 13y agoThanks! I also found a presentation from the Stanford Real World Cryptography event in Jan 2013 which cites Brian's work. It's an interesting read: https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pdf https://crypto.stanford.edu/RealWorldCrypto/slides/gueron.pd...
- lvh 13y agoNo, slower doesn't mean more secure. 3DES is a lot slower than, say, AES, but nobody's suggesting 3DES is more secure than AES.
- dochtman 13y agoI'm pretty sure Brian currently works for Mozilla.
- tptacek 13y agoNo, faster does not mean easier to break. Fast is a problem when brute force attacks are viable, as in with password hashes. There are no viable brute force attacks on 128 bit keys; that's why we use 128 bit keys.
- Achshar 13y agoAs a noob in encryption, why is it not possible to guess the 128 bit private key by brute force?