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Parallel construction is much more relevant to things like DEA's SOD or the FBI itself though. In the NSA's heyday there was simply never a need for parallel c

by mpyne 13y ago

Parallel construction is much more relevant to things like DEA's SOD or the FBI itself though. In the NSA's heyday there was simply never a need for parallel construction as it wasn't as if they were going to be bringing up Soviet diplomats on indictments. They explicitly didn't touch people on American soil so the whole idea of 'chain of custody' was almost completely moot. Even now parallel construction is only a thing because it's that much easier for NSA to run across domestic communications commingled with international comms. Nowadays the analyst may see evidence of a major upcoming crime in the process of their actual duties, which puts you back in Churchill's Coventry quandry.

jacquesm 13y ago
(1) Churchill's Coventry quandary is a myth. See: http://theweek.com/article/index/237427/history-detective-did-churchill-sacrifice-a-city-to-protect-a-secret http://theweek.com/article/index/237427/history-detective-di... And lots of other places. (2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it. If you do you are essentially advocating for broadening the official reach of the NSA's powers rather than to rein them in because they clearly can not stick to their mandate. The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy. Anything less won't do, lest we all end telling another generation how terribly sorry we were. Power corrupts, it's never been any different historically.
- mpyne 13y ago
  > (1) Churchill's Coventry quandary is a myth. It's not whether it actually happened that's important or not, and I think you realize that. Prime Minister Churchill certainly did need to be careful about what actions he took based on ULTRA decrypts so as to avoid revealing the activities of Bletchley Park. Coventry is the quotable example despite not actually happening the way the story is told. However if you require an example that actually happened, consider when Adm. Nimitz received message intelligence pointing out Adm. Yamamoto's flight itinerary. In his case he ended up using a literal example of parallel construction (having a coastwatcher send a report of a Japanese flight) to generate a non-codebreaking reason for his staff to know about the flight, and then sent out his fighter planes to shoot Yamamoto's flight down. > (2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it. With respect to things like DEA I would agree with you. But on the other hand if they came across a no-shit email from a hitman or something describing an upcoming murder I would expect them to report it. It may be that it's impossible to write a policy that straddles that border, in which case I'd say we should probably ban that type of information sharing and then rely on the idea that an analyst who sees that type of murder plot might still leave an anonymous tip. > The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy. Hey look at that, we fully agree!

by mpyne 13y ago

jacquesm 13y ago

(1) Churchill's Coventry quandary is a myth. See: http://theweek.com/article/index/237427/history-detective-did-churchill-sacrifice-a-city-to-protect-a-secret http://theweek.com/article/index/237427/history-detective-di... And lots of other places. (2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it. If you do you are essentially advocating for broadening the official reach of the NSA's powers rather than to rein them in because they clearly can not stick to their mandate. The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy. Anything less won't do, lest we all end telling another generation how terribly sorry we were. Power corrupts, it's never been any different historically.

mpyne 13y ago
> (1) Churchill's Coventry quandary is a myth. It's not whether it actually happened that's important or not, and I think you realize that. Prime Minister Churchill certainly did need to be careful about what actions he took based on ULTRA decrypts so as to avoid revealing the activities of Bletchley Park. Coventry is the quotable example despite not actually happening the way the story is told. However if you require an example that actually happened, consider when Adm. Nimitz received message intelligence pointing out Adm. Yamamoto's flight itinerary. In his case he ended up using a literal example of parallel construction (having a coastwatcher send a report of a Japanese flight) to generate a non-codebreaking reason for his staff to know about the flight, and then sent out his fighter planes to shoot Yamamoto's flight down. > (2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it. With respect to things like DEA I would agree with you. But on the other hand if they came across a no-shit email from a hitman or something describing an upcoming murder I would expect them to report it. It may be that it's impossible to write a policy that straddles that border, in which case I'd say we should probably ban that type of information sharing and then rely on the idea that an analyst who sees that type of murder plot might still leave an anonymous tip. > The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy. Hey look at that, we fully agree!