4 ms·
The funny thing is, you don't actually need to replace a package that's part of the base distribution. Every package format we have (RPM, DEB, etc.) runs its in
by derefr 13y ago
The funny thing is, you don't actually need to replace a package that's part of the base distribution. Every package format we have (RPM, DEB, etc.) runs its install- and upgrade-scripts as root, so every package can potentially do anything on install, including patching the installed files of other packages (or cleverer things, like adding SSL trust roots.)
So, since they don't specifically need to patch your openssl package to compromise your openssl library, they could just as well suborn the signing key of (presuming Ubuntu) some PPA author, as long as the user they're trying to bug has that PPA in their sources.list.
- nitrogen 13y agoThough I do use them, the PPA concept is kind of flawed, because there's no way of saying which packages you will accept from a particular PPA, and no way for a PPA signing key to limit the packages it covers. Packaging systems do detect file collisions, however, and with something vaguely similar to checkinstall or fakeroot they could detect attempts to overwrite other packages' files in the pre- and post-install scripts.
- gtirloni 13y agoSolaris introduced some concepts in its IPS packaging to avoid packages changing the system. IMHO, it is very good but adds some pain to developers and sysadmins alike. http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris11/technologies/ips-323421.html http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris11/t... That coupled with system wide snapshots is a great tool to audit a system after a patch is applied.