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Tor is really shitty against the NSA. Tor offers almost no protection what so ever against a globally passive adversary who can see all packets going into and

Tor is really shitty against the NSA. Tor offers almost no protection what so ever against a globally passive adversary who can see all packets going into and exiting the Tor network. You better believe the NSA can do this

dllthomas 13y ago
What about Tor hidden services?
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  Not any better from an anonymity standpoint currently I think. The hidden service's server still runs traffic from it-self to a Tor entry node , through the network, and then back out via an exit Node. So if the NSA can observe all entry and exit node traffic timings, they can figure out who is talking to the hidden service and where it is. https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
  - bcl 13y ago
    The hidden service is a tor node itself and there are no exit nodes involved. As long as there is other traffic passing through the nodes involved an observer can't tell which traffic is for a HS. Maybe :)
    - dllthomas 13y ago
      It seems like providing a tor service to forward traffic after a delay would help disrupt traffic analysis, too.
    - anologwintermut 13y ago
      I thought that was the case as well, however the documentation [0][1] I read indicated otherwise. I didn't do an exhaustive search after reading those, however, so it's possible. If so, I'm surprised. I'd expect the documentation to make it explicitly clear since their are legal and bandwidth implications to acting as a Tor node (though for non exit nodes, the legal ones are small). Regardless, even if the hidden service is a node itself, a passive observer can still do traffic correlation attacks. It just requires more resources. [0]https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en [1]https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
      - bcl 13y ago
        All the hidden service communication happens inside Tor. No exits are involved. You are correct that a HS node doesn't have to be a bridge, etc. But it is a good idea to mask the traffic.
- jlgaddis 13y ago
  I believe the biggest weakness with hidden services (besides the regular "endpoint" issues) is that they use 1024-bit RSA keys which, as of recently at least, have come under suspicion. The keylength is a "known weakness" to the developers and, while the plan is to eventually shift to longer keylengths, I don't believe there is any goal or deadline for that to happen.

dllthomas 13y ago

What about Tor hidden services?

anologwintermut 13y ago
Not any better from an anonymity standpoint currently I think. The hidden service's server still runs traffic from it-self to a Tor entry node , through the network, and then back out via an exit Node. So if the NSA can observe all entry and exit node traffic timings, they can figure out who is talking to the hidden service and where it is. https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
- bcl 13y ago
  The hidden service is a tor node itself and there are no exit nodes involved. As long as there is other traffic passing through the nodes involved an observer can't tell which traffic is for a HS. Maybe :)
  - dllthomas 13y ago
    It seems like providing a tor service to forward traffic after a delay would help disrupt traffic analysis, too.
  - anologwintermut 13y ago
    I thought that was the case as well, however the documentation [0][1] I read indicated otherwise. I didn't do an exhaustive search after reading those, however, so it's possible. If so, I'm surprised. I'd expect the documentation to make it explicitly clear since their are legal and bandwidth implications to acting as a Tor node (though for non exit nodes, the legal ones are small). Regardless, even if the hidden service is a node itself, a passive observer can still do traffic correlation attacks. It just requires more resources. [0]https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en [1]https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
    - bcl 13y ago
      All the hidden service communication happens inside Tor. No exits are involved. You are correct that a HS node doesn't have to be a bridge, etc. But it is a good idea to mask the traffic.
jlgaddis 13y ago
I believe the biggest weakness with hidden services (besides the regular "endpoint" issues) is that they use 1024-bit RSA keys which, as of recently at least, have come under suspicion. The keylength is a "known weakness" to the developers and, while the plan is to eventually shift to longer keylengths, I don't believe there is any goal or deadline for that to happen.