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Wouldn't it be relatively easy for the NSA to run ubiquitous MITM attacks using some certificates in the certificate chain that they have compromised? That way
by mhb 13y ago
Wouldn't it be relatively easy for the NSA to run ubiquitous MITM attacks using some certificates in the certificate chain that they have compromised? That way all they need to do is compromise certificates and get in the middle on a large scale (which could be done automatically perhaps) instead of breaking encryption.
- tptacek 13y agoNo, because the anti-surveillance features of browsers like Chrome would flag those MITM attacks, which would compromise sources & methods, which is anathema to NSA.
- mhb 13y agoI thought that the browser flags a MITM attack when the information that was sent from the supposed server doesn't agree with the server information received through a different channel (e.g., with the operating system). If the NSA had compromised certificates on the operating system, how would Chrome detect that a MITM attack was being attempted?
- tptacek 13y agoBecause Chrome doesn't entirely rely on the operating system to verify certificates.
- Karunamon 13y agoI wouldn't trust Chrome's extra methods in this case. Nothing against Google whatsoever, but closed source, commercial software from a company the NSA has expressed a great deal of interest in fooling around with is probably the worst possible choice in this case. Same with Safari and IE.
- tptacek 13y ago(a) the code in question is part of Chromium, which you should read, and (b) Mozilla has adopted it as well.
- Karunamon 13y agoGoogle and other corporations still represent a huge risk in that they can be compelled to degrade or modify the feature, and since all you get is a binary blob, you have no way of knowing. The security provided by the feature, in this case, is then questionable. I'd trust Firefox and Chromium, but not Chrome for this reason.