4 ms·

Can you expand a bit on chrome's anti-surveilance capabilities?

tptacek 13y ago
They pin certificates, so that a CA compromise that would enable MITM attack by the global passive adversary would be detectable (and in fact that mechanism has already been used to detect CA compromises.)
- cbr 13y ago
  Why do you say "passive adversary"? I wouldn't call an MITM with a fake cert "passive".
  - tptacek 13y ago
    I wouldn't call a MITM with a fake cert an effective global attack in 2013.
    - socceroos 13y ago
      As we've already seen, NSA and other such agencies already have direct connections into the under-sea cables that connect countries across the globe. MITM is exactly what they do ALL THE TIME. To not see it as effective is to miss the point of Total Information Awareness.
      - tptacek 13y ago
        This is parody, right?
- meowface 13y ago
  Would you say that using a browser like Chrome and using TLS 1.2 with 2048-bit RSA keys and AES, is likely to be safe for many years to come?
  - dekz 13y ago
    That question cannot be answered, sorry. Cryptographically it is sound today. But that point is entirely moot if the NSA has the CA private key, or has access to your computer. Do you think it's easier to discover attacks on AES or court order CA's? You need to trust your OS, Chrome cryptography implementation, AES and RSA, and the end point, its OS and its possible role as a mute puppet, oh and don't forget everyones hardware!.
    - tptacek 13y ago
      The point is not mooted if NSA has compromised a CA, because Chrome does more than simply trusting the CAs.
wonderzombie 13y ago
Probably these: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html
mpyne 13y ago
It was these types of capabilities that revealed Iran (IIRC) managed to break DigiCert to issue a GMail certificate a year or two ago to surveil Iranians via MITM.

They pin certificates, so that a CA compromise that would enable MITM attack by the global passive adversary would be detectable (and in fact that mechanism has already been used to detect CA compromises.)

cbr 13y ago
Why do you say "passive adversary"? I wouldn't call an MITM with a fake cert "passive".
- tptacek 13y ago
  I wouldn't call a MITM with a fake cert an effective global attack in 2013.
  - socceroos 13y ago
    As we've already seen, NSA and other such agencies already have direct connections into the under-sea cables that connect countries across the globe. MITM is exactly what they do ALL THE TIME. To not see it as effective is to miss the point of Total Information Awareness.
    - tptacek 13y ago
      This is parody, right?
meowface 13y ago
Would you say that using a browser like Chrome and using TLS 1.2 with 2048-bit RSA keys and AES, is likely to be safe for many years to come?
- dekz 13y ago
  That question cannot be answered, sorry. Cryptographically it is sound today. But that point is entirely moot if the NSA has the CA private key, or has access to your computer. Do you think it's easier to discover attacks on AES or court order CA's? You need to trust your OS, Chrome cryptography implementation, AES and RSA, and the end point, its OS and its possible role as a mute puppet, oh and don't forget everyones hardware!.
  - tptacek 13y ago
    The point is not mooted if NSA has compromised a CA, because Chrome does more than simply trusting the CAs.

wonderzombie 13y ago

Probably these: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html

mpyne 13y ago

It was these types of capabilities that revealed Iran (IIRC) managed to break DigiCert to issue a GMail certificate a year or two ago to surveil Iranians via MITM.