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> Until we developers have books that better elucidate the pitfalls of implementation, or better libraries that avoid the pitfalls on our behalf, we'll be stuck
by brl 17y ago
> Until we developers have books that better elucidate the pitfalls of implementation, or better libraries that avoid the pitfalls on our behalf, we'll be stuck "building crypto", somewhat blindly.
There are a lot of really good books about cryptography now.
This book is the best one that I've seen for coverage of the pitfalls of implementation.
http://www.amazon.com/Modern-Cryptography-Practice-Hewlett-Packard-Professional/dp/0130669431/ http://www.amazon.com/Modern-Cryptography-Practice-Hewlett-P...
> I've seen you recommend GPGME previously.
I missed the context in which tptacek was recommending GPGME, but if your problem is something other than authenticating downloaded packages or signing and encrypting email, designing with GPG as a 'primitive' is probably not such a great idea. I have seen some attempts to repurpose GPG into new applications and every time these protocols have been badly flawed because the authors don't even realize that they are inventing a brand new protocol.
- tptacek 17y agoI haven't recommended GPGME, but one of my standard recommendations is, "TLS in motion, GPG at rest". A lot of common problems devolve to "encrypted signed blob" and "encrypted mail". I agree with you that building a protocol based on GPG is a bad idea. Building a crypto protocol of any sort is a bad idea.