5 ms·
Because strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents make clear, the agency’s success depends on working with Internet companies — by gett
by untog 13y ago
Because strong encryption can be so effective, classified N.S.A. documents make clear, the agency’s success depends on working with Internet companies — by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their encryption keys or altering their software or hardware.
That's the money quote there- the NSA hasn't cracked encryption. They've just put back doors in.
And we can't even be that angry at the (e.g.) Microsoft execs that authorise the back doors- they potentially face jail time if they resist NSA requests. All the while presumably not able to talk about the requests publicly.
EDIT: and the really fun part - did you know the former head of the NSA serves on the board of directors for Motorola Solutions? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hayden_(general) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hayden_(general)
- teleclimber 13y agoThat's the quote that jumped out at me too. The solution for those who want to stay out of NSA's reach is to use your own hardware, and use open source software (where it's hard to put a backdoor without being discovered) and strong encryption.
- electic 13y agoRemember when Microsoft would trash Linux because it was open source and "not secure." Well, this settles it. Using your own hardware and open source software helps but someone determined will still get in...
- untog 13y agoEven "your own hardware" is going to be pretty damn hard: working with chipmakers to insert back doors So you're going to need to make your own chips, too.
- captainmojo 13y agohttp://opencores.org/or1k/Main_Page http://opencores.org/or1k/Main_Page
- wiml 13y agoThe following isn't directly applicable to your suggestion, but it's a reminder that an FPGA, just like a CPU, may not be doing exactly and only what you told it to do: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/sec_news.html#Backdoor http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/sec_news.html#Backdoor > Abstract. This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. [....] The backdoor was found to exist on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. [....]
- rahoulb 13y agoRMS doesn't seem such an extremist any more.
- javert 13y agoI don't agree with RMS on much, but this just goes to show that calling people "extremist" is a logical fallacy. There is only correct and incorrect, and the margin by which something deviates from a commonly accepted norm is irrelevant to judging that.
- pja 13y agoRefusing to rely on the RNG in Intel processors doesn't seem particularly unreasonable in the light of this revelation does it?
- gaius 13y agoThat's a false sense of security. You can inspect every line of code in SSL but unless you are a world-class cryptographer yourself, how will you spot a backdoor in the algorithm?
- electic 13y agoIt's a bit harder to sneak in junk in open source projects. You can see the checkins. However, you are right, if the flaw is in the algorithm itself, it's hopeless.
- jorgeortiz85 13y agoIs it harder to sneak in junk in open source projects? I'm reminded of Ken Thompson's Turing Award lecture, "Reflections on Trusting Trust". http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html Could someone add a backdoor to git that hides backdoors from showing up in git? Could gcc be backdoored to add backdoors to arbitrary software? How likely is it that NSA has a few zero-days lying around they could use to hack into the servers that host git or gcc or any other tool you rely on? What if they had agents among the committers and maintainers of these projects? Security against a well-armed, well-funded, well-organized, secretive adversary is hard.
- hyperpape 13y agoThere are countermeasures concerning the Trusting Trust attack: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_trus.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_tru..., though I'm not sure if anyone has ever seriously attempted to deploy them.
- betterunix 13y agoI have given some thought to this kind of thing, and one thing I realized is that the limits of the trusting trust attack can be exploited as well. Let's support you only have one compiler. Now, it is going to try to insert the worm into any compiler it compiles, right? The problem is that it must be able to detect that it is actually compiling a compiler. This, however, is not a decidable problem. It is possible to construct a program that will fool the worm and thus you can create a compiler that you know you can trust for this test. It will probably be a hard compiler to use, but you will need it at most twice -- once to check for an attack, and if there is an attack once more to bootstrap a clean compiler.
- justincormack 13y agoPlus (form the Guardian article) there are covert agents in all the companies, presumably lifting all the certs, which may well be unauthorised, but you can't prosecute. Do you know who your covert agents are?
- ganeumann 13y agoWhy couldn't you prosecute, if you found out? I assume theft is still theft, even if done by a government employee.
- numbsafari 13y agoProsecuting would require contacting an authority that would be willing to take the case, and would also require going public with the fact that one of your "trusted" employees had invalidated your security systems, potentially opening you up to untold amounts of liability from customers who may believe their security has been compromised. Go ahead, call the cops and media. I hope you have a ton of money on hand and some jewelry stashed away in various locations before you do so.
- chris_mahan 13y agoPerhaps they could arrest you with the old "interfering with a government agent in the performance of his duties" bit.
- jonknee 13y agoGood luck with that. You would need the government to prosecute and the government makes it illegal to talk about what you want to prosecute.
- rst 13y agoWhy couldn't who prosecute? That's a function of the government; a prosecutor is not obliged to engage in a case (formally, get an indictment out of a grand jury) whenever they believe a crime to have been committed. Undercover agents at all levels of law enforcement commit apparently criminal acts every day, with no fear of prosecution. There's no reason for this to be any different.
- philfreo 13y ago> That's the money quote there- the NSA hasn't cracked encryption. They've just put back doors in. It's not like they've just gotten secret keys. They've specifically gotten chip manufacturers to add backdoors to hardware, as well as significantly influenced actual cryptography standards themselves: > "The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.” > “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor,” the memo says.
- cldr 13y agoI don't understand that part of the article, what algorithm standard was it? AES?
- magicalist 13y agoPresumably that's DRBGs[1]? Does anyone actually use them in that form? [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
- masonhensley 13y agoI'm guessing this is what tripped up Lavabit. Mr. Levison probably didn't have the back doors and balked at being complicit once he came onto the NSA's radar. From the article: "Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read." Also: “Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on,” - Snowden I would assume that because Snowden used Lavabit & they shut down that the NSA took issue with how secure Lavabit actually was.
- Zariel 13y agoIsn't this the fact that NSA has access to the internet companies private key for the SSL certificate? There by giving them the tools to decrypt the initial TLS handshake and then from there you can get the symmetric key and decrypt the rest? Or is there more to it, reading the article I didn't see any hard proof of this.