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We always knew that correlation attacks by an adversary that controlled a sufficiently large portion of the Internet were trivial to carry out. Now that we've l
by seandhi 13y ago
We always knew that correlation attacks by an adversary that controlled a sufficiently large portion of the Internet were trivial to carry out. Now that we've learned that the NSA is capturing 75% of Internet traffic then we should assume that they are able to carry out correlation attacks fairly trivially, right?
- kylemaxwell 13y agoYes, but I have observed multiple times that many engineers, including crypto and even infosec folks, don't really understand or even think about traffic analysis as a threat vector. I want to chalk this up to a lack of thinking about systems (in the classic sense, not in the jargon for "computer" sense), but I'm not entirely sure.
- blake8086 13y agoYes, from a T/A perspective, basically everything everyone uses leaks like a sieve. A great paper about T/A: http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-traffic-analysis.pdf http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-traffic-analysis.pdf
- mike-cardwell 13y agoIf the NSA is your adversary then you have bigger problems. If the NSA isn't, then Tor is probably "good enough".
- karlmdavis 13y agoDo you have a citation for the 75% number? The last one I'd seen was 3% or 4%.
- seandhi 13y agoTo be fair, this says "reach" not "capture", but I have no idea what any of the words mean nowadays. http://m.us.wsj.com/articles/a/SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470?mg=reno64-wsj#project%3DNSA0820%26articleTabs%3Darticle http://m.us.wsj.com/articles/a/SB100014241278873241082045790...