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No. The anthropic principle/branching universes theory explains nothing, and in fact is so utterly unfalsifiable it's kind of surprising intelligent people tak
by eli_gottlieb 13y ago
No. The anthropic principle/branching universes theory explains nothing, and in fact is so utterly unfalsifiable it's kind of surprising intelligent people take it seriously.
- gjm11 13y agoI wonder exactly what "it" is here. Quantum mechanics with the "many worlds" interpretation explains lots of things: it explains all the same things as quantum mechanics with some other interpretation. But QM (many worlds) has all the same observable consequences as, say, QM (Copenhagen), so "many worlds" as opposed to Copenhagen doesn't explain anything[1]. But how does that mean that intelligent people shouldn't take the "many worlds" interpretation seriously? Consider two "interpretations" of Newtonian mechanics. One says that the world mechanically obeys Newton's laws. Another says that the world is controlled by incorporeal angels who are very fond of Newton's laws and always freely choose to push the universe around in such a way that those laws are obeyed. These two interpretations have the same observable consequences (namely, a universe in which Newton's laws always hold), but that doesn't make it surprising if intelligent people take the "mechanical" version of it seriously. Nor, actually, does it make it surprising if intelligent people take the "angels" version seriously. What (at least for me) makes that option hard to take seriously is its gratuitous complexity: it has the same observable consequences as the "mechanical" system but, at least in my view, is vastly more complicated -- if you wanted to describe such a universe completely you'd need to do all the same work as for the "mechanical" version and then go on to set down everything about the angels' nature, personalities, etc. In much the same way, you might choose to prefer "many worlds" or Copenhagen or some other specific interpretation of QM on the grounds of simplicity. "Many worlds is simplest because it avoids notions of 'measurement' and 'collapse' that do no real work, and just says that everything obeys Schroedinger's equation all the time." Or: "Many worlds is horribly complex because it involves all those extra worlds we never observe." So if you mean: "The many-worlds interpretation of QM explains nothing more than any other interpretation of QM does, and therefore it's surprising that intelligent people take the many-worlds interpretation seriously", I think that's wrong. But perhaps what you're surprised that people take seriously is some other thing like, e.g., some particular application of the anthropic principle that appeals to "many worlds"? [1] Actually, that's maybe slightly debatable; it depends on fine details of what you understand by "explain". For instance: any theorem in pure mathematics is logically necessary[2] and therefore has no observable consequences that you couldn't derive without it -- but it still seems reasonable to say, e.g., that a proof that even-length palindromes have to be multiples of 11 "explains" why I've never seen a palindromic prime number with 4, 6, 8, ... digits. So the fact that QM (many worlds) has no extra observable consequences beyond "uninterpreted" QM might not be enough to guarantee that it doesn't explain anything. [2] Given whatever axioms you start with.
- furyofantares 13y agoYou seem to be suggesting that you have to pick some interpretation. Am I misreading? Why do you have to take any interpretation seriously if it does not imply any observable consequences?
- chrislipa 13y agoWhile there are Occam's razor and complexity arguments concerning the relative merits of the Many Worlds Interpretation and the Copenhagen Interpretation, I think this is at best a weak argument. Because, who knows? We could actually be living in a world with very complicated physics. However, there's a different flaw that I believe completely torpedoes the Copenhagen Interpretation: the Copenhagen Interpretation is not a fully specified theory because it never actually gets around to defining when a measurement is performed. What algorithm can an experimenter run to tell when a measurement takes place? There is none. When a system is considered to be "measured" is always determined with the help of human judgement ex post facto, and alway in such a way as to fit the experimental outcome. If proponents of the Copenhagen Interpretation ever proffered such algorithm to determine when a measurement takes place, then at least we'd have something testable, even if the test were outlandish. But as it is now, the lack of such concrete specification makes the Copenhagen Interpretation unfalsifiable with respect to the Many Worlds interpretation. Besides that, there are a couple other weaker reasons to be very suspicious of the Copenhagen Interpretation. It doesn't seem to address in any way the fact that experimenters and detectors are a part of physics themselves. If you believe that consciousness arises from physical processes happening inside of the universe, it's very hard to imagine how the Copenhagen Interpretation would compute and explain (even in theory) the physics of what's happening inside of the brain. [1] And if waveform collapse actually occurred, it would be the only known law of physics that's non-local, inherently random, has a preferred reference frame (breaking relativity), destroys information, and violates CPT symmetry. This rule is not like the other rules. [1] - There actually is a serious school of thought that conscious beings brings the universe into existence, rather than the other way around. I don't know of any experimental evidence for or against this theory, but I'm personally not a big fan of it because the Kolmogorov complexity required to fully specify the theory is fantastically large, because it would need to fully specify how consciousness operates. Without a corresponding amount of evidence in its favor, there's no reason to elevate this hypothesis among all the others with the same or less complexity.
- btilly 13y agoNo. The anthropic principle/branching universes theory explains nothing, and in fact is so utterly unfalsifiable it's kind of surprising intelligent people take it seriously. If you assume that the observer is described by quantum mechanics, then the Everett Interpretation is logically required to be true. If you want to argue for anything else, then you need to explain why you, the observer, are not described by our best scientific theory. That's a pretty good reason to take the theory seriously.
- lutusp 13y ago> If you assume that the observer is described by quantum mechanics, then the Everett Interpretation is logically required to be true. If you want to argue for anything else, then you need to explain why you, the observer, are not described by our best scientific theory. That's a pretty good reason to take the theory seriously. Arthur Conan Doyle notwithstanding, in science the truth is not arrived at by eliminating the alternatives. Science requires positive evidence -- absence of contrary evidence doesn't support a given outlook. Were this not true, Bigfoot and the Loch Ness monster would win acceptance through lack of contrary evidence. > ... the Everett Interpretation is logically required to be true. In science, nothing ever becomes true, but some things become false. Philosopher David Hume summarized this outlook by saying, "No amount of observations of white swans can allow the inference that all swans are white, but the observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute that conclusion." On that basis, and assuming we're still discussing physics, nothing is "logically required to be true." That's not science, it's philosophy.
- btilly 13y ago> If you assume that the observer is described by quantum mechanics, then the Everett Interpretation is logically required to be true. If you want to argue for anything else, then you need to explain why you, the observer, are not described by our best scientific theory. That's a pretty good reason to take the theory seriously. Arthur Conan Doyle notwithstanding, in science the truth is not arrived at by eliminating the alternatives. Science requires positive evidence -- absence of contrary evidence doesn't support a given outlook. Were this not true, Bigfoot and the Loch Ness monster would win acceptance through lack of contrary evidence. How much science do you actually know? Because this sounds like philosophical twaddle that sounds good but makes no sense. If you seek positive proof of everything, then you can never generalize from experience at all. Every day is logically a new day, every object a new object and you have to rethink all of your assumptions at every step. Science does not do this. Instead it tries to produce precise and general theories, tries to test them to destruction, and as they fail to be destroyed, assume them more and more broadly (while testing what we can in every detail that we can). > ... the Everett Interpretation is logically required to be true. In science, nothing ever becomes true, but some things become false. Philosopher David Hume summarized this outlook by saying, "No amount of observations of white swans can allow the inference that all swans are white, but the observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute that conclusion." Sorry, but you fail at basic logic. It is absolutely valid in science to ask, "What is the consequence if this theory applied to that system." The consequence in quantum mechanics of a simple quantum mechanical experiment interacting with a complex quantum mechanical system is that the complex quantum mechanical system should be thrown into a superposition of quantum mechanical states that cannot meaningfully interact thanks to well-understood thermodynamic principles. Whether this is an accurate description of the world is another question. However we've had several hundred years of spectacular success from assuming that the world is described by our best scientific theories, and then testing them as best we can - even though it means accepting things we cannot test at the moment. If we extend that principle to the present moment, we're forced to the Everett Interpretation. And if that turns out to be incorrect in some fundamental level, it is a basic fact that, to the extent that quantum mechanics does describe that system, the Everett Interpretation is true for it. On that basis, and assuming we're still discussing physics, nothing is "logically required to be true." That's not science, it's philosophy. You just failed at basic logic. I made a statement of the form, "If A, then B." This is a statement of math, not science, and as such can be true or false. (It is, in fact, true.) The question of physics is whether the statement that quantum mechanics applies to both observer and observed is true. Nobody knows the answer to that. However the path that science has taken for centuries says that we should make that assumption as long as quantum mechanics remains our best theory, and we come up with no evidence against it applying to observers, and then find every way that we can to test it.
- DavidPlumpton 13y agoThis is not the anthropic part, but still. http://lesswrong.com/lw/q4/decoherence_is_falsifiable_and_testable/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/q4/decoherence_is_falsifiable_and_te...
- chrislipa 13y agoBranching universes need not be falsifiable to be taken seriously, because that's not the theory. Rather it's a consequence of a theory (evolution of Schrödinger's equation sans collapse) and that theory is very falsifiable. In order for a theory to be falsifiable, you don't need all aspects of the theory to be falsifiable, just one. And branching universes is a prediction of a theory that has experimental support. Let me take a non-quantum example to make the argument in a more intuitive setting. If we send out a spaceship at a high speed away from Earth, due to the ongoing expansion of the universe eventually the spaceship will be far enough away that the space between Earth and the spaceship will be expanding faster than the the speed of light, and hence the future light cones of the Earth and the spaceship will not intersect. There's no experiment we can do on Earth that could give us information about the spaceship once the spaceship hits this point of no return, but we still take seriously the proposition that the spaceship is still "real" and doing well because we have a broader theory (i.e. all of physics) that predicts it, even if we can't test this specific prediction. (I view these two scenarios as being superficially dissimilar, but under the surface fairly similar. In each there is some element of "realness" that is predicted by theory but inaccessible to measurement. Only one is intuitive and the other is not.)
- eli_gottlieb 13y agoPutting aside a recent claim that the universe's expansion isn't really accelerating - and instead someone forgot to plug spacetime dilation into the cosmological equations - we're still left with the issue that once the space probe leaves our light-cone we can't know that it wasn't hit by an asteroid.
- chrislipa 13y agoThat's of course not the point of the thought experiment. Just the mass-energy and "realness" of the spaceship after it leaves causal contact with Earth is enough. Consider the statement: "Once any object gets far enough away from me that our future light cones do not intersect, it ceases to exist." And compare with the statement: "Once any configuration gets so far away from my configuration in configuration space that I can't experimentally detect it, it ceases to exist via waveform collapse." The Copenhagen Interpretation is claiming something akin to the second statement, but that seems to me to be logically isomorphic to the first statement, of which our intuitions are much better at grasping the problems.
- mikegagnon 13y agoJust because a theory is unfalsifiable does not mean that it's not true. It just means that science and logic are insufficient to refute or confirm the theory. Where science and logic are not capable of shining a light on reality, we can only rely on non-logical and non-scientific beliefs and philosophy. For example, scientists tend to hold the belief that the laws of the physical universe are constant. But in fact, there is no __logical__ reason to believe that. It is merely an inductive belief that could be violated tomorrow. The theory of constance transcends scientific experimentation and logical proof; it is simply held as an axiom (which could plausibly be wrong). Beyond logic and science, the multiverse theory is just as plausible as the universe theory. Your intuition tells you that simplicity implies a universe, where others see that simplicity implies a multiverse, where still others find no reason to believe that reality is rooted in simplicity at all.