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The way this is usually handled is anonymous credentials. You force someone to identify themselves uniquely (full name, passport, SSN, DNA, photo, etc). You the

The way this is usually handled is anonymous credentials. You force someone to identify themselves uniquely (full name, passport, SSN, DNA, photo, etc). You then issue them a credential that is anonymous (i.e. when shown, you can't link it with when it was issued or previously shown). Furthermore, you set up these credentials so that if they are used too many times (i.e. cloned) then the identity is revealed. You then require them to show the untraceable credential each time they submit a message.

sillysaurus2 13y ago
So the way this maintains anonymity is by not trying? What you've described is a central authority architecture which is in charge of issuing the credentials. But we already have CA authorities that issue SSL certs. They're brittle to government influence, because it's impossible to know whether the government has acquired the secret keys. In your case it'd be impossible to know whether the hypothetical CA has stored your secret credential / whether they've told anyone your real identity. Even if this model were to work, it wouldn't protect users from themselves. Here's a fascinating read about the problems of staying anonymous even in an environment with perfect anonymity guarantees: https://whonix.org/wiki/DoNot https://whonix.org/wiki/DoNot For example, no anonymity network can protect against stylometry, so that's always a concern. I was also shocked to realize that something as simple as automated time synchronization will reveal your general location when using Tor, because your machine requests a time update for your specific timezone. You have to set your clock to UTC to avoid that. There are about two dozen other vectors by which you can accidentally reveal your true identity even when using a rock-solid protocol. Anyone who's interested in this should read the entirety of the Whonix wiki. In addition to being comprehensive, it's also a lot of fun to read. (Most of my comment was meandering and not really related to yours. It's just interesting how difficult perfect anonymity is. It's probably true to say that getting the tech implemented correctly is only a small fraction of the total amount of work required to be truly anonymous.)
- anologwintermut 13y ago
  I should clarify. The credentials are anonymous even given a malicious CA. This is a cryptographic guarantee assuming the Strong RSA assumption holds. The only thing the CA can do is produce a list of people they issued credentials too.
drewcrawford 13y ago
So the problem I see with that solution is twofold: * If there is a central authority collecting the information, then as far as Jeff the User knows, his information could be stored in plain text on a subpoenable hard disk by the central authority. * If the information is verified by a set of moderators, then the moderators must be numerous enough that no single moderator could capture a substantial portion of the identity data. But to achieve that, the mod requirements would be low enough that an attacker could infiltrate their ranks and uncover the identities of users.
cabalamat 13y ago
And then the next day the NSA forces the credential authority to give up all their information. This is not a solution.

sillysaurus2 13y ago

So the way this maintains anonymity is by not trying? What you've described is a central authority architecture which is in charge of issuing the credentials. But we already have CA authorities that issue SSL certs. They're brittle to government influence, because it's impossible to know whether the government has acquired the secret keys. In your case it'd be impossible to know whether the hypothetical CA has stored your secret credential / whether they've told anyone your real identity. Even if this model were to work, it wouldn't protect users from themselves. Here's a fascinating read about the problems of staying anonymous even in an environment with perfect anonymity guarantees: https://whonix.org/wiki/DoNot https://whonix.org/wiki/DoNot For example, no anonymity network can protect against stylometry, so that's always a concern. I was also shocked to realize that something as simple as automated time synchronization will reveal your general location when using Tor, because your machine requests a time update for your specific timezone. You have to set your clock to UTC to avoid that. There are about two dozen other vectors by which you can accidentally reveal your true identity even when using a rock-solid protocol. Anyone who's interested in this should read the entirety of the Whonix wiki. In addition to being comprehensive, it's also a lot of fun to read. (Most of my comment was meandering and not really related to yours. It's just interesting how difficult perfect anonymity is. It's probably true to say that getting the tech implemented correctly is only a small fraction of the total amount of work required to be truly anonymous.)

anologwintermut 13y ago
I should clarify. The credentials are anonymous even given a malicious CA. This is a cryptographic guarantee assuming the Strong RSA assumption holds. The only thing the CA can do is produce a list of people they issued credentials too.

drewcrawford 13y ago

So the problem I see with that solution is twofold: * If there is a central authority collecting the information, then as far as Jeff the User knows, his information could be stored in plain text on a subpoenable hard disk by the central authority. * If the information is verified by a set of moderators, then the moderators must be numerous enough that no single moderator could capture a substantial portion of the identity data. But to achieve that, the mod requirements would be low enough that an attacker could infiltrate their ranks and uncover the identities of users.

cabalamat 13y ago

And then the next day the NSA forces the credential authority to give up all their information. This is not a solution.